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PREFACE
Being my dissertation this used to be my life’s work. Kluwer now 
turns it into a book; my first book, but still just one book among the 
millions. The shift of perspective is thrilling. They used to fill my 
room, these pages, but now they spread the world in an almost infinite 
dilution. It makes me think of this book from the outside, and it makes 
me aware of the fact that any reader will need good reasons to look for 
this particular book. These reasons should concern the way in which 
the book is related to what is going on right now in philosophy (what­
ever that is supposed to mean). It is in order to provide some of these 
reasons that I wrote this preface.1
There are often objects involved in our activities. We need food in 
order to eat, a ball in order to play football, a tune to make music, 
someone to make love to, and so we need objects as well in order to 
think o f or about them. These objects are involved in many different 
ways, but in each case it makes sense to ask what we do with these 
objects if they are involved in our activities. Most of the time the 
answer is easy -  we swallow the things we eat, we kick the ball with 
our feet in playing football, we realize the tune in making music, and in
1 Unlike the preface to the original dissertation this one is not going to be filled with the 
names of people I wish to express my gratitude to. Nevertheless I have to mention the 
names of two people right here, because I owe it to their continued interest in my work 
that this book turned out to be about Salomon Maimon’s relevance to contemporary 
philosophy, and about the Antinomy of Thought -  expressing the idea that it is because 
of our finitude that our understanding of thinking consists in understanding why the 
structure of our articulations of the relation between thoughts and objects has an aporetic 
character. These people are dr. Wayne Hudson and prof. dr. Cornells van Peursen.
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our recently liberated culture it is assumed that we can do all kinds of 
things with our beloved in order to make love.
With respect to thinking, however, the answer is not that easy. It 
isn’t very clear what we do with an object in thinking of it. And the aim 
of this book is to explain why this isn’t very clear. As a consequence 
the book does not contain any attempt to provide an answer -  although 
some answers will be discussed, they are not the real subject-matter of 
this study. All attention is directed at the problem as such and it will be 
argued that it isn’t possible at all to give a comprehensive account of 
thinking conceived of as an activity which involves objects.
Given such a general subject-matter and such a general aim, the rea­
der might be surprised about the apparently extremely narrow and spe­
cific strategy the book follows. For it is indeed true that the book is 
filled with arguments that focus upon the work of just a small number 
of philosophers, and it is indeed not self-evident how such an explicit 
attention to such particular views might help to make such a general 
point. This generality is however a function of the exemplariness of the 
views discussed, and this has everything to do with the dominance of a 
Kantian-flavored conception of thinking in our recent philosophical 
past. Let me explain this.
Assuming that thinking is in one way or another a matter of forming 
judgements, or more carefully, assuming that episodes of thinking find 
in one way or another their proper expression in judgements, it seems 
appropriate to hold that what we do with objects in thinking of them is 
that we determine them. That is, in forming a judgement about some­
thing (assuming the traditional view that judgements typically display a 
subject-predicate structure), we determine the way in which the thing is 
what it is, i.e. we assign a predicate to a subject. We think, for example, 
that the colour of the chair I am sitting on is anthracite, and what we do 
with the object involved in our thinking (the colour of my chair) is that 
we determine it (it is anthracite).
As the designation of an activity, however, the verb ‘to determine’ is 
ambiguous in a crucial way. On the one hand it can mean that in deter­
mining the colour of this chair as being anthracite we lay bare what 
colour this chair is supposed to have independently of our judgements 
about it. Our thinking is as it were a matter of discovering the nature of
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the reality we happen to find ourselves confronted with. But on the 
other hand ‘determining’ can mean that we lay down what colour this 
chair is supposed to have in terms of what colour-judgements we can 
make about it. Our thinking is as it were a matter of deciding on the 
way in which to conceive of the reality we deal with.
Concerning the relation between our thoughts and the objects they 
are about, this ambiguity of ‘determining’ implies an enormous differ­
ence in the direction of dependency -  a difference Kant wrote about in 
the introduction to the second edition of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft2. 
Either our thoughts are dependent upon the objects they are about in 
such a way that our judgements should adjust themselves to the nature 
of the objects we happen to find, or the objects that make up our world 
are dependent upon our thoughts in such a way that their characteristics 
should adjust themselves to the categories we use in our judgements. 
Kant’s famous Copernican revolution might in this sense be under­
stood as an attempt to reinterpret the meaning of ‘determining’ as the 
kind of thing we do with objects in thinking of them. Instead of taking 
‘determining’ to mean ‘discovering’ or ‘laying bare’ and running into 
the problems of a rationalist or empiricist metaphysics, Kant might be 
said to have argued that we better take ‘determining’ to mean ‘deciding 
on’ or ‘laying down’ and transform the problem of experience in such 
a way that it can be solved by means of a transcendental philosophy.
The general assumption behind the strategy I follow in this book is 
that much recent philosophy is Kantian in the sense that it is often taken 
for granted that there is an enormous and self-evident difference be­
tween an interpretation of thinking (i.e. ‘determining reality’) in terms 
of finding a meaningful world and an interpretation in terms of making 
the world meaningful. And the general aim of this book is to show that 
any account of thinking will turn out to have an intrinsically aporetic 
character because of the need and the impossibility to do justice to both 
interpretations -  because, to put it this way, of the ambiguity of the 
verb ‘to determine’ itself.
Given the assumption of this Kantian character of much recent phi­
losophy, the strategy followed in this book is quite straightforward. In
2 KdrV, B xvi-xvm.
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the first part I argue that the Kantian assumption that there is an enor­
mous and self-evident difference between making and finding generates 
difficulties for a number of leading American philosophers. Paying at­
tention to the views of Rosenberg, Rorty and Nagel in this first part is a 
move which can partly be explained from a sociological point of view. 
I join a tradition with which I am acquianted; a tradition which spreads 
its influence and tends to take on global dimensions; a tradition how­
ever in which the voice of skepticism so far did not show up well. 
Therefore I present in the second part of this book an interpretation and 
defence of Salomon Maimon’s skepticism, which is at once both a 
critique of the Kantian assumption and an analysis of the intrinsically 
aporetic character of our accounts of thinking in terms of the Antinomy 
of Thought.
Although it is a consequence of my strategy that the book seems to 
be about the views of a number of philosophers, it is really about a 
number of ideas which are not intrinsically related to the philosophers 
who have put them forward. This does not mean that I don’t want to be 
loyal to them, sincere or grateful, but it only means that I don’t want to 
defend claims about their views. These are not my subject-matter. And 
perhaps the best way to indicate what I mean is to focus on the way in 
which I turn the philosopher Kant in this book into a mere onlooker, 
even though a number of Kantian ideas play the leading part. After all, 
what I just called a Kantian assumption was probably not as such 
defended by Kant. One does not ordinarily defend one’s assumptions. 
And it is a difficult question whether Kant introduced anything like this 
assumption. Even more difficult and already very complex is the ques­
tion whether this assumption was part of Kant’s philosophical legacy. 
For what exactly is left by a philosopher? All this, however, does not 
imply that the idea that there is an enormous and self-evident difference 
between interpretations of thinking in terms of finding and making does 
not exist. Nor does it imply that this idea was never assumed at all by 
Kant, nor that it never occurred to those who read or heard about 
Kant’s writings, nor even that no-one has ever implicitly or explicitly 
ascribed it to Kant.
But whether or not the idea was held by or ascribed to Kant and/or 
his followers, does not improve or weaken the correctness of the idea.
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An idea is not changed, defended or put into doubt by being the idea of 
someone. All that matters to an idea is what it is held to be. And it is 
only there where the philosophers come in. Not because they have 
good or bad ideas, but because they produce good or bad articulations 
of ideas. And it is there where Salomon Maimon comes in, for, as far 
as the ambitions of this book are concerned, I am convinced that I have 
succeeded at least in showing the originality, the strength and the im­
portance for contemporary philosophy of the arguments Maimon deve­
loped with respect to the Kantian problematic. Notwithstanding Mai­
mon’s inaccessible style of writing I think this ambition was easiest to 
fulfill, because his arguments just happen to be original, strong and 
important.3
The fundamental idea put forward by Salomon Maimon is the idea 
of the Antinomy o f Thought. It is, together with his so-called Principle 
o f Determinability, at the core of his skeptical philosophy. Chapters 
Four and Five are devoted to it -  it would be futile to attempt to say 
anything more about it here. But I will say something more about Mai- 
mon’s kind of skepticism, and about the need to defend it right now at 
the close of the twentieth century.
There are three related reasons why Maimonian skepticism is more 
than just another version of the uninteresting kind of self-refuting skep­
ticism modem philosophy is tired of taking seriously. First, it is not a 
collection of arguments designed to put whatever kind of positive 
knowledge-claim into doubt. It is directed against only one dogmatic 
claim: the claim that thought and reality are commensurable. This 
does not mean that one has to defend the incommensurability of 
thought and reality in order to be able to defend Maimonian skepticism. 
No, Maimonian skepticism is the attempt to preserve the modesty that 
we just don’t know whether thought and reality are commensurable or
3 Studying the writings of Salomon Maimon is a good way of discovering the obvious as 
well as problematical distinction between the linguistic, ‘textual’ formulation of an idea 
and its mental, intelligible articulation (or should I say articulatability). Page after page 
one realizes that although Maimon gets almost all words wrong, he gets the ideas right. 
This is a troubling experience for an analytically minded philosopher who tends to agree 
with John Searle’s simple maxim that if you can’t say it clearly you don’t understand it 
yourself. The excuse that Maimon had to learn himself the German language (see below, 
pp. 56-57) does of course not remove all amazement.
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not. It argues that any account of the relation between thoughts and 
objects will lead to the Antinomy o f Thought. This means that any 
account of the relation between thoughts and objects will have an intrin­
sically aporetic character without it being possible for us to know whe­
ther the aporetic involved is a matter of the relation between thoughts 
and objects itself or just a contradiction in or o f the account, because it 
is not possible for us to distinguish between the account and that what 
the account is supposed to be about. As such a Maimonian position is 
typically a skeptical position, sustaining doubt. But it is not just a nega­
tive position: it aims to increase our understanding ourselves.
That is the second reason why Maimonian skepticism is different. It 
argues that we should resist the temptation to solve the problem in­
volved in our accounts of thinking. All we should do is to understand 
why our attempts to account for the relation between thoughts and 
objects lead to the Antinomy of Thought. And if we do understand that 
we still don’t understand something of thinking itself but only of our 
accounts o f thinking, namely, why they take the form of a problem. 
That is the most important feature of Maimonian skepticism, that it 
provides arguments for the apparently counterintuitive conclusion that 
it is possible to understand something by understanding why it is and 
will remain a problem. Or, in other words, Maimonian skepticism is 
the position which argues that it is possible for an adequate account of 
our human condition to take the form of a problem. Understanding the 
finitude of our minds does not, according to such a position, mean to 
have a theory which explains the possibility and the actuality of our 
minds being finite, but does mean to be able to account for the problem 
of experience we are confronted with.
This gives us our third reason why Maimonian skepticism is an in­
teresting and important kind of skepticism: it gives us arguments to 
believe that sometimes we can increase our understanding more by 
appreciating a problem for what it is (namely, a problem) than by at­
tempting to develop a theory in order to eliminate the problem. This is, 
of course, a strange reason, given the philosophical tradition of our 
theoretically oriented culture. But it is all the more the reason why I 
think it is important to defend such a Maimonian kind of skepticism at 
this moment.
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This reason relates to topics not dealt with in the main parts of this 
book; topics hinted at in the Postscript which is about a change of atti­
tude called irony, and which might be of concern to the contemporary 
debate on the self-image of philosophy. I must confess, however, that I 
wasn’t able to make much of this theme -  apart from the suggestion 
that the arguments developed in the main parts of the book and re­
flected upon in the Postscript do strongly favour the impression that 
philosophy is in an important sense concerned with the conservation of 
problems as problems rather than with their dissolution in theories. Of 
course, a mere suggestion is not much, but perhaps it is better not to 
discuss such large issues as the self-image of philosophy in the post­
modern era. Perhaps the only sensible thing to do right now is to show 
what philosophical arguments would be like if one succeeds in com­
bining skepticism with optimism. That is what I hope to have done in 
this book.
Utrecht 
July 1991
Jan Bransen
.
INTRODUCTION
This study is about the currently much neglected aporetic character 
of our accounts of the relation between thoughts and objects, which 
stems, as I will argue, from the need to do justice to two different ways 
in which judgements might be thought to be informative about the ob­
jects they apply to. On the one hand we have to take into account that 
judgements might be said to specify a location within a conceptual 
framework, a location that is occupied by the objects the judgements 
are about. This means that judgements might be informative about the 
objects they apply to only because they define the relations between the 
concepts that make up the conceptual framework within which our 
thinking of reality takes place. On the other hand however, we have to 
take into account that judgements might be said to specify the proper­
ties of objects in such a way that the judgements are informative about 
those objects because they reveal real features of them. Thus, in 
judging that the chair I sit on is a typical twentieth century wheeled 
office chair with all kinds of moving parts, and that its colour is 
anthracite, I on the one hand seem to specify a number of conceptual 
distinctions that function within my conceptual framework in such a 
way that it allows me to classify an object, and on the other hand I 
seem to specify some of the real properties of a particular object upon 
which I happen to sit at this very moment. For matters of convenience
I propose the following slogans as labels for these different ways in 
which judgements might be thought to be informative about the objects 
they apply to:
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1. By means of judgements we make the world meaningful.
2. By means of judgements we find a meaningful world.1
My claim in this study is two-fold. I will argue (a) that it is impos­
sible for us to understand the act of judging in terms of only one of the 
distinct ways in which judgements can be informative; and (b) that it is 
impossible for us to understand how these distinct ways could be 
combined in one account of the relation between thoughts and objects. 
Hence the intrinsically aporetic character of any account of thinking.
Standing in the tradition which seeks to combine European trans­
cendental philosophy with Anglo-American analytical philosophy, I 
shall develop my argument in two steps. In Part One I criticise a num­
ber of leading American philosophers, arguing that even though their 
views differ in important ways, they all run into difficulties because of 
their common underestimation of the tension between the functions of 
making and finding in their accounts of thinking. The point of this part 
is to show (1) the importance of a distinction between making and 
finding as elements of an account of thinking, and (2) the aporetic char­
acter of accounts of thinking that try to do justice to both elements. In 
Part Two I present a detailed reconstruction of the Antinomy of 
Thought, which is a central theme in the philosophy of Salomon 
Maimon (1752-1800)2, a neglected early critic of Kant. The point of 
this reconstruction consists in the fact that Maimon provides the mate­
rial for a powerful argument in favour of the claim that the tension 
between making and finding reflects the intrinsically aporetic character 
of the structure of our articulations of the relation between thoughts and 
objects. This argument leads to the conclusion that an account of 
thinking should not be an attempt to solve the tension between making
1 The difference in word order is not accidental. The position of ‘meaningful’ with respect 
to ‘world’ differs in order to stress that in the first case it becomes an attribute of the 
world whereas it already is an attribute of the world in the second case. The use of different 
articles is needed because the indefinite article would be too indefinite in the first case (as 
if we are involved with just a world among many others), whereas the definite article 
would be too definite in the second case (as if it is already known that there is this one 
meaningful world).
2 The exact year of Maimon’s birth is unknown. It is generally assumed to be 1754 or 
1753, but Samuel Atlas argues that it has to be as early as 1752 (or possibly even 1751). 
See Samuel Atlas, From Critical to Speculative Idealism (The Hague, 1964), p. 3.
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and finding, but, more modestly, an attempt to understand it. To put it 
differently, understanding the relation between thoughts and objects 
means to understand why any account of it will have an aporetic charac­
ter, i.e. why understanding the relation between thoughts and objects 
will remain a problem.
In the Postscript I make a few remarks on the relevance of irony3 in 
order to estimate my apparently paradoxical conclusion.
3 In a sense reminiscent of the romantic irony as developed by Friedrich Schlegel (1772- 
1829).
<
PART ONE
FINDING AND MAKING
ACCOUNTS OF THOUGHT 
IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN 
PHILOSOPHY
“Perhaps it is only with respect to 
philosophical issues that m aking  
them and finding  them mean the 
same.”
Jan Bransen, 
The Antinomy of 
Thought, 
(Dordrecht, 1991), p. 5.
INTRODUCTION
This part consists of three short chapters on the work of Jay F. 
Rosenberg, Richard Rorty and Thomas Nagel. The point of these 
chapters is two-fold. On the one hand they will function as an exten­
sion of the introduction, since I hope to explain more fully what I mean 
by the aporetic character of our accounts of the relation between 
thoughts and objects, by means of a critique of the work of these Ame­
rican philosophers. On the other hand these chapters have an important 
function in the argument of this study as a whole as well. For I will 
argue that it is just because of Rosenberg’s, Rorty’s and Nagel’s ten­
dency to underestimate the importance of the tension between the func­
tions of finding and making in their accounts of thinking, that the 
structure of these accounts reveals its aporetic character.
The arguments I will use in the following chapters are designed to 
meet the specific claims of the philosophers I discuss. Their point 
however, is not that particular. I chose to criticize the views of these 
American philosophers because of their paradigmatic bearing. Thus, I 
am interested in Rosenberg because he argues for one of the logically 
available options — i.e. the view that thinking conceived of as finding a 
meaningful world will turn out to be analytically equivalent to thinking 
conceived of as making the world meaningful, at least if we understand 
this latter one as governed by scientific procedures. Likewise, I am 
interested in Rorty because he argues for another radical option — i.e. 
the view that accounts of thinking in terms of finding have nothing to 
do with accounts of thinking in terms of making. The failure of modem 
philosophy shows the vacuity of the former conception, and Rorty’s 
plea for a post-Philosophical culture is meant to convince us of the fact 
that a conception of thinking in terms of making the world meaningful 
is powerful enough to sustain all our ideas about the relation between
thoughts and objects. Finally, Nagel’s work is of great importance too, 
because he is one of the few contemporary philosophers who is aware 
of the aporetic character of accounts of thinking, even though he un­
warrantably assumes that it is not a matter of our accounts of thinking, 
but of the problematic nature of the relation between thoughts and 
objects itself.
CHAPTER ONE
ROSENBERG: 
SCIENCE AS THE MAKING OF FINDING
In One World and Our Knowledge o f It1 Rosenberg develops a 
version of scientific realism that might be summed up by the following 
three theses:
1. We must understand our experiences necessarily as expe­
riences of a world of things, existing independent of us 
and having spatio-temporal relations with one another and 
with us.
2. The only way our representations of this world can be cor­
rect or incorrect is by thinking them consilient with or in 
conflict with the representations of others, thus giving rise 
to the idea of a communal conceptual scheme.
3. We must comprehend changes in and of our conceptual 
scheme as converging towards an absolutely correct con­
ceptual scheme.2
1 Jay F. Rosenberg, One World and Our Knowledge o f It (Dordrecht, 1980)
2 The structure of One World and Our Knowledge of It is much more complicated, but see 
Rosenberg’s The Thinking Self, pp. 8-9, in which Rosenberg gives a short tripartite out­
line of his former study exactly along these lines.
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Rethinking the arguments of Kant and Strawson (as regards the first 
thesis), Wittgenstein (the second thesis) and Peirce (the third), 
Rosenberg develops an account of thinking as “the building up through 
time of a comprehensive, coherent, unitary, and determinate world- 
picture”.3 This account rests upon an argument to the effect that finding 
a meaningful world comes down to making the world meaningful. The 
origin of this argument lies, according to Rosenberg, in Kant’s ‘Coper- 
nican revolution’. The best way to present it is to take a very precise 
look at the following sequences of bi-conditionals:
I (1) A representation is justified if and only if it is
correct.
(2) A representation is correct if and only if it is a- 
dequate to the world.
II (3) A representation is adequate to the world if and
only if it is correct.
(4) A representation is correct if and only if it is 
justified.4
The first sequence of bi-conditionals can function in an argument to 
the effect that some of our representations are justified because they are 
adequate to the world. Such an argument needs of course one more 
premiss, namely that a given representation is adequate to the world. 
This extra premiss however, is never forthcoming, as Rosenberg 
points out, using both Sellars’ attack on the “Myth of the Given” and 
Wittgenstein’s “Private Language Argument” in his refutation of a hy­
pothetical “Criteriological Realist”.5 This refutation does not, according 
to Rosenberg, entail a refutation of the bi-conditionals under con­
sideration. Therefore it remains possible, precisely indeed because they 
are ^/-conditionals, to reverse their order and use the second sequence 
in another argument. According to Rosenberg, this is what is at stake in
3 One World and Our Knowledge of It, p. 127.
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Kant’s ‘Copemican revolution’. Thus, together with the “Criteriologi- 
cal Realist” and also with the “Transcendental Idealist”, Rosenberg ac­
cepts identity-relations holding between (1) a justified representation, 
(2) a correct representation, and (3) a representation that is adequate to 
the world. He accepts these identities because he needs the second se­
quence of bi-conditionals to secure his position as a “Constitutive Rea­
list”. The claim of such a realist is that we can determine the adequacy 
to the world of our representations, because we can use the second se­
quence of bi-conditionals in an argument together with an extra pre­
miss which states that certain representations are indeed justified. Ro­
senberg’s notion of justification here is a communal one: because we 
can engage in a communal practice of justifying representations, we 
can obtain justified representations, hence correct ones (because of bi­
conditional 4), hence representations that are adequate to the world 
(because of bi-conditional 3).6
Although it would be tempting to suggest that there is at most an 
identity of reference, but a difference of sense between (1) justified re­
presentations, (2) correct representations, and (3) representations that 
are adequate to the world, this is not what Rosenberg is asserting. He 
stresses that there is no real sense in which these different descriptions 
are different and claims that the bi-conditionals under consideration are 
analytically true:
It is surely a necessary truth that an object is represented correctly if  and only if 
it is (in itself) as it is represented as being (...) What and how things are (in 
themselves) is (analytically) what and how they are correctly represented as 
being.7
Questions of existence (of what are ontological reals) just are questions of cor­
rectness.8
...the only way in which we could make sense of the notion of (absolute) cor­
rectness (...) is in terms of a diachronic convergence of representational sys­
tems in the limit which emerges from an invariant pattern of retrospective justi­
6 ibid. pp. 158ff. It is precisely at this point of his argument that Rosenberg, most 
clearly, emphasizes his unwillingness to accept Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. 
Justifications are, according to him, a matter of the community, not a matter of the a
?riori structure of our faculty of cognition. See particularly pp. 109-110. ibid. p. 110
8 ibid. p. 113
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fiabilities. (...) Absolute correctness is nothing but the diachronic limit of justi­
fication.9
These are bold claims, and I will argue (1) that they are false, and (2) 
that their untenability shows (a) the need to do justice to the distinction 
between aspects of finding and of making in accounts of thinking, and 
(b) the difficulty to combine these different aspects in one coherent ac­
count of the relation between thoughts and objects. That is, I will argue 
that it is precisely the breakdown of the bi-conditionals that marks both 
the failure of Rosenberg’s position and the importance to take the ten­
sion between finding and making seriously.
In order to arrive at representations that are adequate to the world, 
Rosenberg needs an extra premiss which asserts that certain represen­
tations are justified. A justified representation, which is for Rosenberg 
the same as a rational representation10, is according to him (the result 
of) an action that satisfies two conditions. Firstly, the action must fit 
with the beliefs of the agent; from the inside. If, for example, I form at 
this very moment the linguistic representation “I am word-proces­
sing”, this representation certainly fits with my internal perspective on 
the way the world is. Just this however, is not enough to make this re­
presentation justified. After all, it might be the case that I am dreaming, 
hence, not really word-processing at all. My beliefs may be false, even 
though I, from the inside, cannot know that. But if my beliefs are false, 
and if my representing action fits these false beliefs, it surely cannot be 
a justified action. Therefore, and this is the second condition, in order to 
be justified, my representing action must fit as well with the way the 
world is seen from the outside. Rosenberg makes it clear that this 
second condition needs a careful formulation. It should not turn out to 
have the impossible consequence that an agent, in order to be rational 
(in order to form justified representations) must be able to determine 
what is the case independent of his beliefs (independent of his 
representations of what is the case). Finite intelligences like us clearly 
cannot do that. There is however, according to Rosenberg, a definite
9 ibid. pp. 116-117
10 ibid. p. 128; pp. 165ff.
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sense in which it might intelligibly be said that rational agents possess 
not only an internal perspective but also an external one. Namely, in the 
sense that we can have a “we-perspective”.11
Rosenberg argues that human beings do not only form individual or 
private representations, but always also do possess collective or com­
munal representations; representations we can have individually only 
by forming them collectively.12 These communal representations are 
accompanied by a ‘collective apperception’, a “we think that...”. The 
‘we’ of this collective apperception is constituted by the collective 
acceptance of these communal representations. This ‘we’ is, to use a 
phrase of Searle13, both caused by the collective action and realized in 
the acting collective.14 Because we can, individually, be rational agents 
only if we possess an external perspective, a “we-perspective”, we 
must be members of a collective. And what is more, we must attach a 
greater normative force to our communal representations in order to be 
rational, i.e. in order to be able to form justified representations.15 To 
put it differently, concordance between representation R and my indivi­
dual or private beliefs is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
R’s being justified, whereas concordance between R and my commu­
nal representations (the representations I have as a member of a collec­
tive, because we formed them collectively) is both a necessary and a 
sufficient condition for R’s being justified.
The justification of particular representations, therefore, is a matter of 
making them fit in our set of communal representations, the set 
Rosenberg calls our ‘conceptual scheme’. Of course, the argument so 
far did only succeed in removing the question of justifying representa­
tions one step. For, how are we to justify our conceptual scheme, or, 
how are we to justify the replacement of one conceptual scheme by 
another? This is a real problem, for whereas it is possible, at least ac­
cording to Rosenberg, to adopt an external point of view with regard to
11 ibid. p. 158
12 ibid. p. 159
13 In his Intentionality (Cambridge, 1983) Searle defends the view that “mental states are 
both caused by the operations of the brain and realized in the structure of the brain”, p. 
265
14 See One World and Our Knowledge of It, pp. 159-164.
15 ibid. p. 168.
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particular representations (as we saw, the point of view of a commu­
nity), this practice cannot work with regard to this communal concep­
tual scheme itself. After all, what kind of external point of view might 
that be, given our being finite? This problem presents itself, according 
to Rosenberg, in terms of the following dilemma: either what can 
count as a justified replacement of one conceptual scheme by another is 
defined in terms of the actual conceptual scheme, which implies that it 
can never be justified to accept a successor scheme, or what can count 
as a justified replacement is defined in terms of this successor concep­
tual scheme itself, which implies that the practice of justification is 
question-begging. Thus, either it can never be justified to replace a con­
ceptual scheme by a new one, or it is always justified, in both cases in­
dependent of whatever content the conceptual schemes in question 
have, and consequently, independent of how reality will turn out to 
be.16a
Rosenberg argues that it is possible to escape from this dilemma, 
without having to claim that we can justify a conceptual scheme from 
outside our finitude. There are, he claims, circumstances that transcend 
any particular conceptual scheme, even though it remains possible for 
us to identify them because they do not transcend our existence as 
members of a rational community. Reference to these circumstances 
enables a community to replace their actual conceptual scheme by a 
successor scheme.15 These circumstances have three characteristics. 
Firstly, there is an ‘analytical truth’ about rational communities:
...a rational community is collectively committed to the policy of adopting 
qualified successor schemes in the face of emerging (predecessor) anomalies as 
a condition of its existence as a rational community —  of its being in the 
“logical space” of epistemic appraisals at all — and the legitimacy of repla­
cing some specific representational system by some specific other (that is, of
16a Rosenberg refers to Rorty as defending the impossibility of justifying conceptual 
schemes, because of the first reason, and to Stroud, because of the second reason, ibid. 
pp. 172-173. See Rorty, “The World Well Lost” in Journal o f Philosophy, 1972, and 
Stroud, “Transcendental Arguments and ‘Epistemological Naturalism”’ in Philosophical 
Studies, 1977
15 One World and. Our Knowledge o f It, p. 179
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some “paradigm shift”) can be retrospectively secured as an analytical conse­
quence of this necessary (collective) commitment.16
The other two characteristics are mentioned in the first sentence of this 
quotation: circumstances, reference to which may enable a community 
to justifiably replace their actual conceptual scheme by a successor 
scheme, must be circumstances in which (1) there is a conceptual 
scheme that qualifies as a successor scheme, and (2) there did emerge 
(predecessor) anomalies. Although Rosenberg’s interpretation of the 
successor-Tolation between different conceptual schemes is quite inter­
esting, I shall not go into it here.17 Neither shall I go into Rosenberg’s 
less cogent account of the emergence of anomalies.18 My reason is, that 
these latter kinds of characteristics may, indeed, be necessary 
conditions for a justified replacement of one conceptual scheme by 
another, but not necessary conditions for the having of a conceptual 
scheme in the first place. Assuming that any collective has a perfectly 
rational history, Rosenberg might be right to think that at any point in 
time any collective has a justified conceptual scheme. For granted this 
assumption, any actual scheme will be the result of a, maybe infinite,
16 ibid.
17 Rosenberg argues that a successor scheme must be able to explain both the phenomena 
dealt with by the predecessor scheme (i.e. the content structured by the scheme), as 
appearances in terms of its own real phenomena, and the laws, assumed by the predeces­
sor scheme (i.e. the way the scheme structured its content), as apparent laws, in terms of 
its own real ones. See, ibid. pp. 180-186. The argument that I will develop is indepen­
dent of the cogency of this account of the successor-relations between conceptual 
schemes.
18 ibid. p. 175-177. Rosenberg asserts that anomalous particular representations emerge 
as representational responses to non-representational stimuli (in that sense we fin d  
ourselves with experiences, since our diachronic world-picture evolves in the face of 
something that is not entirely up to us) in individual experiencers. Now there is a pro­
blem with the communal character of these anomalies, a character which they need in 
order to count as characterizations of the circumstances in which we are to justify our 
(communal) conceptual scheme, and not just one of our individual representations. The 
problem arises because, in order to make anomalies communal, we should collectively 
respond in the same way to the same stimuli. The ‘should’, however, is normative, and 
this is problematic, for it is not very clear whether Rosenberg can accept natural norms, 
precisely because he claims that all epistemic norms, norms governing the representa­
tional responses of individual experiencers, are communal norms, (pp. 168-169) But here 
the norms must be natural, because the only way to identify the situation in which the 
representational activities must collectively be the same, is to point to the non-represen- 
tational (natural) stimulus.
series of replacements in circumstances which had the three required 
characteristics. But the assumption of a perfectly rational history is not 
obviously warranted with regard to any actual collective of human 
beings.
Without this assumption Rosenberg’s argument becomes signifi­
cantly implausible. For imagine the following situation. Walter Alva­
rez, a member of a collective of palaeontologists, has a collection of re­
presentations that might be sorted out in the following way: (1) a set of 
communal representations (the palaeontologists’ conceptual scheme), 
(2) a set of private representations that concord with this conceptual 
scheme (for example, a set of judgements about the chemical compo­
sition of a specific number of fossils), and (3) a set of representations 
that do not concord with this conceptual scheme (for example, his be­
liefs about the extinction of dinosaurs as caused by the impact of a 
huge meteorite). Suppose, in addition, that Alvarez is rhetorically very 
talented, and succeeds in convincing all palaeontologists of the undeni- 
ability of (part of) the last set of representations. Consequently, the 
collective of palaeontologists now is confronted with anomalies. Sup­
pose, finally, that they cannot think of a conceptual scheme that would 
qualify as a successor scheme; a situation that is not all too uncommon 
in scientific communities.
Well, what should a palaeontologist do? Does his “we-perspective” 
help him with regard to the anomalous representations? That is not 
very clear. It depends on whether the anomalous representations are 
treated as part of the set of communal representations. If they are so 
treated, then the palaeontologists’ conceptual scheme as a whole is a set 
of beliefs that doesn’t make sense of reality, because in that case it 
would be an incoherent set. This certainly is a possibility, but it is a 
possibility that doesn’t help the members of the palaeontologists’ 
community. Besides that, it makes Rosenberg’s account of thinking 
(“the building up through time of a comprehensive, coherent, unitary, 
and determinate world-picture”) vacuous: it will reduce our understan­
ding of what it comes down to hold that science is ‘the making of 
finding’ to some empty advice as “Well, keep searching for a concep­
tual scheme that can qualify as a successor scheme!”
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The other possibility is that the anomalous representations are not 
treated as part of the palaeontologists’ conceptual scheme, i.e. the 
paleontologists keep believing what they already believed, and neglect, 
as long as necessary, what cannot fit in their communal conceptual 
scheme. This is a real possibility too, and it has the advantage that the 
palaeontologists remain in possession of a set of justified represen­
tations, and thereby, that they remain in possession of the extra premiss 
they need to complete Rosenberg’s ‘syllogism’19. Hence, they might be 
said to have a set of representations that are adequate to the world. In 
other words, if a palaeontologist acts in concordance with this second 
possibility, if he neglects his anomalous representations as long as he 
doesn’t know of a conceptual scheme that qualifies as a successor 
scheme, then it remains possible to understand what it means to say 
(with Rosenberg) that a palaeontologist is able to think of reality.
This second possibility has, however, consequences that makes 
Rosenberg’s account of what it means to think of reality untenable. The 
point is not that conservatism cannot be justified: granted the actual 
inexistence of a conceptual scheme that qualifies as a successor 
scheme, probably the best thing to do is to stick to your old beliefs. 
Nevertheless, if that is what a palaeontologist does, he cannot at the 
same time hold that his beliefs are correct if that is equivalent to their 
being adequate to the world. In other words, in the face of anomalies 
sequence II breaks down, because the correctness of representations 
cannot, in the face of anomalies, be both equivalent to their conser­
vative justification and their enduring adequacy to the world. In terms 
of the separate bi-conditionals this means that in the face of anomalies 
they turn out to be nothing but ordinary implications.
This can easily be explained in terms of three different sets of repre­
sentations. The first bi-conditional states that the set of justified repre­
sentations is equivalent to the set of correct representations, and the 
second bi-conditional states that, in addition, this set of correct repre­
sentations is equivalent to the set of representations that are adequate to 
the world. As regards the first equivalence, the case of the palaeonto­
logists that I just sketched, now reveals that the set of justified represen­
19 Rosenberg’s term for the argument based on the second sequence of bi-conditionals, 
ibid. p. 117.
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tations is not necessarily equivalent to the set of correct representa­
tions. Whereas it might be the case that every member of the set of cor­
rect representations is, by that very fact, also a member of the set of 
justified representations, it is not necessarily true that every member of 
the set of justified representations is a member of the set of correct 
representations. In other words, we might maintain that the set of cor­
rect representations is a subset of the set of justified representations; a 
proper subset, that is, for a justified representation does not need to be 
correct. It might just be a representation that we happen to have all 
along (and that we stick to in the face of anomalies when we do not 
know of a conceptual scheme that qualifies as a successor scheme). 
And we can only claim that such a representation must by that very fact 
be correct if and only if our factual history as a collective of rational 
agents was itself perfectly rational. But this assumption, as I noticed, is 
not very reliable. If all this is sound, then I think we must reformulate
(1) A representation is justified if and only if it is correct
as
(5) A representation is justified if and only if it is correct or the best 
we happen to have.
The difference between 'correct’ and ‘the best we happen to have’ is 
crucial to the main line of my argument, because this difference reflects 
the difference between finding a meaningful world and making the 
world meaningful. After all, the best representation we happen to have 
might at best be understood as a representation that allows us to make 
the world meaningful, whereas the meaning of a correct representation, 
now that we separated it from its being justified, depends completely 
on its being adequate to the world, i.e. on the possibility to find a 
meaningful world.
Exactly the same effect results from a closer look at the second bi­
conditional. I mean, there is good reason to think that the set of correct 
representations is not necessarily equivalent to the set of representa­
tions that are adequate to the world. This second line of criticism starts
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from the very opposite as the first one: after having established that 
making the world meaningful is not necessarily identical to finding a 
meaningful world, I now want to show that finding a meaningful world 
is not necessarily identical to making the world meaningful. The start­
ing-point of this criticism is Rosenberg’s assertion that, finally, the idea 
of a rational history of conceptual scheme replacements only makes 
sense retrospectively, i.e. in terms of a convergence “across time to an 
ideal limit, a conceptual scheme which embodies an absolutely correct 
representation of the one real world”.20 Now this notion of an absolu­
tely correct representation of the one real world contains a very interest­
ing paradox. Granted that
(2) A representation is correct if and only if it is adequate to the 
world
we must assume that this final conceptual scheme presents the final set 
of representations that are adequate to the world. Yet this cannot be, be­
cause of the nature of a representation. A representation is necessarily 
bound to a point of view on the thing it is a representation of. It never 
can be the thing itself, for then it could not be a representation of it. 
Consequently, something can only be a representation of a thing if it 
implies the possibility of other representations of that same thing it is a 
representation of. It might be true of course, that these implied repre­
sentations are accessible only from another point of view. Therefore, it 
is imaginable that relative to a specific point of view there is a limit to 
the series of replacements of representations. But to call the final set of 
representations we can reach from such a specific point of view absolu­
tely correct, means to take them not as representations of the one real 
world, but as representations of a version21 of the world. This implies 
that we must reformulate
(2) A representation is correct if and only if it is adequate to the 
world
20 ibid. p. 185
21 I borrow the notion of a “version of the world” from Nelson Goodman, Ways of 
Worldmaking, (Indianapolis, 1978). See, especially, pp. 2-5, 17ff, 109ff.
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as
(6) A representation is correct if and only if it is adequate to the 
world as conceived from a specific point of view.
The added qualification is of great importance to the main line of my 
argument, for it relates the equivalence between correctness and ade­
quacy to the world to the particularity of a point of view. As such it 
points out that the connotations of finding and making do not only 
differ with respect to the practices of the thinking agent, but also with 
respect to the implied relations between thoughts and objects. This of 
course was only to be expected, granted that an account of thinking is 
mainly an account of the relation between thoughts and objects. The 
result of the added qualification is that the set of absolutely correct 
representations, as a finite set arrived at from a specific point of view, 
cannot be equivalent to the set of representations that are adequate to the 
world, since this latter set cannot be related to a specific point of view. 
So, if there is a sense in which we might coherently say that it is pos­
sible to find  a meaningful world, this has to be a sense in which the 
emphasis should be on the indefinite article “a”. The idea of an absolu­
tely correct set of representations gives only meaning to the possibility 
of finding a version of the world. But, assuming the equivalency of this 
set of representations to the set of representations that are adequate to 
the world as conceived from a specific point of view, we will realize the 
difference made by the definite article “the” in the phrase “making the 
world meaningful”. For, even if it is not possible for us to conceive the 
world from another point of view, this does not allow us to conclude 
that our point of view is just a neutral instrument with which we can 
make the world meaningful.213 We might of course think that the 
notion of inaccessible representations does not make sense22, but then 
we cannot hold on to the intelligibility of the ideal limit of an absolutely 
correct representation of the one real world, as Rosenberg does.
21a See, in this respect, my treatment of Nagel’s conception of realism. Chapter Three, 
section 1, below pp. 35-39.
22 As Donald Davidson does. See his “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”, in 
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford, 1984), esp. pp. 185-195.
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The point of my argument has been to challenge Rosenberg’s claim 
that there are identity-relations holding between (1) a justified represen­
tation (2) a correct representation, and (3) a representation that is ade­
quate to the world, in order to show that there is no analytical equiva­
lence between making the world meaningful and finding a meaningful 
world. By disputing both alleged bi-conditionals, I made a case for (a) 
the need to do justice to the distinction between aspects of finding and 
of making in accounts of thinking, and (b) the difficulty to combine 
these different aspects in one coherent account of the relation between 
thoughts and objects. Since we need the plausibility of these two points 
in order to be aware of the aporetic character of accounts of the relation 
between thoughts and objects, it is obvious that Rosenberg is bound to 
underestimate this.
But Rosenberg is not the only contemporary philosopher who 
neglects the aporetic character of our accounts of thinking. Even Rorty, 
as I will argue in the next chapter, misses the importance of this 
aporetic, although he certainly is aware, in his critique of the Cartesian, 
Lockean and Kantian background of modem philosophy, of both (a) 
the need to do justice to the distinction between aspects of finding and 
of making in accounts of thinking, and (b) the difficulty to combine 
these different aspects in one coherent account of the relation between 
thoughts and objects.
CHAPTER TWO
RORTY: 
BILDUNG WITHOUT MIRRORS — 
MAKING RATHER THAN FINDING
As early as 19721, Rorty expressed his aversion to the prominent 
place of the notion of ‘the world’ in philosophical accounts of thinking. 
According to him the notion of ‘the world’ is purely vacuous, and 
more of an obsession than an intuition.2 We don’t need it in order to be 
able to analyse the meaning of judgements. The “please don’t care 
about the world” conclusion he put forward in that article3 gradually 
changed. First, in his Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature, it reap­
peared in the notion of ‘edifying philosophy’. This is a kind of philo­
sophy that concentrates on ‘Bildung’, on the “project of finding new, 
better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking”4, without in­
tending to say anything about real objects.
...edifying philosophers have to decry the very notion of having a view, while 
avoiding having a view about having views. (...) Perhaps saying things is not 
always saying how things are. Perhaps saying that is itself not a case of saying 
how things are. (...) We must get the visual, and in particular the mirroring,
Richard Rorty, “The World Well Lost”, in The Journal o f Philosophy 69, 1972.
2 ibid. p. 661. “Intuition” is not used here in the technical sense (translating 
“Anschauung”) in which it is used throughout this study.
3ibid. p. 659.
4Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 360.
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metaphors out of our speech altogether. To do that we have to understand 
speech not only as not the externalizing of inner representations, but as not a 
representation at all. We have to drop the notion of correspondence for sen­
tences as well as for thoughts, and see sentences as connected with other sen­
tences rather than with the world.5
A few years later the same theme reappeared in still another notion: 
the provocative notion of a post-Philosophical culture.6 One of the most 
characteristic features of such a culture is the complete absence of 
Philosophers-with-a-capital-P, people trying to give an ultimate account 
of the relation between thoughts and objects. In Rorty’s words:
In a post-Philosophical culture it would be clear that that [“its own time appre­
hended in thoughts”] is all that philosophy can be. It cannot answer questions 
about the relation of the thought of our time — the descriptions it is using, the 
vocabularies it employs — to something that is not just some alternative voca­
bulary. So it is a study of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the 
various ways of talking that our race has invented.7
Rorty’s recommendation that we should do philosophy without 
being interested in the relation between thoughts and objects, rests, as I 
will argue, (1) on his acceptance of a radical distinction between 
‘finding a meaningful world’ and ‘making the world meaningful’, in 
combination with (2) the assumption that the aporetic character of our 
accounts of thinking has only to do with our obsession with ‘the 
world’, and (3) his mistaken conviction that (a) we can get rid of ‘the 
world’ once we get rid of finding, because (b) ‘the world’ is, in the case 
of ‘making the world meaningful’, nothing but a dummy-term — all 
this slogan is about, is that thinking means nothing but ‘making sense\
As different critics have argued, Rorty adheres, notwithstanding his 
attempt to overcome our Western philosophical tradition, to a rather 
traditional ‘either/or’. Although he does not accept the following 
dilemma
5ibid. p. 371-372.
6See for instance the introduction to Rorty’s Consequences o f Pragmatism (Minneapolis, 
1982)
7ibid. p. xl.
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either there is some basic foundational constraint or we are confronted with 
intellectual and moral chaos8
arguing that we should not take sides here, he nonetheless assumes the 
following dilemma in which he passionately takes sides:
either we are speaking about reality or we are just talking9.
The point that I want to bring out, is that both the dilemma that Rorty 
wants to sidestep and the one he is accused of as forcing on us, are 
variations of the following misdirected either!or:
Either thinking is a matter of ‘finding a meaningful world’, or merely a 
matter of ‘making sense’.
To make my point, I shall first analyse Rorty’s argument against the 
mere possibility of ‘mirroring’ as an adequate account of thinking, 
claiming that the argument is based on the assumption that ‘mirroring’ 
means ‘finding a meaningful world’, in the strict sense that it implies 
judgements that truly specify the veritable properties of real objects. In 
addition I shall analyse Rorty’s introduction of Bildung as an adequate 
account of thinking, claiming that Rorty’s distorted and partial appro-
8 According to Richard Bernstein (“Philosophy in the Conversation of Mankind”, 
Review o f Metaphysics 33, (1980), p. 763) this is the grand Either/Or that Rorty wants 
to overcome, but notice the resemblance between this pair of alternatives and the ones 
below that Caputo, Bernstein and Goldman found in Rorty’s plea for ‘edifying
juiui ^aputo “The Thought of Being and the Conversation of Mankind: the Case of 
Heidegger and Rorty” Review o f Metaphysics 36, (1983), pp. 667-668: “either a 
metaphysical correspondence theory or a kind of neo-nominalism; either we are speaking 
about reality or we are just talking; either our talk has ontological bearing or it is just 
talk”. See also the variations of other critics: “Either we are ineluctably tempted by 
foundational metaphors and the desperate attempt to escape from history or we must 
frankly recognize that philosophy itself is at best a form of “kibbutzing””, in Richard 
Bernstein, op.cit. p. 767. “Either all justification, whether in matters of knowledge or 
morals, appeals to social practices or to illusory foundations”, Bernstein, ibid. p. 772. 
“either knowledge (or justification) is a matter of accuracy of representation, or causal 
interaction, or it is a matter of social or linguistic practice”, in Alvin Goldman’s book 
review of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, in The Philosophical Review XC (1981),
p. 426
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priation of Gadamer’s hermeneutics shows his attempt to equate 
‘thinking’ with ‘making sense’. I shall close this chapter by a short 
analysis of Rorty’s claim that actually nothing deep hinges on the dis­
tinction between ‘finding’ and ‘making’10, a claim that seems to belie 
my interpretation of his position.
It is important to keep in mind that I use these arguments only to 
show that Rorty’s underestimation of the aporetic character of the 
structure of our accounts of thinking is responsible for the problems 
his view involves.
First then I want to take a look at Rorty’s interpretation of the tradi­
tional philosophical attempt to give a comprehensive account of think­
ing. According to Rorty, philosophy in the West, at least since Descar­
tes, Locke and Kant11, assumes
(1) that Our Glassy Essence” is a ‘container of images’12 some of 
which do, while others do not represent their originals accu­
rately;
(2) that thinking of reality can only be a matter of the images that 
do represent their originals accurately — since reality consists of 
originals13; and
(3) that we, therefore, need a general theory of representation to tell 
us how to separate the images that do represent their originals 
accurately (the privileged representations14) from those that do 
not.
10 Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 344.
11 Because of their confusions philosophy became ‘theory of knowledge’, ibid. pp.131- 
164.
12 Although this term does not sound very philosophical, it covers “the notion of a 
single inner space in which bodily and perceptual sensations (...), mathematical truths, 
moral rules, the idea of God, moods of depression, and all the rest of what we now call 
“mental” were objects of quasi-observation” of which Rorty is speaking, ibid. p. 50.
13This is, according to Rorty, a Platonic legacy; ibid. pp. 157-160. See also the 
“Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy” to Consequences of Pragmatism, especially 
pp. xiii-xix.
see particularly Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, pp. 165-173.
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Rorty is opposed to this conception of philosophy. He claims that 
we do not need a theory of the relation between thoughts and objects at 
all, because it is essentially impossible for us to separate images that do 
represent their originals accurately from those that do not, because 
there are neither images nor originals. Thinking of reality, conceived 
of as ‘mirroring’ it, is, according to Rorty, a misleading Cartesian in­
vention.15 The target of his argument is the notion of privileged repre­
sentations. Using, respectively, Sellars and Quine, he argues that two 
candidates “— intuitions and concepts16 — fell into disrepute in the 
latter days of the analytic movement”17, and, using his inside know­
ledge he ingeniously argues for the inescapable failure of attempts in 
empirical psychology and philosophy of language to find new candi­
dates. In short, Rorty argues that there are no beliefs hooked on to the 
World; beliefs that pass as knowledge have an authority by reference to 
what society lets us say. To put it differently, if ‘S knows that p’ we 
had better take that as “a remark about the status of S’s reports among 
his peers” and not as “a remark about the relation between subject and 
object, between nature and its mirror”.18 Now this set of alternatives 
makes sense only once we assume that thinking is either a matter of 
‘finding a meaningful world’ or merely a matter of ‘making sense’. In 
other words, only if we assume such a rigid either/or is it acceptable to 
infer the senselessness of a relation between thoughts and objects from 
the impossibility to distinguish between images and their originals. 
This becomes the more evident once we look at the way Rorty elabo­
rates on the distinction between these alternatives.
On the one hand we have, according to Rorty, a position, mislead­
ingly19 called epistemological behaviorism, which combines a view of 
truth that is pragmatic of character with a “therapeutic” approach to 
ontology, meaning by that something like ‘deconstructive’20. Thus, we
15 See ibid. pp. 45-69 for this ill-sounding ‘invention’-talk.
16 Despite the Anglo-Saxon context, these notions are used here in their technical 
(Kantian) sense.
17 ibid. p. 168.
18ibid. p. 175
19Richard Bernstein notes, correctly, that the choice of this term is unfortunate because it 
suggests that Rorty introduces a new and better epistemological position. Op.cit. p. 757
20 Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 175. See ibid. p. 7, on the meaning of 
“therapeutic”.
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had better stop doing ontology, for there is nothing more to understand 
about why we say this rather than that once we understand the rules of 
the language-game. This is the position that Rorty is arguing for, using 
Quine and Sellars:
Thus for Quine, a necessary truth is just a statement such that nobody has given 
us any interesting alternative which would lead us to question it. For Sellars, to 
say that a report of a passing thought is incorrigible is to say that nobody has 
yet suggested a good way of predicting and controlling human behavior which 
does not take sincere first-person contemporary reports of thought at face- 
value.21
On the other hand we have a position which aims to make truth 
more than ‘warranted assertability’, more than what society lets us say. 
This is the position Rorty is opposed to, because it necessarily gets 
entangled in hopeless ontological explanations, which
usually take the form of a redescription of the object of knowledge so as to 
“bridge the gap” between it and the knowing subjects. To choose between these 
approaches is to choose between truth as “what is good for us to believe” and 
truth as “contact with reality”.22
Hence, what Rorty is opposed to is the idea that beliefs might be 
informative about reality, as if it is something we can find. But, he 
claims, there is nothing to be found; all there is to say about the infor­
mativeness of judgements is what our peers will let us get away with 
saying: it is only a matter of making sense.
The same rigid either!or reappears in Rorty’s appropriation of 
hermeneutics. Hermeneutics is, according to Rorty, largely the name 
for a struggle against the assumption that all contributions to a given 
discourse are commensurable.23 Hermeneutics sees culture as a con­
versation between speakers who do not share a common goal, or 
common ground, but whose paths through life have fallen together, 
and who never lose the hope of agreement so long as the conversation
21 ibid. p. 175.
22 ibid. p. 176.
23 Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 316.
lasts, although they all know that there is no disciplinary matrix that 
unites them from the start.24 This means that hermeneutics is the at­
tempt to make sense of what is going on at a stage where we are still 
too unsure about our conversation to describe it; it is the study of 
abnormal discourse, which is what happens when someone joins in 
the discourse who is ignorant of the conventions that structure normal 
discourse, or who sets them aside.25 As such, hermeneutics is radically 
opposed to epistemology, but not to be sure as an alternative for the 
same kind of task. No, it is precisely an expression of the hope that we 
will stop doing what we tried to do but cannot (and need not).26 In 
Rorty’s words:
Hermeneutics is not “another way of knowing” — “understanding” as opposed 
to (predictive) “explanation”. It is better seen as another way of coping.27
There is, probably, a sense in which this all has to do with Gadamer, 
but Rorty definitely makes the author of Wahrheit und Methoden  too 
much into a hero of his own. That is, although Gadamer admits that 
hermeneutics expresses the open-endedness of dialogues, the need to 
receive the unfamiliar, the absence of a common ground, the radical 
historicity of our opinions (our prejudices), and the Heideggerian 
critique of the correspondence theory, it expresses as well our embed­
dedness in what Gadamer calls a WirkungsgeschichteP  In other 
words, there is an important aspect in Gadamer’s account of what 
hermeneutics boils down to that is completely absent in Rorty’s dis­
cussion. Whereas Rorty enthusiastically accepts the critical part of 
hermeneutics, i.e. the critique of method as the sole path to truth, he 
only accepts half of the constructive part. He likes to substitute “the 
notion of Bildung (education, self-formation) for that of “knowledge” 
as the goal of thinking”30 (assuming wrongly that Gadamer did just
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24 ibid. p. 318.
25 ibid. p. 320. ‘Abnormal’ stands for what Kuhn calls ‘revolutionary’ as opposed to 
‘normal’ science.
26 ibid. p. 315.
27 ibid. p. 356.
28 Tübingen, 1960.
29 Wahrheit und Methode, p. 283ff.
30 Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, 1979), p. 359.
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that31), but he does not like Gadamer’s stress on Bildung as embedded 
in a Wirkungsgeschichte,32 Hence Rorty neglects the fact that, according 
to Gadamer, Bildung is not just a matter of making sense by means of 
inventing new descriptions of oneself, or of one’s world, but a matter 
of being sensitive
(‘offen’) to what wants to get disclosed (‘die Sache’). Bildung is not 
just a matter of voluntary, creative self-formation, but a matter of 
asking the right questions, once confronted with the unfamiliar.33 The 
point of Gadamer’s stress, then, is not what Rorty takes it to be:
Gadamer develops his notion of wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein (the sort of 
consciousness of the past which changes us) to characterize an attitude inter­
ested not so much in what is out there in the world, or in what happened in 
history, as in what we can get out of nature and history for our own uses.34
The phrase “for our own uses” is particularly inappropriate. The 
point of the Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein is, quite to the con­
trary, that we must be ready to be ‘taken’ by the subject-matter of the 
dialogue between us and our tradition:
To have a conversation means to put oneself under the guidance of the issue 
[Sache] at which the conversation partners are directed. In order to have a con­
versation one should not silence the other with arguments, but should really 
consider the strength of the point of the other opinion. It is therefore an art of 
trying. The art of trying is however the art of asking. For as we say: to ask 
means to uncover [Offenlegen] and to expose [ins Offene stellen].35
31ibid. But see Joel Weinsheimer, Gadamer’s Hermeneutics (Yale, 1985), p.68.
32 John Caputo, in his “The Thought of Being and the Conversation of Mankind: The 
Case of Heidegger and Rorty” pp. 678-681, stresses that Rorty misses this part of 
hermeneutics on purpose, and not because of ignorance.
33 See particularly pp. 324-360 of H.-G. Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode (Tübingen, 
1960) , the section entitled “Analyse des wirkungsgeschichtlichen Bewußtseins”.
34 Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 359.
35 My translation. “Ein Gespräch führen heißt, sich unter die Führung der Sache stellen, 
auf die die Gesprächspartner gerichtet sind. Ein Gespräch führen verlangt, den anderen 
nicht niederzuargumentieren, sondern im Gegenteil das sachliche Gewicht der anderen 
Meinung wirklich zu erwägen. Sie ist daher eine Kunst des Erprobens. Die Kunst des 
Erprobens ist aber die Kunst des Fragens. Denn wir sahen: Fragen heißt Offenlegen und 
ins Offene stellen.”Wahrheit und Methode, p. 349.
Rorty: Bildung without Mirrors -  Making rather than Finding 29
And again, this questioning, of which Rorty wants to make use in 
his suggestion that a philosopher should be an “informed dilettante”36, 
is not quite what Rorty makes of it, for in his hands it turns out to be 
only a questioning of the all-too-obvious: an ‘uncovering’ but not an 
‘exposing’.37
Reacting on an earlier version of this chapter Rorty asks “why all 
that stuff about solidarity in my “Solidarity or Objectivity?” doesn’t 
take account of our Wirkungsgeschichte”38. My reply, however, is just 
an extension of the argument I developed so far. For Rorty ‘solidarity’ 
is given with the need we feel to privilege, in practice, our own group. 
As he writes, solidarity means that we
should accept the fact that we have to start from where we are, and that this 
means that there are lots of views which we simply cannot take seriously.39
Such an interpretation of solidarity, however, presupposes that a 
culture consists of a set of clear and evident beliefs, and that we are 
bound to enter the ‘Conversation of Mankind’ with our own prejudices 
about the value of this set of beliefs. Taken this way, solidarity 
amounts indeed to an “ethnocentrism”, a “lonely provincialism”40, to 
preferring the company of “those who share enough of one’s beliefs to 
make fruitful conversation possible41.
36Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 317.
37 Perhaps my disagreement with David Hiley’s interpretation of Rorty (Philosophy in 
Question. Essays on a Pyrrhonian Theme, Chicago, 1988, pp. 143-173.)— which turns 
him into a contemporary advocate of the Pyrrhonian challenge to philosophy —  can best 
be stated with respect to this point. It might be true that Rorty wants to keep the 
conversation going by constantly calling current agreement into question, but what 
would be the point in so doing, other than that current agreement tends to conceal its 
problematical character? In other words, if there is any point in the Pyrrhonian challenge 
to philosophy, then only because of our interest in the Platonic attempt to escape from 
the contingencies of our condition. See the tenor of Maimonian skepticism. See also 
Stanley Rosen’s review of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. “I hope that Rorty will 
not reject me as too Platonic when I say that he provides us with no basis for keeping the 
conversation going, or for distinguishing between a dull and an interesting path.” in 
Review o f Metaphysics, 1980, p.800.
38 In a letter to me, dated August 26, 1988. The article to which Rorty refers appeared a.o. 
in Post-Analytic Philosophy, ed. J. Rajchman and C. West, (New York, 1985)
39 “Solidarity or Objectivity?”, p. 12.
40ibid.
41 ibid. p. 13.
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But the point Gadamer makes by stressing that Bildung must be 
embedded in a Wirkungsgeschichte, is exactly to emphasize that an es­
sential part of our culture is something which so far did not succeed in 
unfolding itself in terms of clear and evident beliefs. In other words, 
what makes a culture what it is, is according to Gadamer not that we 
just like to say what we are used to say, but that there is something 
which wants to be said, and to which we must try to be sensitive even 
if we do not succeed in revealing it, i.e. even if we do not know how to 
formulate exactly what we try to say. This is not chimerical. It is just to 
say that a crucial part of what makes up a culture is a collection of pro­
blems and questions, rather than just a collection of solutions and 
answers. For, it are problems and questions which on the one hand 
resist clear formulations and on the other hand attract our attention and 
evoke our desire for a more comprehensive understanding of reality, as 
if it was more than just what we say it is.42
In order to conclude, then, I want to suggest that Rorty’s interpreta­
tion of Gadamer’s hermeneutics is based upon his conviction that 
‘making sense’ has nothing to do with ‘finding a meaningful world’. 
For, only if we take for granted that Rorty assumes such a radical sepa­
ration between the two, and only if we realize Rorty’s sympathy for an 
account of thinking in terms of ‘making sense’, can we understand his 
attempt to appropriate the notion of Bildung without its embeddedness 
in the idea of a Wirkungsgeschichte — as if, while thinking, there is 
nothing to look for, nothing to be sensitive to. And indeed, realizing 
Rorty’s aversion to an account of thinking in terms of ‘finding a 
meaningful world’, we can understand his attempt to get rid of the idea 
of a Wirkungsgeschichte, treated as the history of concealing and 
revealing Being.43
In his attempt to appropriate hermeneutics as a substitute for episte- 
mology, Rorty comes across the distinction between “nature” and
42 The point is, in other words, that, in order to ask the right questions, we have to be 
sensitive to what is beyond our grasp, as if there was a ‘transcendent object’ we try to 
make sense of.
43 See Rorty’s critique of Heidegger in his “Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and 
Dewey”. Reprinted in Consequences of Pragmatism, pp. 37 -59; especially, pp. 52-54.
“spirit”.44 Traditionally, hermeneutics is thought of as peculiarly suited 
to “spirit”, whereas some other method is appropriate to “nature”. 
According to Rorty, there is a lot of confusion going on around here. 
While unraveling these confusions he makes a few remarks about the 
distinction between the imagery of making and of finding, which are 
very interesting and revealing with respect to the point I try to make.
Rorty wants to separate off “the romantic notion of man as self- 
creative [from] the Kantian notion of man as constituting a phenomenal 
world, and the Cartesian notion of man as containing a special imma­
terial ingredient”.45 According to him, the traditional coming together 
of these notions led Kuhnians to the use of phrases like “being pre­
sented with a new world”, rather than “using a new description for the 
world”, and antireductionists like Charles Taylor to defend a
notion of man as a being who changes from the inside by finding better (or, at 
least, novel) ways of describing, predicting, and explaining himself. Nonhuman 
beings, as mere etres-en-soi, do not get changed from inside but are simply 
described, predicted, and explained in a better vocabulary.46
What is wrong, according to Rorty, with this latter position, is that it 
leads us back into an untenable metaphysical dualism. And what is 
wrong with the Kuhnian vocabulary is that it leads from repudiating the 
metaphysical dualism to the ridiculous “suggestion that part of man’s 
self-creation consists in “constituting” atoms and inkwells”.47 Rorty’s 
‘therapy’ is very simple: the deep meaning of the difference between 
‘finding the truth about the en-soV and ‘making the truth about the 
pour-soV vanishes completely once we realize that the only things we 
find or make are ways of speaking. Talk about “nature” is a way of 
speaking we might be said to find, because nature
is whatever is so routine and familiar and manageable that we trust our own 
language implicitly48,
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44 Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, pp. 343-356.
45 ibid. p. 346. Cf. p. 358
46 ibid. p. 351.
47 ibid. p. 346.
32 Part One: Finding and Making
while talk about “spirit” happens to be, as things are now, a way of 
speaking we need to make, because spirit
is whatever is so unfamiliar and unmanageable that we begin to wonder whether 
our “language” is “adequate” to it. (...) it is just wonder about whether we do 
not need to change our vocabulary, and not just our assertions.48
Rorty, to be sure, thinks it would be better to drop the distinction 
between “nature” and “spirit” altogether. After all, it might well be that 
the coincidence of the parallel between, on the one hand, the unfamiliar 
and the Geisteswissenschaften, and on the other hand, the familiar and 
the Naturwissenschaften, is a mere coincidence. All we actually have is 
‘ways of speaking’, some of which we trust and some of which we 
doubt. This difference, to be sure, is according to Rorty nothing but a 
difference in familiarity; it is a matter of social practice.
My point here is that Rorty’s denial of a real distinction between 
‘finding’ and ‘making’ makes sense only once we assume that ways of 
speaking are all there is. But this latter assumption implies at the same 
time a radical distinction between ‘finding a meaningful world’ and 
‘making sense’. This distinction is, as I have argued in this chapter, a 
misdirected distinction between what Rorty thinks is an improper 
interpretation of judgements (as if they only have to do with the veri­
table properties of real objects) and his favourite kind of interpretation 
of judgements (as if they only have to do with the specification of posi­
tions within a conceptual framework).
Although the position Rorty defends is very different from the one 
defended by Rosenberg, the conclusion of this chapter is that both are 
insensitive to the tension between an account of thinking in terms of 
‘finding a meaningful world’ and one in terms of ‘making the world 
meaningful’. Both American philosophers neglect the aporetic charac­
ter of the structure of our accounts of thinking. Whereas Rosenberg 
assumes that both accounts are, in the final analysis, different versions 
of one and the same coherent and comprehensive account of the rela­
tion between thoughts and objects, Rorty assumes that they refer, in
48 ibid. pp. 352-353.
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fact, to absolutely different practices. Next I shall turn to Thomas 
Nagel, arguing that, although he shows an awareness of the aporetic 
character of accounts of thinking, he mistakenly assumes that he can 
provide a comprehensive account of this aporetic character as being a 
feature of the problematical nature of thinking itself.
CHAPTER 3
NAGEL: 
FINDING AS MAKING FROM NOWHERE
Ever since his “What is it like to be a bat?”1, Thomas Nagel’s 
writings have been dominated by one single problem: “how to com­
bine the perspective of a particular person inside the world with an ob­
jective view of that same world, the person and his viewpoint in­
cluded” 2 In this chapter I argue that the way in which Nagel deals with 
this problem shows (a) that he is definitely aware of the aporetic char­
acter of any account of the relation between thoughts and objects, but 
(b) that he unwarrantably assumes that this aporetic character is a con­
sequence of the relation itself, and not of the structure of our accounts 
of it.
I shall deal with Nagel’s claims in two sections. First I shall discuss 
his refusal to accept the kind of connection Kant makes between an 
empirical kind of realism and a transcendental kind of idealism. Subse­
quently, I shall criticise his analysis of what he calls human self-trans­
1 Originally published in The Philosophical Review, LXXX1Ü (1974), reprinted in 
Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions, Cambridge, 1979.
2 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere, Oxford, 1986, p. 3.
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cendence, arguing that his speculations about objective and subjective 
‘selves’ implies the same kind of mistake he accuses Kant of as having 
made, namely, taking an intrinsic characteristic of accounts of X for a 
characteristic of X itself:
1. Realism
Realism , according to Nagel, is the thesis that there is a world in 
which we are contained, and whose constitution is independent of our 
minds. This view implies that we must accept the possibility that what 
there is does not coincide necessarily with what is a possible object of 
thought for us.3 That is, the idea of realism implies a strong form of 
what Nagel calls anti-humanism. Once we think that there is a world 
independent of our minds, we have to admit that this world is not our 
world, not even potentially.4* In this way, and only in this way, is real­
ism opposed to idealism, which is according to Nagel the presupposi­
tion that what there is cannot be thought to be something completely 
beyond our capacities to grasp it. To put it differently, idealism is, ac­
cording to Nagel, the view that reality cannot be anything that cannot be 
conceived by us, or our human descendants.4
Nagel thinks that Kant is one of his most powerful opponents as 
regards this anti-humanism (i.e. as regards the incompatibility of 
realism with idealism). And indeed, Kant argued very strongly that the 
world we live in is bound to be our world. Of course, Kant accepted 
the possibility, even the necessity, of a noumenal world, but he stressed 
that this noumenal world could not be fleshed out. Probably it is no­
thing but a limiting concept, although it is hard to understand on such 
an interpretation what is meant by Kant’s claim that we need this
3 The View from Nowhere, p. 92.
4a ibid. p. 108
4 Note that there is an extremely diverse use of the notions ‘realism’ and ‘idealism’. 
According to Nagel, Rosenberg, who thinks of himself as defending a constitutive 
realism, is an idealist, as well as Putnam, who thinks of himself as defending an ‘internal 
realism’. Rescher, however, defending a view very similar to Putnam, calls this view, in 
agreement with Nagel’s use of the notion, a conceptual idealism. See Rosenberg, One 
World and Our Knowledge of It, pp. 22-86; Putnam, “Reason and Realism” in Meaning 
and the Moral Sciences, pp. 123-138; and Rescher, Conceptual Idealism, pp. 24-26.
36 Part One: Finding and Making
noumenal world in order to be able to explain the existence of our phe­
nomenal world.5
Nagel’s point is that Kant must have missed a crucial distinction: if 
our human point of view enters our conception of the world it might do 
so as form  and as content. That is, although our picture of the world 
will always have the form  of a human picture (it being stated in a 
human language, or pictured in the modes of our senses), it does not 
necessarily have a human content. By means of the distinction between 
primary and secondary qualities Nagel clarifies his point, relying on 
Colin McGinn’s The Subjective View.6 In explaining the secondary 
qualities of phenomena, for example a tomato’s looking red, we do not 
need the tomato’s really being red. The tomato’s looking red is, in 
other words, a matter of human content. Once we transcend our point 
of view (at least, our perceptual point of view) we understand that 
‘being red’ is not a quality of physical objects: their looking red can be 
analysed in terms of (i.e. can be reduced to) their having specific pri­
mary qualities. On the other hand, we have no good reason to believe 
that primary qualities of phenomena, for example a tomato’s spherical 
extension, are a matter of human content:
We can’t explain the fact that things look spatially extended except in terms of 
their being extended. And we can’t explain the fact that that explanation seems 
true except again in terms of things being extended (...) And so on.7
Of course, there is an easy reply for Kantians. Precisely because we 
cannot conceive of an explanation of primary qualities in other terms, 
we must accept that the world we live in is our world. The distinction
5 These are difficult matters, that I will leave aside here. In discussing Maimon I will, of 
course, go more deeply into these problems. Nagel’s interpretation of Kant is relatively 
simple; let me quote him in full: “The Kantian view that primary qualities, too, describe 
the world only as it appears to us depends on taking the entire system of scientific 
explanation of observable phenomena as itself an appearance, whose ultimate 
explanation cannot without circularity refer to primary qualities since they on the 
contrary have to be explained in terms of it. Primary qualities are nothing more on this 
view than an aspect of our world picture, and if that picture has an explanation, it must be 
in terms of the effect on us of something outside it, which will for that reason be 
unimaginable to us-the noumenal world.” p. 101.
6 Colin McGinn, The Subjective View, (Oxford, 1983)
1The View from Nowhere, p. 102.
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between primary and secondary qualities reflects the distinction be­
tween perception and conception, a distinction that does not parallel the 
distinction between ‘appearances’ and ‘things in themselves’. Per­
ceptions as well as conceptions are ‘appearances’, possible objects of 
thought fo r us. Nagel realizes this reply, but he does not seem to be 
very impressed by this “nonexplanation in terms of the inconceivable 
noumenal world”.8 His point is that there is no good reason to claim 
that our conception of the theoretical possibility to transcend our point 
of view, a conception necessarily given with the idea of realism, is 
nothing but just another higher-order description of the world as it 
appears to us.
To insist otherwise is to assume that if any conception has a possessor, it must 
be about the possessor’s point of view—a slide from subjective form to subjec­
tive content.9
It might help here to reformulate the quarrel between Nagel and Kant 
in terms of the distinction between ‘finding a meaningful world’ and 
‘making the world meaningful’. Nagel thinks that once we take the idea 
of realism for granted, i.e. once we accept the intelligibility of objectivi­
ty, it must with respect to every judgement be possible, in principle, to 
distinguish between whether it specifies a location within a conceptual 
framework or a property of an object. We can try for such a distinction 
between finding and making by transcending our particularity and our 
type, even though this self-transcendence will never be absolute.10
From the Kantian point of view, however, it is impossible to distin­
guish on one and the same level between judgements that specify a lo­
cation within a conceptual framework and those that specify a property 
of an object. This is so because, according to Kant, realism cannot be 
anything but empirical realism, and this kind of realism is only possi­
ble in connection with a specific kind of transcendental idealism, 
which is, so to speak, nothing but the other side of one and the same 
picture. Thus, any judgement that specifies a property of an object
8 ibid. p. 103.
9 ibid. p. 104.
10 See the next section, below pp. 39ff.
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concerns the world of appearances, and might, from the transcendental 
point of view, correctly be said to specify a location within our human 
conceptual framework. Hence, the Kantian tendency to maintain that, 
for example, the spatial extension of empirical objects is merely a 
feature of our way of understanding reality.
Nagel, however, is unwilling to accept the necessary conjunction of 
empirical realism with Transcendental Idealism. According to him, 
there is ground only for a more moderate claim. He asserts that if we 
are unable to unmask our beliefs about, for example, the spatial exten­
sion of physical things as specifying nothing but locations within a 
conceptual framework, we must be careful in two different ways: (1) 
we should realize the skeptical possibility that we mistakenly treat our 
‘making the world meaningful’ as ‘finding a meaningful world’; and 
(2) we should not think that this inability uncovers a transcendental 
truth. We should be moderate, acknowledging that we just don’t know 
(yet) whether our judgement about reality as spatially extended speci­
fies a property of empirical objects or their location within our concep­
tual framework, or, perhaps, a bit of both. The modesty Nagel urges 
for, leads to the awareness of a serious problem as regards our ability 
to give a comprehensive account of the relation between thoughts and 
objects. The problem presents itself, according to Nagel, in two differ­
ent ways.
On the one hand, we have to accept skepticism as objectivity’s 
twin11. Although objectivity must be a picture of the world from no 
point of view in particular, we cannot understand the possibility of it 
not being based on a specific point of view at all. Hence it seems to be 
the case that whatever forms the objective conception of the world can­
not itself be included in this objective picture. Therefore, it seems
to follow that the most objective view we can achieve will have to rest on an 
unexamined subjective base, and since we can never abandon our own point of 
view, but can only alter it, the idea that we are coming closer to the reality out­
side it with each successive step has no foundation.12
11 The View from Nowhere, pp. 67-71. This is more often heard, lately. See also, for 
example, P.F. Strawson’s Naturalism and skepticism: some varieties (Oxford, 1985)
12The View from Nowhere, p. 68.
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If there is a world independent of our minds, then objectivity is a real 
possibility (for such a world will have properties conceivable from 
nowhere in particular — that is, from the objective point of view), but 
so is skepticism (since we can never free ourselves completely from 
our point of view, we will never reach a view from nowhere).
On the other hand we will realize that once both skepticism and ob­
jectivity are real possibilities for us, it might turn out to be impossible 
for us to know whether we are able or unable to transcend our human 
point of view. It is with respect to the problematic of human self-trans­
cendence that Nagel shows his awareness of the aporetic character of 
the structure of our accounts of thinking. But, as I will argue in the next 
section, it is precisely with respect to this problematic that Nagel makes 
the same mistake as Kant — “a slide from subjective form to subjec­
tive content”.
2. Human self-transcendence
One of the most constant themes in Nagel’s work is the problematic 
of human self-transcendence. Although the notion appeared for the first 
time in the programmatic article “Subjective and Objective”13, the 
theme it refers to was already central in his celebrated “What is it like 
to be a bat?”, and is still at the core of his latest publication14. This pre­
dominance is comprehensible, granted Nagels view of realism.
There is a development in Nagel’s treatment of the subject. His ini­
tially largely negative result, that reduction is not always a good way of 
transcending one’s point of view, changed via an attempt to understand 
why self-transcendence is such a problematic affair to a wildly specu­
lative account of it in terms of all of us having, or being, besides our 
natural subjective self, an objective self as well, capable of conceiving 
the world from nowhere within it in particular. I shall take a look at 
each of these stages, arguing that the direction in which Nagel’s view
13 This article appeared for the first time as the final chapter of Mortal questions (pp. 
196-213). Despite this place, the article is really more of an introduction to subsequent 
work.
14 i.e. The View from Nowhere.
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develops shows an unwarranted tendency to think that the aporetic 
character of accounts of thinking is a consequence of our way of 
thinking rather than of the structure of our accounts of it.
The point of Nagel’s “What is it like to be a bat?” was to reveal a 
fundamental unclarity in the reductionism implied by physicalistic 
theories of the mind. In almost all fields of knowledge the process of 
reduction is a move in the direction of greater objectivity. That is, in 
order to understand more of, for example, the nature of snow, it is 
good practice to try to get out of your specific point of view of snow. 
This is true of you, and also of Italians, Eskimo’s, skiers, the 
Abominable Snowman, etc. The best conception of snow is an objec­
tive one, a conception with a content independent of any view towards 
snow in particular, a conception equally conceivable by you, and the 
Italians, Eskimo’s, etc. The reductionism involved in such a move 
towards greater objectivity is nothing but the idea that those aspects in 
your particular conception of snow that cannot be aspects of the con­
ception of snow of, for example, the Abominable Snowman, must be 
left out of the picture. In other words, getting a better grasp of snow 
consists in trying to reduce those aspects of snow that are only aspects 
of snow dependent on a specific viewpoint to aspects of snow that are 
independent of those specific viewpoints.
In accordance with this general practice of reduction, physicalistic 
theories of the mind assume that getting a better conception of the 
nature of experience is a matter of reducing the aspects dependent on a 
specific point of view towards experience. But now, there is the pro­
blem that one of the essential aspects of experience is ‘what it is like’ 
for an organism to have it — the “subjective character of experience”, 
in Nagel’s words.15 And as regards this aspect, it is fundamentally un­
clear whether the practice of reduction will make sense:
Certainly it appears unlikely that we will get closer to the real nature of human 
experience by leaving behind the particularity of our human point of view and 
striving for a description in terms accessible to beings that could not imagine 
what it was like to be us. If the subjective character of experience is fully com­
15 Mortal Questions, p. 166
prehensible only from one point of view, then any shift to greater objectivity —  
that is, less attachment to a specific viewpoint — does not take us nearer to the 
real nature of the phenomenon: it takes us farther away from it.16
Using an insecure terminology, one might think that the point is that 
it does make sense to reduce ‘appearances’ to ‘realities’ with respect to 
the external world, but not with respect to the ‘internal’ world, because 
the furniture of the ‘internal’ world consists of nothing but 
‘appearances’. The greyness of a tomato under a red light should be 
reduced to its redness under normal circumstances, so as to get rid of 
unreal colours. But in order to understand the nature of the grey appear­
ance as appearance, such a practice does not make sense, for it leaves 
us without any appearances at all. Such a traditional formulation has its 
point, but it is slightly misleading as well, because it tends to regard 
‘appearances’ as private objects, thus mislocating, according to Nagel, 
their subjectivity.
There is a sense in which phenomenological facts are perfectly objective: one 
person can know or say of another what the quality of the other’s experience is. 
They are subjective, however, in the sense that even this objective ascription of 
experience is possible only for someone sufficiently similar to the object of as­
cription to be able to adopt his point of view17
The central notion with respect to experience is indeed not that an 
experience consists of ‘appearances’, private objects with nothing but 
phenomenological properties, but that it, according to Nagel, implies 
'having a point of view’, that it makes sense to ask ‘what it is like’ for 
the organism that has the experience to have it. And it is this ‘having a 
view’, as an essential feature of experience, that, Nagel argues, explains 
the problematic character of psycho-physical reduction. But what is 
more, and here Nagel moves beyond the mind-body problem into the 
problematic of the relation between thoughts and objects, ‘having a 
view’ reveals that there might be objective facts that we cannot possibly 
comprehend. Bats ‘know’ facts about their environment. Such facts 
might probably be reduced to facts we know too, because we and the
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16 ibid. p. 174
17 ibid. p. 172
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bats both perceive trees and insects and the like, although we do not 
perceive them in the way bats do. There might be a lot of facts about 
those natural objects that can be grasped from both points of view. But, 
because of their ‘having a view’, we should expect bats to ‘know’ facts 
about ‘what it is like’ for them to have those experiences of trees and 
insects, too. And these latter facts we cannot possibly comprehend.
Reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the 
conclusion that there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions 
expressible in a human language. We can be compelled to recognize the 
existence of such facts without being able to state or comprehend them.18
This is a far-reaching conclusion, as it implies that an account of 
thinking based on reduction probably cannot be comprehensive. 
Thinking of reality probably is not the same as reducing a specific un­
derstanding of reality to an, ideally speaking, completely unspecific 
understanding of reality. There might, on the one hand, be judgements 
that are informative about the objects they apply to just because they 
specify properties of these objects. This might, for example, be the case 
with judgements that specify primary qualities of physical objects. But 
we have to admit, on the other hand, the possibility of there being 
judgements that are informative about the objects they apply to just be­
cause they specify a location within a particular conceptual framework, 
without it being possible to reconstruct these judgements as being in­
formative because of their specifying properties of objects. This might, 
for example, be the case with judgements that concern the “what is it 
like”-aspects of secondary qualities. Thus, in realizing the tension be­
tween the subjective aspect of having a point of view and the objective 
conception of reality produced by such a point of view, Nagel appears 
to be aware of the aporetic character of the structure of a comprehen­
sive account of thinking. It might be the case that thinking is both a 
matter of ‘finding a meaningful world’ and of ‘making the world 
meaningful’, without it being possible to understand how these differ­
ent ‘models’ are to be related to one another.
18 ibid. p. 171.
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In “Subjective and Objective” there is a change of emphasis. Nagel 
now presents the problem as how to value the presence of incompatible 
objective and subjective points o f view, suggesting, as I would put it, 
that we can get a comprehensive account of it in terms of the pro­
blematic of human self-transcendence.
Nagel begins by making a distinction between the notion of an ob­
jective point of view and that of a subjective point of view, suggesting 
these notions to be relative to one another, as if they refer to the ex­
tremes of some kind of continuum. Thus, the notions of a subjective 
and an objective point of view do not form different categories, but 
mark out a continuum, with on one end the point of view of a particular 
individual, and on the other end “a conception of the world which as 
far as possible is not the view from anywhere within it”.19 Nagel 
acknowledges the possibility of there being not really an end-point on 
this objective side of the continuum, but only some regulative ideal. 
Once we imagine such a kind of continuum, he argues, we can under­
stand the relativity of different viewpoints, in the sense that a general 
human point of view will be more objective than mine, but less objec­
tive than the point of view of physical science.
Because of this polar relativity, understanding the relation between a 
subjective and an objective point of view is, according to Nagel, mainly 
a question of understanding the process o f detachment,20 which is the 
process of transition from a more subjective point of view to a more 
objective one. ‘Reduction’ is one kind of interpretation of this process, 
but as we saw in the case of psychophysical reduction, it is not always 
clear what ‘reduction’ is supposed to be. The process of detachment, 
Nagel states now, involves two ways of transcendence of the self, a 
transcendence of particularity and a transcendence of one’s type.21 
Advancing our understanding is, at first sight, mainly a matter of these 
kinds of transcendence.
In terms of making and finding, it is relatively easy both to under­
stand what Nagel is after and to point out the problematic nature of 
Nagel’s attempt. Presumably, an extremely subjective point of view
44 Part One: Finding and Making
generates judgements that specify nothing but locations within a 
conceptual framework, whereas an extremely objective point of view 
generates judgements that specify nothing but the properties of objects. 
This latter extreme might, as Nagel notices, be just a regulative ideal: it 
might still be a judgement that specifies a location within a conceptual 
framework, but this framework will be so universal, so unbiased by 
whatever feature of the point of view it embodies, that we might take it 
as if the judgements it generates really specify nothing but properties of 
objects. The point of such an imagined continuum is that it allows us to 
think that a judgement says more about the properties of objects if it 
identifies a location within a more general conceptual framework. So 
far, however, this is merely an unwarranted suggestion, motivated per­
haps by the meanings of words: an objective point of view allows 
judgements to specify properties of objects. And actually, the idea 
behind this suggestion has the flavour of an unwarranted Kantian 
‘transcendentalism’: if absolutely nobody is able to point out that a par­
ticular judgement is informative because it makes the world meaning­
ful, why not accept, for the sake of simplicity, that this judgement is 
informative because it allows us to find a meaningful world.
In The View from Nowhere Nagel continues his attempt to explain 
the aporetic character of our accounts of thinking in terms of the intrin­
sically problematic nature of our human predicament. He does not only 
hold now that there are subjective and objective points o f view , but 
speculates moreover about there being different ‘subjects’ related to 
these points of view too.
Each of us, then, in addition to being an ordinary person, is a particular objec­
tive self, the subject of a perspectiveless conception of reality22
The emergence of this objective self, besides our subjective self, is 
according to Nagel quite unproblematic, given with the simple step of 
viewing the world as a place containing the person that I am.23 Thus
22 The View from Nowhere, pp. 63-64.
23 This kind of step plays an important role too, for example, in G.H. Mead’s social 
behaviourism, and in H. Plessner’s philosophical anthropology. See G.H. Mead, Mind,
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being already in some way beyond one’s particularity, the objective self 
might step forward, transcending one’s type as well. This last trans­
cendence probably is, to be sure, not really possible, but we can accord­
ing to Nagel understand what it would involve:
The aim of objectivity would be to reach a conception of the world, including 
oneself, which involved one’s own point of view not essentially, but only 
instrumentally, so to speak; so that the form of our understanding would be 
specific to ourselves, but its content would not be.24
The notion of an objective self has an initial advantage: it allows 
Nagel to give a comprehensive account of the tension between the 
subjective and the objective point of view as a tension that occurs in 
everyone of us, indeed in any organism capable of detachment. The 
possession of an objective self allows each of us a rudimentary grasp 
of reality as being a world in which we are contained and whose consti­
tution is independent of our minds, so that we can understand a differ­
ence between the way the world is and the way it seems to us to be.
Introducing the notion of an objective self has, however, an unac­
ceptable consequence as well. For if we take the idea of an objective 
self at face value, it implies an absolute distinction between an objective 
and a subjective understanding of reality. This implication is hard to 
accept, for different reasons. In the first place we can hardly combine 
such an absolute distinction with both the idea of the everlasting possi­
bility of skepticism, and with the polar relativity of objective and sub­
jective points of view. More seriously, however, if we are supposed to 
be an objective self as well as a subjective one, if we have an objective 
as well as a subjective understanding of reality, then this seems to 
imply that we have two fundamentally different kinds of experiences. 
But then it will make sense to hold that there are ‘facts’ about what it is 
like for me to be an objective self, as well as ‘facts’ about what it is like 
for me to be a subjective self. Hence, the subjective character of ex­
perience does not reside merely in my being a subjective self, but my 
experiences in the ‘objective mode’ will have a subjective character too.
Seif & Society (Chicago, 1934), and H. Plessner, Die Stufen des Organischen und der 
Mensch (Berlin, 1927)
24 The View from Nowhere, p. 74.
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Therefore, if we are to understand this, and if we accept Nagel’s way of 
understanding the relation between the objective and the subjective 
character of experience in terms of objective and subjective selves, then 
we are bound to accept that the experiences of the objective self de­
mand again a distinction between an objective objective self, and a sub­
jective objective self. And this will go on ad infinitum. The converse 
will happen as well. As a subjective self I will no doubt have expe­
riences of more than just the content of my own experiences. Hence, as 
a subjective self I will be capable of taking a more objective point of 
view towards the objects of my experiences. But this amounts to a 
further distinction, at least if we accept Nagel’s speculation concerning 
the distinction between objective and subjective selves, between an 
objective subjective self and a subjective subjective self. And this too 
will have to go on ad infinitum.
There is obviously something seriously wrong, here. Introducing the 
notion of an objective self, being the subject of a centerless view of the 
world25, leads to an infinite regress. For, even according to Nagel 
himself, at least the one that wrote “What is it like to be a bat?”, having 
a view is what is essential to the subjective character of experience.26
My diagnosis of what went wrong here is as follows.27 Nagel has 
mislocated the origin of the aporetic character of our accounts of 
thinking, or more carefully, Nagel has made the same mistake he ac­
cuses Kant of as having made. To repeat, if it is impossible for us to 
distinguish between (1) an x being F because of the way in which we 
conceive of x, and (2) an x really being F, we have to be careful in two 
ways. On the one hand, we should realize that the implied impossibility 
to transcend our way of conceiving x implies, as its twin, the skeptical 
possibility of our mistakenly believing x really to be F. And on the 
other hand, we should not think that the implied impossibility uncovers
25 ibid. p. 64.
26 See “What is it like to be a bat?”, p. 175.
27 Both A.W. Moore and Colin McGinn make similar observations in their discussions of 
Nagel’s The View from Nowhere, “...it is hard to resist the Wittgensteinian charge that he 
[Nagel] is confusing a kind of grammatical shift with a shift of subject matter”. A.W. 
Moore, in The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 37, 1987, p. 325. “Nagel’s stipulation, by 
contrast, has the consequence that manner of conception transfers itself to truth con­
ceived —  a result at odds with his own views”. Colin McGinn, in Mind 96, 1987, p. 264.
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a transcendental truth. With respect to Nagel’s unacceptable speculation 
about all of us having both a subjective and an objective self, this 
means the following. If it is impossible for us to distinguish between a 
relation between thoughts and objects having a problematical character 
because of the way in which we give an account of it, and a relation 
between thoughts and objects really having a problematical character, 
we should not assume that this relation is really problematical. And 
irony has it that it is exactly the failure of Nagel to give a compre­
hensive account of this relation between thoughts and objects as really 
being problematical in itself (because of “the dramatic idea of a conflict 
between selves”28), that shows us that such a way of distinguishing is 
impossible for us.29
This leads me to conclude that the need and the impossibility to do 
justice to two different ways in which judgements might be thought to 
be informative about the objects they apply to, must be appreciated on 
the level of our accounts of thinking, because there are no sufficient 
reasons to assume that the aporetics involved in these accounts follow 
from the problematical nature of the relation between thoughts and 
objects itself. Thus, Nagel must be tributed for being aware of the 
aporetic character of our accounts of thinking, but he must be blamed 
for underestimating the fact that we have to be moderate, that we have 
to accept the possibility that the problem he tries to grasp follows from 
the aporetic character o f the structure of our accounts of the relation 
between thoughts and objects.
28 As Colin McGinn puts it. op.cit. p. 268.
29 Even though A.W. Moore’s point is another one he also introduces the irony of 
success by means of failure: “But my charge of fundamental misguidedness is meant as a 
tribute: Nagel is led astray in ways which redound and are instructive at a fundamental 
level.” op.cit. p. 324.
CONCLUSION
In this part I criticised the views of Rosenberg, Rorty and Nagel on 
the relation between thoughts and objects. The theme of my critique 
was that the problems implied by their accounts of thinking, reflect the 
tension between doing justice both to the idea that thinking is like 
‘finding a meaningful world’ and the idea that it is like ‘making the 
world meaningful’.
The criticisms put forward allow me to draw the following conclu­
sions. As against Rosenberg it may be objected (1) that it is necessary 
to distinguish between a conception of thinking in terms of ‘finding a 
meaningful world’ and a conception of thinking in terms of ‘making 
the world meaningful’; and (2) that it is not the case that these different 
conceptions are analytically equivalent to one another. In accordance 
with Rorty it may be argued that it is not possible to give a compre­
hensive account of thinking merely in terms of finding a meaningful 
world’, but against Rorty it should be objected that it isn’t possible as 
well to give a comprehensive account of thinking merely in terms of 
‘making the world meaningful’. Hence, we have to do justice to aspects 
of both conceptions of the relation between thoughts and objects, even 
though we do not understand how we could; i.e. we should take the 
aporetic character of the structure of our accounts of thinking seriously. 
Finally, as against Nagel, it may be concluded that there are no suffi­
cient reasons to assume that the aporetics involved in our accounts of 
thinking follow from the problematical nature of the relation between 
thoughts and objects itself. As I will argue in the next part, this does 
not mean that we are allowed to conclude that the aporetic character is 
merely an aspect of our accounts of thinking, even though it must be 
appreciated on the level of our accounts of thinking. The point is that
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we have to be moderate, acknowledging that we just don’t know, be­
cause we are not in a position to distinguish between the aporetic being 
a feature of the structure of our accounts of thinking and of it being a 
feature of the relation between thoughts and objects itself.

PART TWO
SALOMON MAIMON 
AND THE 
ANTINOMY OF THOUGHT
“Auch werden sie behaupten, daß ich 
in meinen Erklärungen nicht selten 
meine eigene Gedanken dem Aristo­
te les  untergelegt habe. Was mich 
aber anbegrifft, so mag ich, in zwei­
felhaften Fällen, lieber meine Gedan­
ken, als gar keine dem A risto te les  
unterlegen.”
Salomon Maimon, 
Die Kathegorien des Aristoteles, 
(Berlin 1394), p. XI.
INTRODUCTION
In this part I will present a detailed analysis of Maimon’s defense of 
the Antinomy o f Thought — i.e. the claim that any account of thought, 
as really being about objects, implies a pair of statements whose con­
junction has to be true, even though we cannot understand how this is 
possible. Stated as a criticism of the constructive part of Kant’s trans­
cendental philosophy, Maimon’s point is that to understand the relation 
between thoughts and objects means to understand that the so-called 
problem of experience is both intelligible and insoluble.
In order to prepare the way for the rather technical analysis of Mai­
mon’s sometimes quite exotic views, I will present here the general 
argument of the following chapters. In the next chapter, “Salomon 
Maimon’s Reading of Kant”, I analyse Maimon’s critical interpretation 
of a number of Kantian distinctions. These are (1) a distinction between 
different kinds of judgements (analytic, a priori, and synthetic a 
priori); (2) a distinction between different kinds of objects (things in 
themselves and appearances)', and (3) a distinction between different 
kinds of ‘mental states’ (intuitions and concepts). The purpose of this 
chapter is to give the contemporary reader a relatively easy entrance to 
the idea of an Antinomy of Thought.
In my analysis of Maimon’s critique of Kant, it will become evident 
that it leads to this Antinomy o f Thought because Maimon argues 
against the comprehensibility of the fusion of the elements implied by 
the Kantian distinctions. Thus, Maimon argues that even though Kant 
is right in claiming that the problem of experience will be solved once 
we grasp the possibility of synthetic judgements a priori, it is impos­
Introduction 53
sible for us to comprehend the conjunction of the synthetic and the a 
priori in one single judgement. Likewise, Maimon argues that even 
though he does not accept the Kantian distinction between appearances 
and things in themselves, it is nevertheless necessary to distinguish 
between objects determined outside o f thought and objects determined 
by thought, and, again, we are unable to comprehend the possibility of 
the fusion of these different notions (i.e. of their referring to the same 
objects). And, finally, Maimon argues that even though Kant is right to 
stress the difference between sensibility and understanding, it is im­
possible for us to comprehend a particular representation as a synthesis 
of an intuition and a concept. By thus arguing that any account of the 
relation between thoughts and objects will end up with the Antinomy of 
Thought, Maimon expounds in a powerful way the latent aporetic in 
Kant’s philosophy.
Within the philosophical climate of the time it was only to be expect­
ed that Maimon’s defense of the inescapability of the Antinomy of 
Thought would take two forms. Given a philosophical world divided 
by the great controversy between skepticism and dogmatism, it would 
only be natural that Maimon turns out as defending on the one hand the 
value of skepticism and on the other hand the failure of dogmatism. 
But it is important to stress, that for Maimon the controversy was es­
sentially a conflict about whether an adequate account of the relation 
between thoughts and objects would, in the final analysis, present a 
problem or a solution. Thus, the skeptic holds that an understanding of 
the relation between thoughts and objects amounts to the comprehen­
sion of its intrinsically problematic nature, whereas the dogmatic holds 
that an understanding of the relation between thoughts and objects 
consists in a theory that solves any problem that could arise with 
respect to it.
I shall accept the notions of skepticism and dogmatism as convenient 
labels for arranging the argument I will reconstruct out of Maimon’s 
often quite chaotic writings. Thus in Chapter Five, “The Value of 
Skepticism”, I shall develop Maimon’s reasons for defending the 
highly paradoxical claim that to understand the relation between 
thoughts and objects means to understand why any account of it will 
have an aporetic character. This will involve on the one hand a detailed
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analysis of the implications of the distinction between the Quid juris 
and the Quidfacti, and on the other hand an elaborate exposition of the 
Principle ofDeterminability.
The point of the distinction between the Quid juris and the Quid facti 
is that it reveals that the relation between thoughts and objects might 
take two forms. Thus, taking for granted that a judgement embodies a 
relation between thoughts and objects, it will be argued that we have to 
distinguish between the judgement as containing a reason why it ex­
presses a relation between a mind and a specific state of affairs in the 
world and as containing the fact that it expresses such a relation. In 
addition, it will be argued that (1) it is necessary for any judgement, if it 
is to embody a relation between thoughts and objects, to take both 
forms, even though (2) these forms are incompatible with one another.
In order to explain these conflicting implications I shall make use of 
an analysis of what Maimon calls the Principle o f Determinability. 
This Principle governs, according to Maimon, all judgements that 
might properly be said to embody a relation between thoughts and 
objects. As will become clear however, we, having finite minds, will 
not be able to construct or encounter judgements that we know to be 
governed by this Principle. Although we understand the Principle of 
Determinability, and although we construct and encounter all kinds of 
judgements, we are unable to evaluate these judgements in the light of 
this Principle. The important implication of this is that it might be the 
case that many judgements are actually indeed governed by the 
Principle ofDeterminability, but that we just are unable to know which 
judgements are so governed.
Therefore we should, according to Maimon, defend a kind of skep­
ticism. This does not mean, however, that we have to avow an all-em­
bracing doubt. For Maimon skepticism is not like that. Rather, it 
amounts to a claim about the conditions of knowledge and, by that, a 
claim about our inability to satisfy them. More specifically, it amounts 
to a defense of the Antinomy o f Thought as an account of our human 
condition, an account of what it means to have a finite mind, an account 
we are unable to abandon. Maimon’s skepticism is an attempt to 
explain in terms of our finitude why the structure of our articulations of 
thinking has an aporetic character.
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As against this conclusion it might be objected that any account of 
whatsoever is unacceptable as long as it implies an unescapable pro­
blem. That is, the objection runs, we cannot claim to have understood 
something as long as it continues to challenge us with incomprehen­
sibilities. Therefore, if skepticism has the last word, we will necessarily 
be lost in absolute ignorance. It just cannot be defensible.
This objection introduces the voice of dogmatism. I will deal with it 
in the third chapter on Maimon, “The Failure of Dogmatism”, claim­
ing that the only way in which dogmatism could make sense implies 
itself a profound problem of intelligibility. I will argue that the dogma­
tic has to hold that, in the final analysis, the notion of an object deter­
mined outside o f thought, and that of an object determined by thought 
refer to the same kind of objects, even though this assumed identity of 
reference is, for us, incomprehensible. The point of this chapter will be 
to show that to understand why the relation between thoughts and 
objects is intrinsically incomprehensible, does not imply a self-refuting 
skepticism, even though it does imply that we cannot have a compre­
hensive account of this relation. This will allow me to conclude that an 
adequate account of the relation between thoughts and objects will have 
to take the form of a problem. Or, to put it this way, I will conclude 
that the aporetic character of the structure of our articulations of 
thinking is not something to be eliminated but, rather, something to be 
understood, which means to appreciate it for what it is: a problem.
CHAPTER FOUR 
SALOMON MAIMON’S READING OF 
KANT
Salomon Maimon was a Selbstdenker1. This is not to say, however, 
that he was not deeply influenced by other philosophers, or that he did 
not take pains to read what others had written. Quite the reverse; it is 
exactly his way of reading that made him into a Selbstdenker. Let me, 
by way of introducing the spirit of a very remarkable man, quote at 
length from his autobiographical Lebensgeschichte:
To satisfy my desire for the sciences, there was no other way but to learn 
foreign languages. But how should I start with that? (...)
Finally, by happy chance, I noticed that some Hebrew books, that were 
rather bulky, contained several alphabets which meant that the pages were not 
only printed with Hebrew characters, but that one could have used a second and 
a third alphabet, which were usually Latin and German characters.
It is true that I had no idea of the printer business. I used to think that books 
were printed like linen and that each page was printed by one special form.
But I suspected that the characters that stood next to one another signified 
the same letters, and as I had already heard something about the order of the 
alphabet of these languages, I supposed that, for example, ‘a’ which stood next 
to [the Hebrew ‘alpha’] must as well be an Alpha. In this way I learnt the Latin 
and German scripts.
1 Logik, p. 387
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By means of a way of deciphering I started to combine German characters 
into words, but all the time I doubted whether perhaps all my efforts were in 
vain, when the characters that stood next to the Hebrew ones were altogether 
something different from these letters, until, by lucky chance, some pages of an 
old German book fell into my hands.
I started to read them. To my great joy and astonishment I noticed from the 
relationship that these words corresponded with the words I already learnt. Of 
course, because of my Jewish language, a lot of words remained incomprehen­
sible, but the context allowed me to understand it almost completely, even 
though I left these words out.
This way of learning, by means of deciphering, is still the only way for me to 
grasp and judge the thoughts of others, and I assert that one cannot claim to 
have understood a book, as long as it remains necessary to present the thoughts 
of the author, in their definite order and context, by means of the phrases he 
used himself. This is nothing but a construction of thoughts, and only then one 
can pride oneself for having understood an author, when his thoughts, which 
were initially hard to follow, force one to think of these matters oneself, and 
when it becomes possible to put forward his thoughts, as if they were one’s 
own.2
2 Unless stated otherwise, translations are mine. Footnotes will contain the German 
original. “Um meiner Begierde nach Wissenschaften ein Genüge zu leisten, war kein 
anderes Mittel übrig, als fremde Sprachen zu lernen. Aber wie sollte ich es damit 
anfangen? (...)
Endlich kam mir hierin ein glücklicher Zufall zu Hilfe. Ich bemerkte nämlich an einigen 
hebräischen Büchern, die sehr strakleibig waren, daß sie mehrere Alphabete enthielten 
und man ihre Bogenanzahl daher nicht bloß mit hebräischen Buchstaben hatte bezeich­
nen können, sondern im zweiten und dritten Alphabet sich zu diesem Behuf auch anderer 
Schriftzeichen hatte bedienen müssen, welches gemeiniglich lateinische und deutsche 
Buchstaben waren.
Nun hatte ich zwar nicht den mindesten Begriff von einer Druckerei. Ich stellte mir 
gemeinichlich vor, daß Bücher so wie Leinwand gedruckt würden und daß jede Seite durch 
eine besondre Form abgedruckt würde.
Ich vermutete aber, daß die nebeneinanderstehenden Schriftzeichen einen und eben­
denselben Buchstaben bedeuteten, und da ich schon von der Ordnung des Alphabets in 
diesen Sprachen etwas gehört hatte, so supponierte ich, daß z.B. a, das neben [the hebrew 
‘alpha’] steht, gleichfalls ein Alpha sein müsse, und lernte auf diese Art nach und nach die 
lateinische und deutsche Schrift kennen.
Durch eine Art des Dechiffrierens fing ich an, verschiedene deutsche Buchstaben in 
Wörter zu kombinieren, blieb aber dabei noch immer zweifelhaft, ob nicht meine ganze 
Mühe vergebens sein würde, indem die neben den hebräischen Buchstaben befindlichen 
Schriftzeichen ganz etwas anderes als eben dieselben Buchstaben sein könnten, bis mir 
zum Glück einige Blätter aus einem alten deutschen Buche in die Hände fielen.
Ich fing an zu lesen. Und wie groß war nicht meine Freude und Verwunderung, da ich aus 
dem Zusammenhang sah, daß die Worte mit denjenigen, die ich schon gelernt hatte, völ­
lig übereinstimmten. Zwar blieben mir nach meiner jüdischen Sprache eine Menge Worte 
unverständlich, aber aus dem Zusammenhange konnte ich doch auch, mit Weglassung 
dieser Worte, das Ganze ziemlich fassen.
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Maimon read Kant in this way.3 And Kant appreciated it, as seems 
to follow from the famous letter Kant wrote to Marcus Herz, in which 
it is said that
...but a glance soon enabled me to recognize its merits and to see not only that 
none of my opponents had understood me so well, but that very few could claim 
so much penetration and subtlety of mind in profound inquiries of this sort, as 
Mr. Maimon.4
From this letter it is clear too that Kant considered Maimon to be an 
opponent.5 He was. But it is more important to stress that Maimon, in 
reading Kant, was set on to something -  something Kant was apt to 
miss (hence Maimon’s frequent struggles with and arguments against
Die Art, durch Dechiffrieren zu lernen, macht noch jetzt meine eigne Manier aus, die 
Gedanken anderer zu fassen und zu beurteilen, und ich behaupte, daß man noch gar nicht 
sagen kann, man verstehe ein Buch, solange man sich gezwungen sieht, die Gedanken des 
Verfassers in ihrer bestimmten Ordnung und Verbindung mit den von ihm gebrauchten 
Ausdrücken vorzutragen. Dieses ist ein bloßes Werk des Gedächtnisses, und nur alsdann 
kann man sich rühmen, einen Autor verstanden zu haben, wenn man durch seine 
Gedanken, die man anfangs bloß dunkel wahmimmt, veranlaßt wird, selbst über diese 
Materie nachzudenken und dieselbe, obschon auf Veranlassung eines ändern, selbst her­
vorzubringen.’’Sa/omon Maimons Lebensgeschichte, (Insel Verlag 1984), pp. 73-75.
3 as he did with Maimonides, Leibniz, Aristotle, Spinoza, Reinhold, Aenesidemus, etc.
4 English translation from F.Beiser, The Fate of Reason, p. 285 “Allein ein Blick, den 
ich darauf [on the manuscript of Maimon’s Versuch über die Transscendentalphilosophie] 
warf, gab mir bald die Vorzüglichkeit desselben zu erkennen, und daß nicht allein nie­
mand von meinen Gegnern mich und die Hauptfrage so wohl verstanden, sondern daß auch 
nur wenige zu dergleichen tiefen Untersuchungen so viel Scharfsinn besitzen möchten, 
als Hr. Maimon.”Letter from Kant to Marcus Herz, May 26, 1789. Kant, Briefwechsel, ed. 
Otto Schöndorffer(Leipzig, 1924), pp. 396ff. It might well be, however, that these ap- 
preciatory words are but a kind of politeness of Kant towards his friend Marcus Herz, for 
in a letter to Reinhold (March 28th, 1794) we read “...what however, for example, a 
Maimon actually wants with his readjustment of my critical philosophy (a thing Jews 
like to do, to provide themselves with prominence at the expense of others) [I] did not 
quite understand, and therefore I have to leave it to others to reprimand him.” “...was aber 
z.B. ein Maimon mit seiner Nachbesserung der kritischen Philosophie (dergleichen die 
Juden gerne versuchen, um sich auf fremde Kosten ein Ansehen von Wichtigkeit zu 
geben) eigentlich wolle, [ich] nie recht habe fassen können und dessen Zurechtweisung 
ich anderen überlassen muü.”Kant, Briefwechsel, ed. Otto Schöndorffer(Leipzig, 1924), 
pp. 662f. I owe this reference to prof.dr. J. Mansfeld.
5 It is clear as well from this letter that Kant misses the point of Maimon’s criticism. See 
for this same judgement F.C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason, pp. 370-371, note 15.
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Kant’s conception of a critical, transcendental philosophy), something 
that, nevertheless, was first made discernible by Kant’s transformation 
of the problem of experience, namely, the intrinsically aporetic charac­
ter o f  the structure o f our articulations o f thinking. It is in order to 
clarify this, that I start my analysis of Maimon’s defense of the Antino­
my o f Thought with a reconstruction of his reading of Kant.
The theme of this reconstruction will be Kant’s transformation of the 
problem of experience, which according to Maimon reveals a ‘con­
sciousness-inherent dualism’. Although Kant succeeded in avoiding 
the misleading dualism between the human mind and the external 
world (a dualism that had frustrated both rationalists and empiricists 
for some time), and succeeded in formulating the problem of empirical 
knowledge in terms of the inner structure of the mind, he was, accord­
ing to Maimon, too interested in solutions to be able to grasp the depth 
of the problem he had uncovered. Kant succeeded as far as he did, be­
cause he introduced some new distinctions: (1) a distinction between 
appearances and things in themselves; (2) a distinction between certain 
kinds of judgements, introducing the notion of a synthetic judgement a 
priori; and (3) a distinction of kind, instead of of degree, between con­
cepts and intuitions. But his success remains limited to the uncovering 
of a problem . As Maimon argues, a proper understanding of the 
Kantian distinctions shows that Kant’s transcendental philosophy is 
untenable as a solution to the problem of experience, because the dis­
tinctions we need to understand the problem are themselves responsi­
ble for its remaining a problem.
In the following pages I will develop this Maimonian argument, by 
taking a closer look at his reading of the Kantian distinctions.
1. Appearances and things in themselves
Up to the present day, the obscure and peculiar notion of a thing in 
itself is one of the most debated aspects of Kant’s philosophy.6 Imme­
6 See for a review of the recent attention it received Karl Ameriks “Recent Work on Kant’s 
Theoretical Philosophy” {American Philosophical Quarterly, 1982).
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diately after the publication of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft it became 
the focal point of a vivid and extremely interesting debate on the pre­
mises of a critical philosophy.7 Maimon’s contribution to this debate 
was original and important, because he was one of the few to direct all 
attention to the distinction between things in themselves and appear­
ances, rather than just to the puzzling notion of a thing in itself. This 
allowed him to pass over the received reason for introducing the notion 
of a thing in itself, and to ask instead for a reason, from within the 
critical philosophy, for introducing a distinction between two kinds of 
‘intentional’ objects.8 Having found such a reason, Maimon was able to 
re-interpret it in such a way that there is no need for either of the objects 
to have a transcendent status.
Kant gave the notion of a thing in itself evidently two functions. On 
the one hand the notion has a merely negative function, to explain the 
meaning of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. That is, Kant used the 
notion of a thing in itself negatively, or polemically, as a kind of limit­
ing concept, to clarify his claim that from a transcendental point of 
view all objects of experience are dependent on the mind.9 Appearances 
are not things in themselves and, consequently, we are not allowed to 
treat them as if they had an existence of their own, nor are we allowed 
to think that their a priori characteristics are characteristics of things in 
themselves as well.
Besides this negative function, Kant frequently makes a positive use 
of the notion of a thing in itself too.10 This positive use is primarily 
related to “the tricky question of affection”11. Kant maintains that our
7 See for an overview of this debate Ernst Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem. Dritter Band: 
Die Nachkantischen Systeme, (Berlin 1923), pp. 17-126. See also Frederick C. Beiser, 
The Fate o f Reason. German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Harvard, 1987).
8 I will make frequent use, in my interpretation of Maimon, of the notion of an 
‘intentional’ object, even though Maimon himself never uses the term. I will discuss my 
reasons for this later on, in section 3. Here I use the notion in order to escape the need to 
use words that favour either a “double-aspect” or a “two-object” view of the distinction. 
See, for this contemporary distinction Richard E. Aquila, “Things in Themselves and 
Appearances: Intentionality and Reality in Kant”, in Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie, 1979.
9 KdrV , B 311.
10 See, for example, KdrV  B xxvi-xxvii, A251-252, B235/A190, Prolegomena 314-315.
11 “die heikle Frage der Affektion”; Henri Lauener, Hume und Kant (Bern, 1969), p. 129.
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sensibility is a receptive faculty.12 Its content is the product of two 
factors: (1) space and time as a priori forms of intuition; and (2) an un­
knowable factor x, the thing in itself, which somehow is needed to 
explain the a posteriori character of experience. Or, as Kant says it:
The faculty of sensible intuition is strictly only a receptivity, a capacity of 
being affected in a certain manner with representations (...) The non-sensible 
cause of these representations is completely unknown to us, and cannot there­
fore be intuited (...) We may, however, entitle the purely intelligible cause of 
appearances in general the transcendental object, but merely in order to have 
something corresponding to sensibility viewed as a receptivity.13
It is Kant’s temptation to explain the passive, ‘given’ element in 
intuition by means of an analysis in terms of our sensibility being a 
receptive faculty. The a posteriori character of all empirical knowledge 
cannot be explained, according to him, by reference to the spontaneity 
of our understanding, nor by reference to the forms of intuition, since 
these only provide for the possibility of experience, not for its actuality. 
We need recourse to some transcendent object, of which we do not 
know anything, and need not know anything but that it must somehow 
be responsible for the appearances that we experience.
Even though this Kantian account of our receptivity is fairly 
cautious, since it does not imply any positive knowledge of things in 
themselves, but only needs to posit them as an unknown “cause” or 
“ground” in order to be able to explain the a posteriori character of 
experience, it could not satisfy Kant’s early commentators. It was 
exactly with respect to “the tricky question of affection” that the notion 
of a thing in itself became the pivotal point of Reinhold’s, Jacobi’s and 
Schultze’s attempts to understand the coherency of Kant’s critical phi­
losophy. Witness Jacobi’s famous epigram, this was hard to do: “I
12 KdrV, B33/A19
13 Translation from Norman Kemp Smith “Das sinnliche Anschauungsvermögen ist 
eigentlich nur eine Rezeptivität, auf gewisse Weise mit Vorstellungen affiziert zu werden 
( ...)  Die nichtsinnliche Ursache dieser Vorstellungen ist uns gänzlich unbekannt, und 
diese können wir daher nicht als Objekt anschauen (...) Indessen können wir die bloß in- 
telligibele Ursache der Erscheinungen überhaupt, das transzendentale Objekt nennen, 
bloß, damit wir etwas haben, was der Sinnlichkeit als einer Rezeptivität korrespon­
diert.’’ibid. B522/A494.
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need the assumption of things-in-themselves to enter the Kantian sys­
tem, but with this assumption it is not possible for me to remain inside 
it.”14
Maimon was not convinced of the need to introduce some kind of 
transcendent object in order to be able to explain the fact that experience 
has an a posteriori character. More than that, he rejected the whole ex­
planation as a non-explanation. If we think it makes sense to assert that 
things in themselves cause in us certain sensations, he argues, then it 
makes sense as well to ask what causes these things in themselves to 
cause these rather than other sensations. And this kind of questioning 
could go on ad infinitum, as is nicely illustrated by the following 
example:
This is more or less like the question of the Indian who, when it is said to him 
that the world rests on a couple of elephants and the elephants on a huge tor­
toise, asks in his innocence: “And on what, finally, rests the tortoise?”.15
Maimon’s point is not to show that every explanation implies a 
possible regressus, nor just to show that the explanation under consi­
deration has such an obscure structure that it hardly can count as an 
explanation at all. No, the point is that there is an illusion involved in 
thinking that an appearance implies something other than itself that 
appears. Kant gave occasion for the illusion by speaking sometimes of 
appearances as of “mere representations”.16 This need not have been 
misleading by itself, had Kant been very clear about a ‘representation’ 
(“Vorstellung”) actually being a ‘partial presentation’ (“Theildarstel- 
lung”).17 Now that he wasn’t, the illusion18, Maimon argues, deceived 
Reinhold as well as Schultze.19
14 Jacobi, Werke (Leipzig, 1812), II, p. 304. Quoted from (and translated by) Frederick C. 
Beiser, The Fate of Reason, p. 124.
15 “Es hat damit ungefähr die Bewandniß als mit der Frage des Indianers, der, indem man 
ihm sagte: die Welt steht auf ein paar Elephanten, und die Elephanten auf einer größen 
Schildkröte, in seiner Unschuld fragte: und worauf endlich die Schildkröte?” Maimon, 
Logik, p. 321.
16 See, for example, KdrV, B591/A563.
17 Maimon, Logik, pp. 241-242.
18 Compare the following fragments to see in what way Maimon unmasks a Kantian
reasoning, “es folgt auch natürlicher Weise aus dem Begriffe einer Erscheinung über­
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In itself, this point does not have a positive consequence. After all, 
Maimon is bound to admit that the status of the ‘given’ in real thought 
is still a problem. Nonetheless, now that Maimon made clear that there 
is no positive use for the notion of a thing in itself with respect to the 
problem of affection, he is in a position to see whether the distinction 
between appearances and things in themselves, introduced by Kant in 
order to be able to explain the meaning of his Transcendental Idealism, 
implies more than just a negative use for the notion of a thing in itself.
According to Maimon this is indeed the case. That is, the distinction 
between appearances and things in themselves is in Kant’s philosophy, 
at least initially, a distinction between two different kinds of ‘intentio­
nal’ objects, i.e. a distinction between two different kinds of objects to 
which thought might be related. On the one hand, there are appear­
ances, objects whose form fits our forms of thought, since it is some­
how the product of thought; on the other hand we can imagine objects 
that have a form that does not fit the forms of thought, in which case 
we have to assume that these objects have a form of their own, a form 
that is not a product of thought. To be sure, this is for Maimon as well 
as for Kant, a transcendental distinction: it concerns the conditions for 
thought to have objects to think about. So far, the distinction apparently 
allows only a negative use for the notion of a thing in itself: it is 
supposed to refer to objects that cannot be objects for thought. Hence, 
the notion could not possibly have a positive referential use.
haupt: daß ihr etwas entsprechen müsse, was an sich nicht Erscheinung ist, weil 
Erscheinung nichts für sich selbst, und außer unserer Vorstellungsart sein kann, mithin, 
wo nicht ein beständiger Zirkel herauskommen soll, das Wort Erscheinung schon eine 
Beziehung auf Etwas anzeigt, dessen unmittelbare Vorstellung zwar sinnlich ist, was aber 
an sich selbst, auch ohne diese Beschaffenheit unserer Sinnlichkeit (worauf sich die Form 
unserer Anschauung gründet), Etwas, d.i. ein von der Sinnlichkeit unabhängiger 
Gegenstand sein muß.” Kant, KdrV , A251-252. “Da wir durch die beständige 
Wirksamkeit der reproduktiven Einbildungskraft uns Objekte beständig vorstellen, d.h. 
weil die Einbildungskraft nicht stark genug ist, alle Merkmale der Objekte darzustellen, 
und wir immer die dargestellten Merkmale auf die noch fehlenden und im Objekt selbst 
befindlichen beziehen, so entstehet bei uns die Täuschung, als wären alle Objekte unsers 
Bewußtseyns Vorstellungen-, und da wir nicht wissen, worauf wir die ursprünglichen 
Objekte weiter beziehen sollen, so fingiren wir Objekte außer denselben, gleichsam als 
deren Urbilder, worauf sich jene beziehen.” Maimon, Logik, p. 242.
19 Logik, p. 319; p. 368.
However, there are two complications. For, if appearances have 
nothing of their own, if they are nothing but products of thought, then 
(1) the notion of truth would lose its meaning (thought would equal 
fantasy—i.e. the “Einbildungskraft” would be our only cognitive fac­
ulty), and (2) thought could not have an a posteriori aspect (experience 
would not exist). These complications, to be sure, are ruled out by 
Kant, since he clearly states that it is only the form, not the matter, of 
appearances that is a product of thought. Thus, Kant gave the notion of 
a thing in itself its positive use: as we have seen things in themselves 
are held responsible for the provision of the matter of appearances. 
Seen from this perspective however, Kant’s move has something in­
comprehensibly arbitrary. After all, the consequence of this move is 
that we are bound to admit that it is only the form  of appearances that 
we can think about20, and that we must accept that objects of thought 
are some strange amalgam— combinations of an intelligible form and 
some unintelligible matter. Hence, what have we won by distinguish­
ing appearances from things in themselves, if a shadow of the distinc­
tion recurs in one of its terms? Why would we be interested in objects 
whose form is intelligible, but whose matter is not?
It is at this point that the originality of Maimon with respect to the 
distinction between things in themselves and appearances is most evi­
dent. In his attempt to evade the complications involved, he forces on 
us a plausible reinterpretation of the initial distinction. If we want to 
make a distinction between objects that f it the forms of thought, and 
objects that do not fit these forms, we are in fact, Maimon argues, 
looking for a distinction between objects we might regard as being 
determined by thought, and objects we consider to be determined  
outside of thought.21
If we accept this interpretation of a distinction between two kinds of 
‘intentional’ objects, we can, Maimon argues, evade the complications 
mentioned above. For, firstly, we can understand that the notion of 
truth makes sense in the following way: a representation, which is an 
object determined by thought, might be said to be true if it corresponds
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20 as Kant realised. See KdrV, BXVDI
21 Maimon, Logik, pp. 21-22., and p. 327.
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to an object considered to be determined outside o f thought, if, that is, 
the determinations of the former object (being ‘produced’ by thought) 
are identical to those of the latter one.22 For example, if I have a repre­
sentation of a tomato being red, then this representation is true if it cor­
responds to a tomato which, considered to be determined outside of 
thought, is red as well.
Secondly, we can understand that there is a definitely a posteriori 
aspect in thought, if there are objects for thought, that are objects 
determined outside o f  thought. Surely, these latter cannot be things in 
themselves. After all, if they were, then they could not be objects for  
thought, and we would be bound to take recourse to the untenable 
Kantian suggestions that led immediately, as we saw above, to “the 
tricky question of affection”. No, taking objects determined outside of 
thought to be transcendent objects leads nowhere, and what is more, it 
is not necessary at all. For we are acquianted with a very clear, and 
obvious kind of object determined outside o f thought: namely, the ob­
jects of intuition.23 There is a clear sense in which we are confronted by 
them, without, in any clear sense, being able to assert that thought 
determined them. Even Kant, of course, has to admit that; as he does, 
to wit, since for Kant thought only determines the form  of appear­
ances.
The distinction between an object determined by thought and an 
object determined outside o f thought is for a proper understanding of 
Maimon’s defense of the Antinomy o f Thought of utmost importance. 
Therefore I will have to say, in this as well as in subsequent chapters, 
much more about it. Here, however, I will just clarify the connotation 
of the addition ‘outside o f thought', in order to be able to indicate in 
what way Maimon speaks of objects of intuition as of ‘objects deter­
mined outside of thought’. Something is determined outside o f thought 
if it is something that is (1) present to consciousness, (2) without being 
determined by thought', that is, if it might properly be regarded as an 
intentional object, without thereby implying that it is determined accor­
ding to concepts, i.e. rules of the understanding. This means, to be
22 ibid. p. 18.
23 ibid. p. 327.
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sure, that objects determined outside o f thought are consciousness- 
inherent: typically a manifold taken together in consciousness, without 
thereby implying that the ‘act’ of consciousness was governed by rules 
of the understanding.24 By thus using the distinction between 
‘consciousness’ and ‘thought’ to give meaning to a difference between 
two kinds of ‘intentional’ (‘consciousness-inherent’) objects, Maimon 
is able to save the function of the Kantian distinction between appear­
ances and things in themselves, without committing himself to the 
introduction of transcendent objects —objects the mind by definition 
cannot cope with.
It is important of course to realize that Maimon is still confronted 
with the problem of the ‘given’, but, seen from his perspective, this is 
not really the problem of affection. The real problem in an account of 
thinking is not so much how it is possible that there are objects present 
to consciousness that are nevertheless not determined by thought. As 
we will see, according to Maimon, all real objects25 are. No, the big 
problem here is how it is possible, if it is possible at all, to determine 
by thought objects that are considered to be already determined outside 
o f thought.
It is this problem that Maimon discovered in reading Kant. It is a 
manifestation of the Antinomy of Thought™. Thought needs, in order to 
be able to think of reality, at the same time objects determined outside 
of thought as well as objects determined by thought, and, what is more, 
in any concrete act of thinking these different kinds of objects must be 
thought to be identical.
24 For Maimon the distinction between ‘consciousness’ and ‘thought’ is very important. 
I will have to say more about that below. See, Maimon, Logik, pp. 21-25; p. 251.
25 In Maimon’s writings the notion of a real object is a complicated one. On the one hand 
he uses it to refer to actual objects of experience, and on the other hand he uses it to refer 
to objects that are completely determined. This latter definition is more basic than the 
former one. For it is the case that every actual object of experience is completely 
determined but it is not the case that every object that is completely determined is an 
actual object of experience. After all, it might be an object that is created by means of a 
thought of the infinite mind. As far as the objects of our finite mind are concerned, the 
class of objects that is completely determined is equivalent to the class of actual objects 
of experience. Cf. below p. 80; pp.84f; pp. 140-146.
26 Maimon, Worterbuch, p. 162.
Maimon’s Reading o f Kant 67
There are two more ways to present Maimon’s discovery of the 
Antinomy o f Thought in terms of his reading of Kant. One is by way of 
Maimon’s criticism of Kant’s treatment of the question “Are synthetic 
judgements a priori possible?”; the other by way of Maimon’s criti­
cism of Kant’s distinction between concepts and intuitions. I will turn 
first to the notion of a synthetic judgement a priori.
2. Synthetic judgements a priori
The introduction of the notion of a synthetic judgement a priori is, at 
least in a historical sense, one of Kant’s greatest contributions to philo­
sophy. It enabled him to accomplish a radical transformation of the 
problem of experience. Instead of taking this problem as being con­
cerned with the rather incomprehensible relation between the human 
mind and the external world, Kant made it possible to tackle it by 
focusing on certain distinctions between different types of judgements. 
Thus Kant was able to sidestep the unpromising task of having to 
bridge the gap between the human mind and the external world. The 
focus shifted, in other words, from a very problematic relational ap­
proach to a very promising semantic approach.27 What makes experi­
ence (i.e. empirical knowledge) differ from perception (mere opinion) 
now no longer needs to be regarded as some incomprehensible relation 
between the mind and the world, but can be taken as a special feature of 
a certain type of judgement.
This is a radically new approach, made possible by Kant’s 
Copernican revolution, which opened up the possibility to treat features 
of objects as the contents of judgements. As we shall see, this shift of 
attention was fully explored by Maimon. In a critical vein, though, for
27 These labels stem from Richard Aquila, Representational Mind (Bloomington, 1983), 
pp. 36ff. It is important to admit that these labels ask for a very careful use. They are not 
intended to make Kant into a philosopher who made a ‘linguistic turn’. I use them just to 
cover Kant’s stress upon the inner functions of the components of a conscious state, as 
being a mental as well as a linguistic state. That is, ‘semantic’ here does not contrast 
with ‘psychological’, but with ‘relational’—i.e. the label is meant to underline Kant’s 
renouncement of any attempt to understand meaning as the product of a relation between 
the mind and the external world.
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Maimon was convinced that Kant, notwithstanding his having 
‘invented’ the new approach, seriously failed to do justice to the differ­
ences between analytic, synthetic, a priori and a posteriori judgements.
In order to understand the question that is central to Kant’s Kritik der 
reinen Vernunft: “How are synthetic judgements a priori possible?”28, 
it is necessary, Maimon argues, to differentiate between the following 
questions:
1. How are analytic judgements a priori possible?
2. How are synthetic judgements as judgements in themselves, without 
any relation to the empirical objects which fall under them, in respect 
to which they are a priori, possible?
3. How are synthetic judgements a priori in mathematics possible?
4. How are synthetic judgements a priori in empirical science possi 
ble?29
An analysis of the first two questions will show (1) why Maimon 
claims that the only way to understand the actual existence of synthetic 
judgements a priori is to accept the incompleteness, the finitude, of our 
understanding; and (2) why there is a problem of method related to 
how to answer these questions. An analysis of the last two questions 
will subsequently clarify why Maimon claims that the last question 
cannot be answered at all.
The point of the first question is nothing but to set the scene for 
grasping the differences between the other three questions. Its purport 
is, according to Maimon, to ask for the possibility of knowing that cer­
tain determinations (“Bestimmungen”) belong to every determinate 
object, before knowing any specific determinations of those objects. 
And the answer to this question stems from the notion of an object at
28 “Wie sind synthetische Urteile a priori möglich?”Kant, KdrV , B19.
29 “ l. Wie sind analytische Urtheile a priori möglich?
2. Wie sind synthetische Urtheile als Urtheile an sich, ohne Beziehung auf die 
darunter zu subsumirenden empirischen Objekte, in ansehung welcher sie a 
priori sind, möglich?
3. Wie sind synthetische Urtheile a priori in der Mathematik möglich?
4. Wie sind synthetische Urtheile a priori in der Naturwissenschaft möglich?” 
Maimon, Logik, pp. 412-418
Maimori s Reading o f Kant 69
all (“Objekt überhaupt”), which is dependent upon the logical Principle 
of Non-Contradiction, and its relative, the Principle of Identity.
we have to predicate of determinate objects, prior to any knowledge of their 
specific determinations, what we have to predicate of an object at all.30
An analytic judgement a priori, thus, represents a piece of know­
ledge: it presents a relation between certain determinations and certain 
objects, or, more precisely, between a certain determination (“Bestim­
mung”) and a certain ‘determinable’ (“Bestimmbares”), by means of a 
semantical entity relating a predicate to a subject. The knowledge con­
tained by an analytic judgement a priori is, of course, rather small; it 
means nothing more than that the subject it is about is an object at all— 
a thing identified, i.e. nothing but a ‘determinable’ identical with its 
determination.31
The important thing to notice here is the way in which Maimon 
analyses the separate parts of the notion of an analytic judgement a 
priori. “Judgement” stands for some piece of knowledge, that is, for 
having determined some object in some way (I might add that there is 
for Maimon, as for Kant and their contemporaries, no interesting dif­
ference between a piece of knowledge considered as a linguistic entity, 
and a piece of knowledge considered as a specific mental state32). “A 
priori” stands for having the specific knowledge that is presented by a 
judgement a priori, before, that is, prior to having any other knowledge 
of the specific object it is knowledge of. Thus, if there is with regard to 
a certain object some a priori knowledge of it, then this means that we 
have to determine the object in some specific way (namely, the way 
presented by the judgement a priori) before being able to determine this 
object in another way. “Analytic”, finally, stands for having the speci­
fic knowledge that is presented by an analytic judgement implicit in any
30 “wir müssen von bestimmten Objekten, vor der Erkenntniß ihrer besondem Bestim­
mungen, dasjenige prädiciren, was wir von einem Objekt überhaupt prädiciren 
müssen.”ibid. p. 415.
31 For example, A=A.
32 This, for analytical philosophers, almost natural distinction stems from Frege’s fear 
for a psychologism. See Stanley Rosen, The Limits o f Analysis, pp. 4-26.
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other knowledge of the object. Thus, if there is with regard to a certain 
object some analytic knowledge of it, then this means that a certain de­
termination of the object (namely, the one presented in the analytic 
judgement) is implied  by any other determination of the object in­
volved.
The difference between a priori and analytic is crucial. It reflects the 
specific position of a thinking subject in the course of determining an 
object. If certain determinations belong to a specific object in such a 
way that one has to start a process of determining that object by using 
these determinations, then judgements which attribute these determina­
tions to the object in question are, in the final analysis, both analytic 
and a priori. After all, in order to be able to determine this specific ob­
ject in whatever way, one has to start first with determining the object 
by means of the determinations under consideration. Hence, the judge­
ments containing them are a priori. They are analytic too, for any 
determination that can be attributed to the object, implies a prior deter­
mination of the object by means of the mentioned determinations. Let 
me illustrate this. The determination “having three sides” is, according 
to Maimon, part of the concept (the rule of production) of a triangle. 
Therefore it belongs to any knowledge of a triangle in such a way that 
any process of determining a triangle has to start with a judgement 
stating that it is a spatial shape having three sides. It does not make 
sense, for example, to determine the colour of the triangle first; no, the 
determination “having three sides” precedes all other determinations of 
whatever triangle. Hence, the judgement containing this determination 
is a priori. It is analytic too, for any determination of a triangle implies 
that the object, since it is a triangle, is determined by the determination 
“having three sides”.
From the point of view of a thinking subject, however, there can be a 
difference between a priori and analytic judgements; not only qua con­
notation (such a difference is, after all, implied by the given analysis), 
but precisely qua denotation. For it might be necessary for some 
thinking subject to start with some specific determination of some 
specific object. A judgement that attributes this determination to this 
object, consequently, is a priori. But if there do not follow more deter­
minations of the object under consideration, then it makes no sense to
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say that the judgement that attributed the specific determination to this 
object is analytic, since the determination under consideration is not 
implied by any other determination of the specific object Such a judge­
ment is, therefore, a synthetic judgement a priori, but it can only be 
such a judgement if the mind of the thinking subject involved is 
limited, incomplete, if, that is, the thinking subject is unable to proceed 
the determination of the object under consideration.33
This analysis of the notion of an analytic judgement a priori, leading 
to the conclusion that a judgement can only be a priori and synthetic for 
a limited mind in the midst of determining its objects, has as a result 
that the specific position of the thinking subject with respect to the 
judgements under consideration is of great importance to the character 
of these judgements. And this, as Maimon points out, makes it neces­
sary to differentiate between the three questions, quoted above, that deal 
with synthetic judgements a priori.
The first of these, to repeat,
How are synthetic judgements as judgements in themselves, without any rela­
tion to the empirical objects which fall under them, in respect to which they are 
a priori, possible?
is mainly a rhetorical question. Maimon wants to make clear that, in the 
final analysis, it is hard to make sense of the conjunction of ‘synthetic’ 
and ‘a priori’. After all, ‘a priori’ implies that the determination of the 
object presented by the judgement in question precedes any other 
determination of the object. Strictly speaking, this entails that any other 
determination of the object presupposes this ‘a priori’ determination. 
However, ‘synthetic’ does imply that the judgement involved is not 
analytic, that is, that it is not the case that any determination of the 
object under consideration implies this specific determination; that, to 
put it differently, there is no ground for accepting the necessity of the 
determination in question. Stated thus, a synthetic judgement a priori 
does not so much express a special kind of knowledge, but expresses 
much more a strange kind of perplexity: the existence of synthetic 
judgements a priori reveals the incompleteness of our minds. It reveals
33 Maimon, Transscendentalphilosophie, pp. 61-62.
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that we do not know enough of things to understand them. In other 
words, were we to understand the possibility of synthetic judgements a 
priori, we would be bound to assert that they actually cannot be possi­
ble at a ll  So if there are, nonetheless, or at least, if there appear to be 
synthetic judgements a priori, then this only means that we are some­
times forced to accept that certain objects are determined in a specific 
way, without being able to understand the sense of, or the reason for, 
this determination.34 This implies that we should take notice of the 
difference between the fact that (“Faktum”) of a synthetic judgement a 
priori and the reason why (“Grund”) for such a judgement. This 
difference is of fundamental importance for a proper understanding of 
Maimon’s philosophy; it is the difference he usually refers to as the 
difference between the "Quid facti?” and the “Quid juris?”.35 In the 
next chapter, I shall present a detailed analysis of its implications. Here 
it will suffice to point out that the difference between the last two ques­
tions concerning synthetic judgements a priori, reflect the methodologi­
cal consequences of the difference between the "Quid facti” and the 
"Quid juris” .
In these last two questions reference is made to specific, determinate 
objects, which must, at least in asking the question, be treated as if their 
determinate character is not relevant. In order to be able to understand 
this, Maimon gives the following reformulation:
How is it possible for us to attach the predicates which are given to us only by 
determinate objects, necessarily to these very objects, as if it was the case that 
these predicates belonged to these objects not because of their being determi­
nate objects, but because of the form of cognition related to an object at all.36
This reformulation, Maimon stresses, is only applicable to the ques­
tion “How are synthetic judgements a priori in mathematics possible?” 
According to Maimon, realizing synthetic judgements a priori in ma­
34 Maimon, Transscendentalphilosophie, pp. 61-62.
35 See for example Maimon, Transscendentalphilosophie, p. 9; Logik, p. 192; ibid. pp. 
419-421.
36 “Wie können wir die erst durch die bestimmten Objekte gegebenen Prädikate, von 
denselben auf eine nothwendige Art, als würden sie nicht erst durch diese bestimmten 
Objekte, sondern durch die Form der Erkenntniß, in Beziehung auf ein Objekt überhaupt 
bestimmt, prädiciren?” Maimon, Logik, p. 415.
Maimoris Reading o f Kant 73
thematics goes like this. One encounters a determinate mathematical 
object, say a triangle, and one notices that one of its determinations is 
that the sum total of its angles equals two right angles. The next step is 
to try to imagine whether this determination belongs necessarily to the 
object in question. One tries to discover whether, in order to be able to 
say anything at all about a triangle (i.e. being able to determine it in 
whatever way), it is necessary to imagine the triangle as being deter­
mined by the determination ‘the sum total of the angles equals two 
right angles’. This, indeed, seems to be the case, and we can discover 
this by constructing the object.
Since mathematical concepts entail the complete rule for 
‘constructing’ their object, Maimon claims, it is possible to construct 
mathematical objects.37 However, such a construction shows us just the 
fact that it is the case that the sum total of the angles of a triangle equals 
two right angles, not the reason why this is the case. And that is exactly 
the very condition needed to realize that the judgement “The sum total 
of the angles of a triangle equals two right angles” is a synthetic judge­
ment a priori. For, would the construction reveal not only the fact that 
the judgement is a priori true, but also the reason why it is so, then the 
judgement would not be synthetic, but analytic, as is the case with “A 
triangle has three sides”. The difference between this latter judgement 
and the former one lies, according to Maimon, in the fact that the rule 
of the understanding we use in constructing a triangle (i.e. the concept 
of a triangle) contains the latter determination, but not the former one.38
Apart from the fact that a construction shows us, according to 
Maimon, just the fact that some a priori judgement is synthetic, but not 
the reason why, the above analysis reveals another interesting aspect of 
the way we arrive, in mathematics, at synthetic judgements a priori. 
This lies in the fact that synthetic judgements a priori are somehow 
‘derived’ (though of course not logically) from two judgements that are 
definitely a posteriori. On the one hand there must first be some 
judgement that gives us, a posteriori, both the subject and the predicate 
of the synthetic judgement a priori. One first has to encounter a ma­
37 ibid. pp. 414-415
38 According to Maimon the concept of a triangle is “a space bound by three lines”. 
Logik, p. 24.
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thematical object—or, what, for Kant and Maimon, comes to the same 
thing, one first has to make a synthetic judgement a posteriori, in order 
to have disposal of the ‘determinable’ and the determination: “The sum 
total of this triangle equals two right angles”. To be sure, Kant was 
from the very beginning of his Kritik der reinen Vernunft, well aware 
of this need for an initial synthetic judgement a posteriori.39 On the 
other hand, we need a second synthetic judgement a posteriori—we 
must construct a triangle, out of nothing, making its essence40 intuitive, 
as Maimon says 41 This, again, means making a synthetic judgement a 
posteriori; a judgement about a concrete object that has been 
constructed according to a concept (i.e. according to a rule of the 
understanding): “The sum total of this constructed triangle equals two 
right angles”.
Maimon claims that we can, at least in mathematics, derive a synthe­
tic judgement a priori from these two synthetic judgements a posteri­
ori:, because the second judgement a posteriori is a direct consequence 
of an a priori activity of the understanding. This is so, according to him, 
because mathematical concepts entail the complete rule for ‘construc­
ting’ their object.42 In order to make clear why there is, according to 
Maimon, a very significant difference between mathematics and phy­
sics, I will just accept this claim.
The structure of the answer to the question “How are synthetic 
judgements a priori in mathematics possible?” makes clear that the last 
question, “How are synthetic judgements a priori in empirical science 
possible?”, cannot have the same purport as this former one. For there
39 As is clear from the very first sentence of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft: “It is beyond 
doubt that all knowledge begins with experience.”, “Daß alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der 
Erfahrung anfange, daran ist gar kein Zweifel” KdrV, B l. And just a few sentences later: 
“Even though all knowledge begins with  experience, this does not mean that it all 
originates from  experience.”, “Wenn aber gleich alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung 
anhebt, so entspringt sie darum doch nicht eben alle aus der Erfahrung”.
40 Its “Differenzial” (Transscendentalphilosophie, p. 395), a pure quality, of which every 
concrete instantiation is an “Integral”. I will not discuss Maimon’s obscure ‘doctrine of 
differentials’, since it is not relevant to the systematic problem of this thesis, but see, 
for a very good discussion of this doctrine: Samuel Hugo Bergman, The Philosophy of 
Solomon Maimon (Jerusalem, 1967), pp. 59-68.
41 Maimon, Transscendentalphilosophie, p. 58
42 Ci. Logik, pp. 116-118, where Maimon argues that mathematical knowledge is in a 
narrow sense a posteriori but in a broad sense a priori.
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is no answer of the same kind in physics as there is in mathematics, 
since empirical objects surely cannot be constructed by the understand­
ing according to a rule. This means that the second judgement a poste­
riori, that is needed to be in a position to derive a synthetic judgement a 
priori, is not a direct consequence of an a priori activity of the under­
standing. No, as is clear, this second judgement a posteriori can only be 
given by experience. Hence, it is at most a direct consequence of 
something that is a posteriori. Taking this last question as being on a 
par with the former one, as Kant did, weakens the strength of a critical 
philosophy in advance, according to Maimon.43
A better interpretation of the last question, therefore, Maimon 
claims, is the following:
Because of what reasons do we relate synthetic judgements a priori to empirical 
objects, without determining on which?44
and the answer is well-known:
this is because of the possibility of experience, as it is the case that empirical 
objects can only be objects o f possible experience by means of these judge­
ments 45
An analysis of this Kantian answer, Maimon stresses, will reveal the 
importance of the difference between mathematics and physics. The 
first point to notice is that the Kansan answer forces us to make a dis­
tinction between a material and a formal reality, or, in other words, 
between the actuality of an object, and its mere possibility. Construc­
ting an object, as we can do in mathematics, provides an answer that is 
based on the material reality of the object the synthetic judgement a 
priori is about. We derive the a priori character of the judgement from 
the actuality of the object we constructed. Ensuring the possibility of 
experience, however, as we do in physics, just provides an answer that
43 Maimon, Logik, p. 416.
44  “Aus welchem Grunde beziehen wir synthetische Urtheile a priori auf empirische 
Objekte überhaupt, ohne zu bestimmen, auf welche?”, ibid.
45 “(...)dieses geschieht aus dem Grunde der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung, weil empyrische 
Objekte nur durch diese Urtheile Gegenstände möglicher Erfahrung seyn können.”, ibid.
76 Part Two: Salomon Maimon and the Antinomy o f Thought
is based on the formal reality of the object. The Kantian answer as­
sumes that it must be possible to derive the a priori character of a 
synthetic judgement in physics from the mere possibility of the object it 
is about. If this is indeed what the Kantian answer is assuming, then 
the actual existence of synthetic judgements a priori in mathematics 
implies by the same token their material, real application, whereas the 
actual existence of synthetic judgements a priori in physics implies, by 
that very fact, nothing but their formal, possible applicability46 
This crucial distinction between synthetic judgements a priori in 
mathematics and in physics might also be stated in another way, using 
notions I did already introduce. That is, this distinction clarifies the real 
importance of the distinction between the “Quid juris” and the “Quid 
facti” . To recall, the first question asks for the reason why certain syn­
thetic judgements a priori are true of certain objects; the latter one asks 
for the very fact that certain synthetic judgements a priori are true of 
certain objects. As we saw, Maimon argues that we get, in mathema­
tics, decisive answers to this last question, but not really satisfactory 
answers to the former one. We do not know the reason why the sum 
total of the angles of a triangle equals two right angles, but we know, in 
fa c t, that the judgement “The sum total of the angles of a triangle 
equals two right angles” is a synthetic judgement that is a priori true of 
all triangles. We know this fact, because we cannot construct a triangle, 
following the rule of the understanding for its ‘construction’, without 
having to construct it in such a way that the sum total of its angles 
equals two right angles. All of this we saw above. But now we can see 
that in physics the situation is exactly the reverse. In physics we get an 
answer to the "Quid juris”, but not to the "Quidfacti” . Thus Maimon 
argues that the Kantian answer to the question concerning synthetic 
judgements a priori in physics gives us only an answer to the former 
question: experience (meaning, in the technical Kantian sense, empiri­
cal knowledge) would not be possible at all if we could not apply syn­
thetic judgements a priori in physics. So Kant makes it clear, Maimon 
is willing to admit, that we are justified in applying synthetic judge­
46 Logik, pp. 325-331.
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ments a priori to empirical objects.47 But whether we in fact do apply 
synthetic judgements a priori to empirical objects remains a question. 
After all, the actual existence of synthetic judgements a priori implies, 
in physics, nothing but their formal, possible applicability, i.e. not their 
material, real application. This is so because, as Hume argued, the 
apparent fact that we have experience (the fact which is the starting- 
point of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction), i.e. that we are not just 
engaged in mere perception, but actually have empirical knowledge, can 
be explained in terms of a psychological illusion.
Let me give Maimon’s example. It might be necessary, in order to 
make experience possible at all, to accept that everything stands in 
some causal relation. If so, the possibility of experience would require 
a synthetic judgement a priori like “All objects of experience stand in 
causal relations”. However, this judgement never tells us anything 
about whatever pair of concrete objects that in fact stand in a causal 
relation to one another, and, as a consequence, we never know whether 
we experience causal relations or just perceive what seem to be causal 
relations. Thus, we never know whether there is in fact a causal relation 
between the fire and the warmth of a stone, one of Maimon’s favourite 
examples goes, or whether we just imagine such a relation in percep­
tion.48
47 Maimon, Logik, p. 419.
48 See for a good account (although it is, characteristically, formulated with much diffi­
culty) of this difference between Maimon and Kant, Logik , pp. 328-329: “Do we have 
pure knowledge related to empirical objects in an absolutely a priori way? In Kant’s 
Critique o f Pure Reason this question is answered affirmatively, and instead of any proof 
reference is made to its common use as if it were a. fact. We say, for example, that the fire  
heats the stone, i.e. fire is the cause of the heating of the stone, and so forth, and in this 
way we look for the cause of every appearance. This implies the presupposition of the 
concept of cause and of the principle that every appearance has a cause. Our Critique of 
the Faculties o f Cognition answers the question negatively, by showing that this so 
called fact rests on an illusion of the imagination. This concept and this principle might 
well be a priori, but they have no other sense but the one that is given to them by their 
actual use, and they have no other actual use than with respect to a priori objects. 
Substance, for example, means according to our Critique not that what exists in itself, 
whereas accident is what changes and what cannot exist in itself but only as an accident 
of the substance. According to our Critique, substance is what can be an object o f con­
sciousness in itself, whereas accident cannot in itself, but only in combination with the 
former be an object of consciousness·, and so on. This is the entire foundation of my 
skepticism."', “Haben wir reine Erkenntnisse, die sich auf empyrische Objekte absolut a 
priori beziehen? Diese Frage wird in der Kantischen Kritik der reinen Vernunft mit Ja
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This is, clearly, Hume all over again, but as Maimon stresses more 
than once, the purport of his skepticism is to reformulate Hume in 
terms of Kant’s critical philosophy in order to show that Kant did not 
succeed in refuting Hume’s skepticism. Kant’s Transcendental 
Deduction is informing about the preconditions of knowledge49 and it 
provides a convincing answer to the "Quid juris” , Maimon is willing 
to accept, but in order for it to provide a convincing answer to the 
{<Quidfacti” too, Kant had to take refuge in an unwarranted premise. 
This is the premise that we have experience (that we do sometimes 
make true judgements about empirical objects), where ‘experience’ is 
understood as the universal and necessary connection of certain 
determinations and certain ‘determinables’; not merely a contingent, 
though constant connection. This premise must be doubted, according 
to Maimon, which does not, however, imply that we do not have 
experience. No, we just don’t know whether we have or not, and this 
we will never know, which reminds us again of our finite understand­
ing.
Let me now that I have finished my analysis of Maimon’s criticism 
of Kant’s treatment of synthetic judgements a priori, formulate the 
following conclusions. Firstly, we have seen that, according to 
Maimon, all judgements that are a priori, are also analytic. It is only 
possible for them to seem synthetic with respect to a finite mind 
engaged in the project of determining a possible object of thought.
beantwortet, und statt aller Beweise wird ihr gemeiner Gebrauch als Faktum angeführt. 
Wir sagen z.B. das Feuer erwärmt den Stein, d.h. das Feuer ist Ursache von der Erwärmung 
des Steins u.dgl. und wir suchen auf gleiche Art zu jeder Erscheinung ihre Ursache. Dieses 
setzt also den Begriff von Ursache und den Grundsatz: jede Erscheinung muß eine Ursache 
haben, voraus. Unsere Kritik des Erkenntnißvermögens aber beantwortet diese Frage mit 
N e in , indem sie zeigt, daß dieses vermeinte Faktum auf einer T äuschung  der 
Einbildungskraft beruht Diese Begriffe und Grundsätze sind allerdings a priori, sie haben 
aber keine andere Bedeutung, als die ihnen in ihrem reellen Gebrauche zukommt, und 
haben keinen ändern reellen Gebrauch, als von Objekten a priori. Substanz z.B. heißt 
unser Kritik zufolge nicht das was an sich existirend bleibt, während daß die Akzidens 
wechselt, und was nicht an sich, sondern als Akzidens der Substanz existiren kann, son­
dern das was ein Gegenstand des Bewußtseyns an sich, und das was nicht an sich, sondern 
in Verbindung mit jenem ein Gegenstand des Bewußtseyns seyn kann; u.s.w. Dieses ist 
das ganze Fundament unseres Skeptizismus.”
49 It is interesting to notice that this line of evaluation is recently put forward again. See 
Karl Ameriks, “Kant’s Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument”, in 
Kantstudien, 1978.
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Secondly, we must realize with respect to judgements that seem to be 
synthetic and a priori to us—as is possible, since our minds are 
finite—, that there is a distinction between the fact that they apply to 
certain objects, and the reason why they do so apply. This distinction is 
important, because the finitude of our minds consists exactly in that we 
cannot know, with respect to whatever synthetic judgement a priori, the 
answers to both the “Quid facti” and the "Quid juris” . For, should 
we, then the judgement in question could not be both synthetic and a 
priori, but would reveal its real character: analytic a priori. Maimon 
presented the purport of this distinction by distinguishing between 
mathematical and empirical objects, but the point is not really depen­
dent upon his being right about mathematical objects.50 The point can 
sufficiently be made with reference to physics alone, since it is enough 
to show that we can arrive at an answer to the "Quid juris" with 
respect to the applicability of synthetic judgements a priori to empirical 
objects, but not at an answer to the "Quid facti” . After all, the only 
point really to be made, is that a judgement is a priori and analytic as 
soon as we know both the reason why and the fact that it applies to the 
objects it is about.
These conclusions contain, from another perspective, a second 
formulation of the Antinomy o f Thought. Determining an object by 
thought is only possible if one possesses the concept of the object, the 
rule of its determination. If one possesses this rule, one knows the 
reason for all specific determinations of the object and, as a conse­
quence, all judgements one makes about the object will be analytic. 
Human understanding, however, is finite. We don’t have concepts, at 
least not if conceived as the complete rules of the determination of 
objects. We sometimes have, indeed, according to Maimon, a rule for 
constructing an object, but we need an intuition of the constructed 
object in order to know which specific determinations of the object 
follow from this rule. That is, real thought implies, for us, both a
50 It can, for example, be doubted whether induction is implied by the derivation of the a 
priori character of a judgement out of a synthetic judgement a posteriori that concerns a 
constructed object, even if it is said that this judgement a posteriori is a direct conse­
quence of an a priori activity of the mind. Doubts arise as well, of course, from the non- 
Euclidean kinds of mathematics Maimon was not yet acquianted with.
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determination of the object according to a rule of the understanding 
(according to a concept) and a determination of the object from outside 
o f thought, which is given to the understanding by intuition.51 The 
former determination is always underdetermined —a rule not to think 
the object, but to construct it, or, in physics, even merely to realize the 
possibility of experiencing it. Therefore we need the latter determina­
tion, because an object can only be real if it is completely determined.52 
But this latter determination is merely sensible, not intelligible. We 
need both of these determinations but, since they stem from altogether 
distinct cognitive faculties, we will never attain, as finite minds, the final 
fit between, or, better, the actual identity of, a determination by a 
concept, i.e. according to a rule of the understanding, and a 
determination given by intuition from outside o f thought. To make this 
sweeping claim plausible, it will be necessary to analyse in some detail 
Maimon’s radical interpretation of Kant’s distinction between concepts 
and intuitions. This analysis will provide a third way to approach 
Maimon’s account of the Antinomy o f Thought as emerging out of his 
reading of Kant.
3. Concepts and intuitions
Kant’s move beyond his predecessors can be formulated in terms of 
his stress on a distinction of kind rather than of degree between con­
cepts and intuitions. Both empiricists like Locke and rationalists like 
Leibniz struggled with an unbridgeable gap between the human mind 
and the external world, as well as with an unclear Scholastic distinction 
between two ways to bridge that gap: an intellectual and a sensible way. 
Because of this background both empiricists and rationalists tended to 
think of understanding and sensibility as on a par, as different ways to 
do the same thing: establishing a connection between mind and 
world.53 It might be argued that Kant opened up the possibility of a
51 Obviously we need remember the results of the previous section (concerning the dis­
tinction between thought and consciousness): ‘outside of thought’ does not mean ‘from 
outside our mind’.
52 See footnote 25, above, p. 66.
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functional approach to concepts and intuitions, instead of the unfruitful 
relational approach, by stressing the fundamentally different functions 
of concepts and intuitions in acquiring knowledge.54
But, again, despite the clarity of the relevance of a distinction be­
tween the functions of concepts and intuitions, there are serious diffi­
culties with respect to Kant’s own account of (1) the precise meaning 
of the distinction, and (2) the way in which concepts and intuitions are 
thought to come together. Perhaps these difficulties are inescapable 
consequences of the revolution Kant brought about, or, as Dieter 
Henrich observes:
The theory and its new language remain outside of the light that they shed on 
the questions they try to answer.55
Unfortunately the Kantian reaction took little notice of the import of 
Maimon’s specific disagreements with Kant on the distinction in ques­
tion. The most important feature of Maimon’s view is that, according 
to him, concepts and intuitions, both being modes of consciousness, 
differ from one another because they entail different kinds of inten­
tional objects:; and not because they provide different aspects of one 
and the same object (even though they may, in the final analysis), nor 
because they are products of different cognitive faculties (even though 
in fact they are).
According to Maimon, we need a much more careful account of the 
‘givenness’ of our intuitions than the one Kant provides. We need an 
account that should enable us to escape the problematic threat of a 
transcendental realism, an account, in other words, that is not based 
upon the questionable idea that our sensibility is a receptive faculty.
53 See for a good discussion of Kant’s move beyond his predecessors with respect to 
‘understanding’ and ‘sensibility’: Jonathan Bennett, Kant’s Dialectic, (Cambridge, 
1974), chapter 1.
54 See, for example, Cassirer’s interpretation of Kant’s transformation of philosophy; 
this is especially clear in the introduction to his own Philosophie der symbolischen 
Formen. (Berlin, 1923-1929). See also, of contemporary scholars, the interpretation of 
Richard Aquila in his Representational Mind (Bloomington, 1983), chapters 1 and 2.
55 “Die Theorie und ihre neue Sprache stehen nicht in dem Licht, das von ihnen auf die 
Fragen fällt, die sie beantworten wollen.”Dieter Henrich, Identität und Objektivität 
(Heidelberg, 1976), p. 9.
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What Maimon tries to accomplish is to think about our passivity 
without thereby having to think about our receptivity. He argues that we 
have said enough if we have ascertained that there is nothing we did, at 
least not consciously, to get intuitions. Our being conscious just 
implies our having intuitions, and all we really have said, if we say that 
intuitions are ‘given’, is that we do not know at all how we have got 
them. We just happen to have them; that is, we did not construct them, 
and we have no clue whatsoever concerning who or what did construct 
them. To put it differently, our intuitions are intuitions just because they 
are mental states we are in, without having the faintest idea about what 
cause realized this state of mind we are in.
Of course, this is only a negative characterization, but the crucial 
point is that it allows Maimon to dissociate our intuitions radically 
from our ‘receptivity’. That intuitions are ‘given’ does not mean to say 
anything at all about their origin; it only says something about the way 
our cognitive faculty is related to them. With respect to intuitions our 
conscious mode of being is passive: we just happen to have them. 
That, precisely, is part of our being conscious at all.
But now, if intuitions do not have a causal relation with their objects, 
or, more precisely, if we do not know whether they have such a rela­
tion, and, consequently, if their having such a relation or not does not 
change in any way their meaning, how, then, should we understand the 
relation they have with their object? And, what comes together, if con­
cepts are mental states we create, or introduce (as rules of the under­
standing) as soon as we think, then in what way do they relate to their 
objects? These are important questions raising the point that, in order to 
be able to approach the problem of experience in terms of the inner 
dynamics of consciousness, that is, in order to be able to understand 
concepts and intuitions as functions of thought, and not as connections 
between the human mind and the external world, it might well be 
necessary to make use of the idea of an intentional object.56
56 This point has recently been put forward by Richard Aquila, in his interpretation of 
Kant’s theory of knowledge. See his Representational Mind (Bloomington, 1983), 
chapters 1 and 2. In his “Things in Themselves and Appearances: Intentionality and 
Reality in Kant”, Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, 1979, he first introduced the 
basic ideas of his interpretation.
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Maimon realized this point without using the term “intentional”. In a 
very compact passage of his Logik, a passage that almost sounds like a 
list of definitions, Maimon provides the material for answering the 
questions formulated above. Let me quote it in full:
The determinate consciousness of each element in itself of a manifold that has 
to be joined, apart from this conjunction by thought, is an intuition. The con­
sciousness of each of these to be joined elements, not just in itself, but as well 
as an element of this manifold that has to be joined, is a representation of this 
to be joined manifold. The consciousness of each element, not just as an ele­
ment of this, but of several to be joined manifolds, is a concept of this manifold. 
The specific determination of an intuition is an object of intuition. The in itself 
determinate, in a unity of consciousness to be joined manifold is an object of 
thought. The manifold, joined in a unity of consciousness, is an object of repre­
sentation. The several objects, represented by means of a common concept, are 
together the objects o f a concept.51
The point here is not so much that Maimon disagrees with Kant (for 
on certain interpretations of Kant’s view, Kant could subscribe to the 
quoted assertions), but rather that he stresses that intuitions and con­
cepts are mental states, modes of consciousness. This means, and this 
is clear from the last sentences, that the objects of intuitions and con­
cepts are defined exclusively in terms of the mental states they are 
related to, or, still better, the mental states they are part of. That is to 
say, Maimon uses the notion of an ‘object’ as if it has the very same 
meaning as the notion of an ‘intentional object’. This is, indeed, a very 
crucial feature of Maimon’s ontology, to which I will return at length in 
subsequent chapters. I make mention of it here mainly to emphasize 
the specific character of Maimon’s interpretation of the status of
57 “Das bestimmte Bewußtseyn eines jeden B estandteils des zu verbindenden 
Mannigfaltigen an sich, außer der Verbindung durchs Denken, ist Anschauung. Das 
Bewußtseyn eines jeden Bestandteils des zu verbindenden Mannigfaltigen, nicht nur an 
sich, sondern zugleich als eines Bestandteils dieses zu verbindenden Mannigfaltigen, 
ist Vorstellung dieses zu verbindenen Mannigfaltigen. Das Bewußtseyn eines jeden 
Bestandteils nicht nur als eines Bestandteils dieses, sondern mehrerer zu verbindenden 
Mannigfaltigen, ist Begriff dieses Mannigfaltigen. Die besondere Bestimmung der 
Anschauung ist Objekt der Anschauung. Das an sich bestimmte, in einer Einheit des 
Bewußtseyns zu verbindende Mannigfaltige ist Objekt des Denkens. Das in einer Einheit 
des Bewußtseyns verbundene Mannigfaltige, ist Objekt der Vorstellung. Die mehrem, 
durch einen gemeinschaftlichen Begriff vorgestellten Objekte, sind zusammengenommen 
Objekte des Begriffs.”Maimon, Logik, p. 16.
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concepts and intuitions. That is, Maimon resisted the Kantian inclina­
tion to relate the distinction between concept and intuition to such quite 
diverse dichotomies as form/content, spontaneity/receptivity, univer­
sal/particular58, and, consequently, evaded the problems raised by 
them.59 So, in stressing that concepts and intuitions are mental states, 
Maimon was able to emphasize the fact that they, at least in one 
respect, resemble one another — both have an intentional object of their 
own, i.e. both are intentional states of mind. They differ, Maimon 
argues, because they have different kinds of objects. This statement is 
of utmost importance for a proper understanding of Maimon’s account 
of concepts and intuitions. I shall, therefore, take a close look at it.
The difference between the intentional object of an intuition and that 
of a concept is, according to Maimon, that the former is a real object60, 
the latter a pdssible one. In addition to this Maimon holds that the 
possibility and the reality of any intentional object are completely 
independent of one another. It might be the case that a possible object is 
not real, as is, for example, the case with Kant’s famous, imagined 
coin, which has the very same qualities as a real coin, except for its 
being real. But, and this is much more striking, it might, according to 
Maimon, be the case as well that a real object is not possible. In fact — 
but notice that I am speaking of intentional objects — this is for us, 
finite minds, always so. Of course, everything here depends upon what 
meaning we attach to ‘real’ and ‘possible’. Maimon gives two, closely 
related, senses of these terms. The first sense contains a reference to the 
way the mind is related to the genesis of the object:
All intuitions, as far as they are represented in time and space, are real, but not 
possible, as far as we do not comprehend their genesis. All concepts (even if 
they are ‘omni modo determinata’) are possible, i.e. we comprehend the reason 
of the unity in their manifold, but not real, because this unity is not thought in 
time and space.61“
58 See, for example, respectively, K drV , B102/ß6-77; K drV , B33/A19; K drV , 
B377/A320.
59 As, for example, the “tricky question of affection”.
60 It is a completely determined object because it is an actual object of experience. Cf. 
footnote 25, above, p. 66.
61a “Alle Anschauungen, in so fern sie in Zeit und Raum vorgestellet werden, sind wirk­
lich, aber nicht möglich, in so fern wir ihre Entstehungsart nicht einsehen. Alle Begriffe,
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The second sense specifies the kind of synthesis implied by the 
object in question:
The judgement about the objective possibility of a thing, entails four judge­
ments. 1) the absence of impossibility (of contradiction); 2) the absence of 
necessity; 3) a positive reason for the possibility; 4) the absence of reality61 
The reality requires therefore another definition: namely, the real is that in 
which I actually perceive a synthesis, not, however, according to rules of the 
understanding (...), but just [according to the operations] of the imagination.62
Let me explain the purport of these quotations. For Maimon, every 
(intentional) object implies a synthesis, a compound mental state, a 
being conscious of a unified manifold. We might state this linguistically 
as well (since, as noted above, there was for Maimon and his contem­
poraries no interesting difference between mental and linguistic ways 
of representation): the awareness of an object implies, for Maimon, a 
judgement—something being predicated of something else. Now such 
an object, such a unified manifold, such a subject-predicate combina­
tion, is, according to Maimon, possible (a) if the two components 
involved do not contradict —this is the condition for the possibility of 
an object at all (“ein Objekt überhaupt”), which is purely a logical 
condition; (b) if the components do not imply one another—for, if they 
did, the object would have been necessary, not possible; (c) if there is a 
positive reason for their possible conjunction—this will turn out to be 
the crucial condition, grounded in the so-called Principle of 
Determinability,63 stating that a conjunction is possible only if we can
(ja sollten sie auch ‘omni modo determinata’ seyn) sind möglich, d.h. wir sehen den 
Grund der Einheit in ihrem Mannigfaltigen ein, aber nicht wirklich; weil diese Einheit 
nicht in Zeit und Raum gedacht wird.”, Maimon, Transscendentalphilosophie, p. 249.
61 “Das Urtheil von der objektiven Möglichkeit eines Dinges, begreift vier Urtheile in 
sich. 1) Mangel der Unmöglichkeit (des Widerspruchs); 2) Mangel der Nothwendigkeit; 
3) einen positiven Grund der Möglichkeit; 4) Mangel der Wirklichkeit.”, ibid. p. 247.
62 “Die Wirklichkeit erfordert also eine andere Definition: nämlich das Wirkliche ist 
dasjenige, worinnen ich zwar eine Synthesis, aber nicht nach Gesetzen des Verstandes 
(...), sondern bloß der Einbildungskraft wahmehme.”, ibid. p. 102.
63 See for a concised formulation of it, Maimon, Logik, p. 20. I will discuss the principle 
at length in Chapter Five, especially pp. I08- I I 6.
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understand it is; (d) if the components are not (yet) actually combined 
— after all, ‘actuality’ is a mark of the real64, not of the possible.
From this definition of the possibility of an object we can infer a 
similar definition of the reality of an object. Clearly the first two condi­
tions will have to be met by the reality of an object too. If a real object 
is to be an object at all, (a) its components should not contradict, and, 
also, since a real object is not a necessary one, (b) its components 
should not imply one another. The differences arise with regard to the 
latter two conditions. Maimon seems to imply that (c) there is no posi­
tive reason for the conjunction of the components of a real object The 
reason for this apparently strange condition follows directly from a, for 
Maimon, quite common-sensical understanding of necessity: if there 
was such a positive reason, then this would yield, together with the 
fulfilment of the last condition, that (d) the two components are actual­
ly combined, the unwanted result of the object not being real at all, 
since it would, then, be necessary.
Granted that these latter conditions specify the reality of an object, 
then it must indeed be the case that every real object implies a synthesis 
which should not be understood. Such a synthesis is, according to 
Maimon, a synthesis of the imagination, i.e. a conjunction of two com­
ponents not by virtue of some rule of the understanding. Such a syn­
thesis is, Maimon asserts, an intuition, a conjunction of two compo­
nents in space and time.65 This implies, finally, that a concept, being a 
rule of the understanding which generates syntheses, does not have a 
real intentional object, but only possible ones.66
Before we are tempted to object that the coherence of this view 
depends upon a misinterpretation of the distinctions between the cate­
gories of modality, we should realize that Maimon is not concerned 
here with objects as things in themselves. All objects, he claims, are 
intentional objects; they are determinate only with respect to a determi­
nate mental state, or consciousness. And this makes all the difference, 
because the mode of an intentional object is determined by the mental 
state it is the object of. A determinate mental state cannot, however, be
64 In the sense that an actuality must be determined completely.
65 Maimon, Transscendentalphilosophie, p. 104-105
66 Maimon, Logik, pp. 261-262.
Maimoris Reading of Kant 87
the same state while determining different modes of an object. In other 
words, every mode of an object implies a different mental state, and 
Maimon is doing nothing but defining the special features of these 
different states.
A determinate mental state of a triangle having three sides, for ex­
ample, implies an intentional object that is necessary, for there cannot 
be a mental state of a triangle which is not, by that very fact, a mental 
state of a space bounded by three lines. This does not, to be sure, imply 
that this determinate mental state is also a mental state of a real object. 
No, it could not possibly be. A determinate mental state which is a state 
of a real object, for example a real triangle, is something completely 
different. In such a state the two components will not be ‘triangle’ and 
‘having three sides’, but rather 'this triangle’ and ‘having these three 
sides’. It is crucial to estimate the function of the indexicals ‘this’ and 
‘these’. They refer to a specific spatio-temporal unit—for Maimon the 
ground for the reality of intentional objects. These indexicals embody 
the essential feature of real objects: that we do not understand their 
conjunction, i.e. that we do not know anything of their genesis. In other 
words, real objects are intentional objects of mental states that are 
intuitions: states we happen to be in without having the faintest idea 
about what caused them. That is, we understand that every triangle 
(hence, this specific triangle as well) has three sides, but we do not un­
derstand why this triangle has these three sides. There is no reason for 
it, but its being given in space and time. To put it differently, the reality 
of this specific triangle consists in it being the intentional object of an 
intuition, i.e. in there being no positive reason for the conjunction of its 
components and its being actually given in space and time. Whereas 
Maimon’s favourite example of a necessary object is, indeed, that of a 
triangle having three sides, his favourite example of a real object is, 
usually, that of gold being yellow.67 After all, there is clearly still no 
reason for gold to be yellow; that conjunction must, till eternity, be 
given in experience.
67 See, for example, Maimon, Transscendentalphilosophie, p. 102. It is, by the way, 
very characteristic of the poor quality of the index of the new edition of Maimon’s Logik 
(Kantgesellschaft, Heidelberg, 1912) that it contains over 40 references to the examples 
Maimon uses. Hence, see that index on ‘gold’, too.
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Now these mental states of real objects could not, at the same time, 
be mental states of possible objects as well. Since there cannot be a 
positive reason for the conjunction of components that make up real 
objects, and since there has to be such a reason for a synthesis that 
makes up a possible object, we have to accept that, for example, ‘gold’ 
and ‘yellow’ cannot possibly be the components of a possible object. 
Good candidates, conversely, are for example ‘straight’ and ‘line’. 
These are not necessarily connected, for we can think, for example, of 
curved lines as well. Moreover, as long as there are no indexicals 
involved (which, to be sure, would change the mental state into another 
one, into a synthesis of, for example, ‘that line’ and ‘straight’), they are 
not really connected. But, nevertheless, there is a positive reason for 
their possible conjunction. After all, we cannot think of ‘straightness’ 
without, at the same time, having to think of ‘line’ as well. Only lines 
can be straight. Behind this fact is the principle I already mentioned: the 
Principle ofDeterminability. It is the principle behind all concepts. For 
concepts are nothing but rules of the understanding, rules by virtue of 
which we can make a synthesis of a manifold. And the Principle of 
Determinability does nothing else but help us determine a certain mani­
fold as a unified manifold, i.e. help us identify a certain manifold (the 
genus) by means of a specific feature (“Merkmal”, the species). In 
other words, this principle does nothing else but generate concepts. So, 
it helps us, for example, by generating the concept of a straight line, 
which is a mental state governed by a rule of the understanding, 
enabling us to know possible objects: lines (the manifold or genus) that 
are straight (the “Merkmal” or species).
The consequence of Maimon’s position with respect to concepts and 
intuitions is that we cannot have a concept and an intuition of the same 
object. This is indeed the radical conclusion anticipated by my discus­
sion in the previous section of Maimon’s account of the idea of a syn­
thetic judgement a priori. Here we should, again, emphasize that this 
radical conclusion has everything to do with the fact that our human 
understanding is finite. This is not to say that the infinite mind which is
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for Maimon a very important ‘idea’68, has both a concept and an 
intuition of one and the same object, since the infinite mind does not 
have intuitions at all. It does not need them, because it possesses of 
every possible object the complete rule for generating it. Hence, it only 
knows necessary objects; the possibility of an object implies, for the 
infinite mind, its reality, because the Principle of Determinability al­
ways provides the infinite mind with the complete rule of any possible 
object.
The finitude of our minds, in contrast, consists precisely in our need 
for intuitions to be able to be conscious of real objects. We do not pos­
sess concepts of real, concrete objects. The rules of our understanding 
do not enable us anything more than to know possible objects, since 
these rules are, characteristically, incomplete. Our minds can only grasp 
some small series of determinations: ‘straightness’ being of ‘lines’; 
‘yellow’ being of ‘colour’, and ‘colour’ being of ‘surface’, but we 
never arrive from ‘surface’ up to the mere ‘determinable’ in order to 
grasp the complete series of determinations that make up the complete
68 ‘Idea’ is a technical notion here: “An idea is a method to find a transition from the 
representation or the concept of a thing to the thing itself. It does not determine an 
object o f intution, but it still does determine a real object, of which the object of intui­
tion is the scheme; for example, our understanding is the scheme for the idea of an infi­
nite understanding. The scheme refers here to the idea, and the idea refers to the thing 
itself or to its existence, without which both the idea and the scheme would not have been 
possible. Thus I disagree with Kant in two ways. 1) Rather than presupposing three ideas
I think one idea will suffice (the idea of an infinite mind). 2) Contrary to Kant, who 
thinks that these ideas are no objects of our knowledge at all, I think they are indeed no 
objects of intuition, but, to be sure, they are objects of understanding, which are known 
by us as determinate objects of thought, not immediately in themselves, but by means of 
their scheme (that of themselves that is given in intuition).”; “Eine Idee ist eine 
Methode, einen Uebergang von der Vorstellung oder dem Begriffe eines Dinges zum 
Dinge selbst zu finden; sie bestimmt zwar kein Objekt der Anschauung, aber sie bestimmt 
doch ein reelles Objekt, dessen Schema das Objekt der Anschauung ist z.B. das Schema zu 
der Idee eines unendlichen Verstandes ist unser Verstand. Dieses Schema deutet hier auf die 
Idee, und die Idee auf das Ding selbst oder auf seine Existenz, ohne welche diese Idee und 
ihr Schema selbst unmöglich wären. Ich weiche also in diesen zwei hauptstücken von 
hm. Kants Meinung ab. 1) Daß ich anstatt der drei Ideen, die er annimmt, eine einzige für 
hinreichend halte (die Idee eines unendlichen Verstandes). 2) Anstatt daß Herr Kant der­
gleichen Ideen für gar keine Objekte unsrer Erkenntniß hält, ich sie zwar für keine 
Objekte der Anschauung, wohl aber für Objekte des Verstandes, die, wenn schon nicht an 
sich (unmittelbar) dennoch vermittelst ihres Schema’s (was von ihnen in der Anschauung 
gegeben ist) als bestimmte Objekte des Denkens von uns erkannt werden.” 
Transscendentalphilosophie, pp. 365-366.
)concept, and, consequently, the concrete object of ‘gold’. So we need 
intuitions of gold, in order to... well, what? Not, of course, in order to 
be able to understand that gold is yellow; not, that is, in order to grasp 
the reason why of the conjunction of ‘gold’ and ‘yellow’. No, we need 
intuitions merely to be aware of the fa c t— the experiential reality — 
that it happens to be the case that gold is yellow.
Our concept of gold (if we have one) is not of the same thing as one 
of our intuitions of gold; i.e. the ‘determinable’ of a synthesis of the 
understanding cannot be the ‘determinable’ of a synthesis of the imagi­
nation. The gold we understand (if we can at all), using rules of the 
understanding, is not the gold we are aware of, using intuitions. This is 
so, because the ‘determinable’ of an intuition is really nothing but a 
specific spatio-temporal unit, in which a qualitative manifold is taken 
together, with the help of the imagination, not with the help of a rule of 
the understanding. The ‘determinable’ of a concept, on the other hand, 
is always an abstract feature, a “Merkmal”, itself a rule for unifying a 
manifold.69
All of this leads, again, now along the lines of Maimon’s radicaliza- 
tion of the Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions, to the 
Antinomy of Thought. Kant was not only wrong, when he asserted that 
we can solve the problem of experience by witnessing the distinction 
between appearances and things in themselves, and not only when he 
assumed the fact that we do apply synthetic judgements a priori to 
empirical objects, but also, and this is just the same mistake from 
another perspective, when he thought that every representation is a 
synthesis of an intuition with a concept. He is wrong here, because 
every intuition and every concept can be considered a representation, 
but the former one only has real objects, that are not possible, and the 
latter one only has possible objects, that are not real. For us, finite 
beings, never the twain will meet. Hence, an account of thinking will 
turn out to be a defense of the Antinomy of Thought.
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69 I won’t elaborate on it here, but I will deal with this at length in Chapter Six, pp. 140- 
146.
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4. The Antinomy of Thought
There is only one passage in the work of Salomon Maimon, and not 
even in one of his major publications, in which he himself uses the 
words “Antinomie des Denkens” to describe the problem that is cen­
tral to his work. It is nevertheless a passage that might function as a 
key to an understanding of his criticism of Kant:
The thing in itself therefore is an idea of reason produced by Reason itself in 
order to solve a universal Antinomy of Thought at all. For thought at all consists 
in a relation between a form (a rule of the understanding) and a content (the 
subsumed given). It is impossible to arrive at the consciousness of the form 
without the content, which means that the content is a necessary precondition 
of thought. That is, in order to perform a real thought a form or rule of the under­
standing should necessarily be given a content to which it is related. On the 
other hand, however, the completeness of a thought of an object requires that 
nothing in it is given, i.e. that everything in it is thought.10
In order to get an initial grasp of how Maimon’s understanding of 
the Antinomy of Thought might be used in an analysis of the aporetic 
character of the structure of our accounts of thinking, I shall, in this 
final section, reformulate the conclusions of the previous sections as 
different versions of this Antinomy, making references to the distinction 
between finding and making as well.
The first formulation concerns the objects of thought. Here we are 
dealing with Maimon’s reading of the Kantian distinction between 
appearances and things in themselves, which led to a distinction 
between 'objects determined by thought' and ‘objects determined out-
70 “Das Ding an sich ist also eine Vemunftidee die von der Vernunft selbst zur Auflösung 
einer allgemeinen Antinomie des Denkens überhaupt gegeben ist. Denn das Denken 
überhaupt bestehet in Beziehung einer Form (Regel des Verstandes) auf eine Materie (das 
ihr subsumirte Gegebne). Ohne Materie kann man zum Bewußtseyn der Form nicht 
gelangen, folglich ist die Materie eine notwendige bedingung des Denkens, d.h. zum 
reellen Denken einer Form oder Verstandesregel muß notwendig eine Materie, worauf sie 
sich beziehet, gegeben werden; auf der ändern Seite hingegen erfordert die 
Vollständigkeit des Denkens eines Objekts, daß nichts darinn gegeben, sondern alles 
gedacht werden soll.”, Maimon, Wörterbuch, p. 162.
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side of thought’ — a distinction, to be sure, that does not parallel the 
Kantian one, but takes over its function in a critical philosophy. I sug­
gest that the first formulation runs as follows:
(1) Thesis: Real thought will only be real thought if it deter­
mines its object according to rules of the under­
standing.
Antithesis: Real thought will only be real thought if its object 
is given to thought as determined outside of 
thought.
The thesis specifies that we can view the act of thinking to be an act 
of making something meaningful, i.e. an act that specifies, by means of 
rules of the understanding, a location within a conceptual framework. 
On this view, the object thought is related to is, actually, a product of 
thought; nothing more than a possibly occupied location within a con­
ceptual framework. On the other hand, if we take notice of the antithe­
sis, the story is quite the reverse. Thinking is, according to the antithe­
sis, an event of finding a meaningful world, i.e. an event in which the 
properties of actual objects are given to consciousness. The object 
thought is related to is in no way a product of thought; it is, instead, 
something given to thought, something that might possibly turn out to 
be intelligible.
According to this formulation of the Antinomy of Thought, the 
structure of our accounts of thinking has an aporetic character because 
the objects of thought must be taken to be both objects determined by 
thought and objects determined outside of thought — which is for us, 
finite minds, incomprehensible because we cannot understand the pos­
sibility of an identity between these two notions.
The second formulation concerns the ‘medium’ in which thought is 
present as an activity. Here we deal with Maimon’s reading of Kant’s 
treatment of synthetic judgements a priori, considered to be, by Kant as 
well as by Maimon, the proper carriers of real thought, i.e. of thought 
that concerns reality as it is — in short, of empirical knowledge. I pro­
pose the following formulation to express how, according to Maimon,
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the idea of a synthetic judgement a priori reveals the Antinomy of 
Thought:
(2) Thesis: Real thought must be expressed by judgements
that reveal the reason why they apply to the objects 
they are about.
Antithesis: Real thought must be expressed by judgements 
that reveal the fact that they apply to the objects 
they are about.
The point of the thesis is to assert that, in order for a judgement to be 
informative about the object it applies to, it has to explain why the deter­
mination and the ‘determinable’ are related to one another. This means 
that the judgement has to specify, by means of rules of the understand­
ing, a location within a conceptual framework. Again, the point of the 
antithesis is quite the reverse. It states that, in order for a judgement to 
be informative about the object it applies to, it has to reveal that the 
determination and the ‘determinable’ are actually related to one another. 
This means that the judgement should express an intuition of a spatio- 
temporal connection between determination and ‘determinable’.
According to this second formulation of the Antinomy of Thought, 
the structure of our accounts of thinking has an aporetic character be­
cause the judgements by means of which we might be able to express 
our understanding of the relation between thoughts and objects should 
be both a priori and synthetic—which is for us, finite minds, incom­
prehensible, because knowing a judgement to be a priori implies the 
impossibility of knowing it is synthetic, and vice versa.
The final formulation of the Antinomy of Thought concerns the func­
tions of the consciousness in which the relation between thoughts and 
objects manifests itself. Here we are dealing with Maimon’s radicali- 
zation of the Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions. I sug­
gest that the following formulation expresses Maimon’s understanding 
of the different functions of concepts and intuitions in real thought:
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(3) Thesis: Real thought must have, in order to be real
thought, a conceptual character, that is, it must 
consist of a synthesis according to a rule of the 
understanding.
Antithesis: Real thought must have, in order to be real 
thought, an intuitive character, that is, it must 
consist of a synthesis of the imagination.
If we overlook the reference to the different faculties of mind, this 
third formulation is almost the same as the first one. That is, the thesis 
claims that the act of thinking makes use of concepts, rules of the un­
derstanding that specify locations in a conceptual framework. Thus, the 
act of thinking is an act of making something meaningful, an act that 
starts from the intelligibility of conceptual relations. The further point 
of Maimon’s radicalization of the Kantian distinction between concept 
and intuition now turns out to be that this something, which is made 
meaningful, cannot be anything more than an empty location within a 
conceptual framework. That is, the objects referred to by means of 
concepts are just possible, not real.
The antithesis, however, claims the reverse. The act of thinking must 
make use of intuitions, i.e. states of mind that specify real syntheses, 
connections between determinations and ‘determinables’ that actually 
are given in space and time, without there being any reason for their 
being given. In other words, if thought is going to be related to any­
thing at all, thinking will turn out to be the event of finding a meaning­
ful world, an event that starts from there being something rather than 
nothing. Again, there is the further point of Maimon’s radicalization of 
Kant’s distinction between concept and intuition: the world we will be 
able to find by means of intuition, will not be an intelligible world.
According to this final formulation of the Antinomy of Thought, the 
structure of our accounts of thinking will have an aporetic character, 
because we have to do justice, in such accounts, to both the function of 
concepts and the function of intuitions, even though these notions 
imply altogether incompatible relations we must assume exist between 
thoughts and objects.
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The point of this chapter, to conclude, has been to elucidate how 
Maimon arrived at the Antinomy of Thought by means of his reading of 
Kant One of the central claims of this thesis is that a reconstruction of 
this Antinomy, and of Maimonian skepticism considered as a defense 
of this Antinomy, will provide the material for an argument in favour of 
the claim that the structure of our articulations of the relation between 
thoughts and objects have an intrinsically aporetic character. In the next 
two chapters I will develop this argument, by taking a detailed look at 
both the value of skepticism and the failure of dogmatism.
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE VALUE OF SKEPTICISM
Skepticism has turned out to be epistemology’s Mr. Hyde—the 
anonymous letter1 every dogmatic philosopher will find one day on his 
doormat, fearing somewhere deep down that he himself is responsible 
for it. Like the dragon with seven heads it has proved to be inera­
dicable. Nevertheless, modem philosophy thinks skepticism has to be 
refuted.2 It shouldn’t, as might read one of the morals of my attempt to 
revalue Maimon’s critique of Kant. Skepticism is indeed a serious 
matter3, but not a threatening enemy. Instead, if properly formulated, it 
provides a powerful way to understand the Antinomy of Thought as a 
plausible account of human thought and its problem of experience4, or,
1 See Richard Popkin’s article on skepticism in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. 
Edwards): “...skepticism has not functioned in philosophy as merely one more position 
alongside idealism, materialism, and realism. Instead, it has been an anonymous letter 
received by a dogmatic philosopher who does hold a position.”
2 See David R. Hiley’s Philosophy in Question. Essays on a Pyrrhonian Theme (Chicago, 
1988) for an opposition between skepticism and modem philosophy which tries to make 
sense of a connection between skepticism and postmodernism. Hiley’s claims as regards 
skepticism resemble however, as a matter of fact, more what I have to say about irony in 
the Postscript than what I am going to say about Maimonian skepticism in this chapter.
3 Unlike Michael Williams suggestion “that we get off the treadmill by overcoming the 
philosophical obsession with skepticism”, in “Coherence, Justification, and Truth”, 
Review o f Metaphysics, 1980.
4 The central theme of this chapter, that skepticism clarifies in a significant way the 
human condition, i.e. what it means for us to have a finite understanding, to be trapped,
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so I will argue in this chapter. Moreover, and this will be the central 
claim of my argument, a properly formulated skepticism will help us 
understand in what way the aporetic character of the structure of our 
articulations of thinking is characteristic of our understanding of 
thought itself. Crucial to such a formulation of skepticism are the no­
tions of a 'reason why’ and a ‘fact that’, notions that reflect the distinc­
tion between the Quid juris and the Quidfacti. I will discuss the details 
of this distinction in section 1. In order to understand the implications 
of this distinction, it is necessary to provide a careful analysis of the 
way in which Maimonian skepticism is based upon the Principle of 
Determinability. I will do that in section 2.
Occasionally I will, in this chapter, refer to the slogans with which I 
began this thesis (i.e. ‘finding a meaningful world’, and ‘making the 
world meaningful), suggesting that Maimon’s analysis throws light 
upon the views behind these slogans.
1. Quid juris and Quid facti
As a plain start, let me claim that Maimonian skepticism consists of 
a defense of the Antinomy of Thought, which implies that it should 
provide both a convincing argument for the thesis and one for the anti­
thesis. Here, I will argue for this directly with respect to the second 
formulation of the Antinomy, leaving the other formulations for close 
examination to the following chapter.
Thus, Maimonian skepticism argues for the following two theses:
(2) Thesis: Real thought must be expressed by judgements
that reveal the reason why they apply to the objects 
they are about.
Antithesis: Real thought must be expressed by judgements 
that reveal the fact that they apply to the objects 
they are about.
that is, in an Antinomy o f Thought, is also one of the motives underlying Barry Stroud’s 
The Significance o f Philosophical Scepticism  (Oxford, 1984), as well as Stanley 
Cavell’s In Quest o f the Ordinary. Lines o f Skepticism and Romanticism (Chicago, 1988)
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The first thing to notice is that according to Maimon, skepticism is 
not merely a matter of doubt. Even though it might be true that the 
skeptic often appears to be a philosopher who is parasitic upon the 
knowledge-claims of others, just trying to create doubt, one is bound to 
miss the essential point of skepticism if one regards it as just that. 
Doubt merely is the upshot of skepticism for those who are no skep­
tics; seen from the point of view of skepticism itself, Maimon argues, 
it amounts to an account of the human condition: a positive account of 
what it means to be cursed with a finite understanding.5 That is, skep­
ticism is itself a claim about the conditions of knowledge (or, as Mai­
mon would say, about the conditions of real thought), and, by that, a 
claim about our inability to satisfy them.
But what, exactly, does these claims entail? What does it mean for a 
judgement to reveal the reason why, and what to reveal the fact that it 
applies? And how are we to understand the meaning of an Antinomy? 
How are we to value the significance of two incompatible claims about 
the same thing? Should we not just resign, pleased again by the obvi­
ous self-refuting character of skepticism?
No, we should not, as I will argue -  and my point is that Maimon’s 
analysis of the difference between the Quid juris and the Quid facti 
amounts to more than just another skeptical argument. Its strength is 
that it explains why skeptical arguments are so persistent, since it 
makes it clear that real thought demands an answer to both questions, 
even though for a finite understanding answering one of them implies 
being unable to answer the other.
Maimon’s account of the distinction between the Quid juris and the 
Quid facti should be understood against the background of his pre­
5 We should take Maimon’s criticism of Aenesidemus in this light. Maimon thinks 
Aenesidemus is much more sympathetic to dogmatism than Kant, because Aenesidemus 
just doubts that any philosopher, so far, was able to prove anything “about the being and 
non-being of things in themselves and their properties, or about the limits of the human 
faculties of cognition”; “über das Dasein und Nichtseyn der Dinge an sich und ihrer 
Eigenschaften, noch über die Gränzen der menschlichen Erkenntnißkräfte”. (.Aenesidemus 
oder über die Fundamente der von dem Herrn Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten 
Elementar-Philosophie, Berlin, 1911, p. 18) See Logik, pp. 299-300.
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sumption that, in the final analysis, an object can be nothing but (and 
this must be taken literally6) that what is identified, by means of a 
judgement, with respect to a conscious subject. Accordingly, an object 
has, in the final analysis, no other features than those ascribed to it by 
means of a judgement. Or, as Maimon says:
Here it is my aim to show how the elements of a judgement (subject and predi­
cate) are as well the elements of the object the judgement is about.7
This means that it will, in the final analysis, make no sense to distin­
guish between the Quid juris and the Quidfacti, because the fact that a 
judgement applies to the object it is about, is, by the same token, the 
reason why it applies: namely, nothing but the actual existence of the 
judgement.
That we all, hpwever, notwithstanding this, do grasp a distinction be­
tween the fact that a judgement applies, and the reason why it does, is 
according to Maimon a consequence of our having a finite mind. That 
is, it seems to be the case that we have to accept that it is up to the con­
tingency of the world of experience to account for the fact that a speci­
fic judgement applies to the object it refers to. As it happens to be the 
case, it is a fact that “gold is yellow”. Mere contingency, however, 
does not seem to provide a reason why “is yellow” applies to “gold”8. 
After all, as long as it makes sense to ask why a fact is what it is, we do 
not appear to have understood the reason why it has to. Accordingly, 
this seems to suggest that the reason why a judgement does apply to 
the object it is about, has got something to do with explaining the syn­
thesis expressed by the judgement. It seems, that is, to be the case that 
a judgement does only reveal the reason why it applies if it is self-evi­
dent, if it gives expression to a rule of the understanding that might not 
be violated. To give a twist to a well-known example, analytic judge­
6 Remember that, for Maimon, all objects are intentional objects. See above, pp. 63-66, 
and 83-87.
7 “Hier ist meine Absicht zu zeigen, wie die Bestandtheile eines Urtheils (Subjekt und 
Prädikat) eben die Bestandtheile des Objekts, wovon geurtheilt wird, sind"J^ogik, p. 
254.
8 A fact is no reason, according to Maimon. Cf. Transscendentalphilosophie, pp. 107- 
109.
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ments like “a husband is a married man” are self-evident in this way: 
the rule of the understanding that governs the use of ‘husband’ (in ordi­
nary speech, the concept of an husband) would be violated by the 
denial of this judgement
This allows us to formulate the finitude of our minds the other way 
round: we have to depend upon the contingency of the world of experi­
ence, because our understanding is not able to produce self-evident 
judgements that express a complete determination of an object. And, of 
course, if an object cannot be anything but that what is identified by 
means of a judgement, this means that a judgement must express a 
complete determination, in order for the object it is about, to be real. 
Thus, in one more formulation, our having a finite mind consists in our 
being unable to provide the reason why real objects are the way they 
are. We just have to accept the fact that they are what they are, without 
being able to understand why.9
Taking into account that an analysis of real thought is, for Maimon, 
an analysis of the process of making judgements, we can formulate our 
finitude in terms of the deficiencies involved in the four different kinds 
of judgements we can produce. According to Maimon, there are two 
extreme kinds of judgements: the one being absolutely necessary (in 
the sense of being undeniably true), but, as far as we can see, absolu­
tely devoid of information; the other being absolutely informative, but, 
as far as we can see, absolutely devoid of necessity. These are, (1) ana­
lytic judgements a priori, that possess a formal necessity, because their 
predicate is identical to a part of their subject; and (2) synthetic judge­
9 This way of formulating what it means to have a finite mind, explains why we encounter 
the following problems in the models of finding and making : (1) What is the meaning of 
“meaningful” in ‘finding a meaningful world’?; and (2) What is the meaning of “the 
world” in 'making the world meaningful? The point of these questions is that we might 
conceive of thinking as (1 ) a matter of finding, but then we have to accept that the world 
we find does not seem to be intelligible, which makes it hard to explain what it means to 
maintain that this world is meaningful; or (2) a matter of making, but then we have to 
accept that what we make does not seem to be real, which makes it hard to explain what it 
means to maintain that this is nevertheless the world. In footnotes 18, 19, 46, 55, 57, 
61, 62 I will ‘translate’ the course of Maimon’s arguments for his skeptical position as 
illuminations of the slogans I have introduced to indicate the way in which our accounts 
of thinking can be understood to have an aporetic character.
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ments a posteriori, that are merely arbitrary, because they consist of a 
synthesis of a subject with a predicate that do not have anything to do 
with one another. In addition we can produce two kinds of interme­
diary judgements, being both necessary and informative. These are (3) 
synthetic judgements a priori, that exhibit a transcendental necessity;
i.e. they express the need that they have to be true (even though it might 
be the case that they aren’t), because we need the fact that they apply to 
the objects they are about, in order for experience to be possible at all 
(therefore these judgements are merely hypothetically informative); and
(4) synthetic judgements a priori, that exhibit an incomprehensible 
factual necessity, forced on us by intuition in connection with our abili­
ty to construct objects, as is the case in mathematics10 (therefore these 
judgements are merely intuitively necessary).11
The first kind of judgements do typically have an analytic character. 
Even though they are perfectly self-evident, giving expression to a rule 
of the understanding, we have to be very skeptical about their ability to 
serve as expressions of real thought. The point is that the necessity they
10 Remember that, according to Maimon, a synthetic judgement a priori in mathematics 
is derived from the occurrence of two synthetic judgements a posteriori, that are 
necessarily related by means of an a priori activity of the mind: the construction of an 
object. See above, pp. 73-74.
11 For those familiar with the philosophy of Leibniz it will prove fruitful to situate my 
discussion of Maimon’s distinction between the Quid juris and the Quid facti in this 
section and of his Principle o f Determinability in the next section in a Leibnizian 
context. Leibniz made a distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact, the former 
being analytic and necessary, the latter analytic and contingent. Problems arise once 
Leibniz tries to account for the difference between the attributes of analyticity, necessity 
and contingency given that necessity and contingency seem to exclude one another but 
that it nevertheless should be possible for analyticity to be combined with both. Seen in 
this light Maimon’s distinction between the Quid juris and the Quid facti might be viewed 
as an attempt ( 1) to make sense of the attributes of truths of reason such that they might 
be grasped independently of their supposed common root: the logical Principle of 
Identity or Non-Contradiction; and (2) to make sense of the combination of analyticity 
and contingency as attributes of truths of fact without having to take recourse to a 
Kantian kind of reformulation which would somehow amount to the opposite (contingent 
being synthetic, thus not analytic; analytic being a priori, thus not contingent). 
Maimon’s Principle o f Determinability, subsequently, might in this light be viewed as 
an attempt to substitute the logical Principle of Identity in such a way that Maimon’s 
Principle  might be said to govern both the non-trivial truths of reason and the non- 
arbitrary truths of fact, i.e. all real truths. In this context Maimon’s distinction between 
our finite understanding and the idea of an infinite understanding is typically Leibnizian 
in spirit, as will become apparent throughout this chapter.
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possess, is merely formal — it follows from the fact that the predicate 
is identical to a part of the subject. Therefore, the necessity of such a 
judgement is independent of the reality of the object it is about. As a 
consequence, it is possible that the kind of necessity involved in such a 
judgement is actually quite arbitrary. Dealing with nothing but the, form 
of judgements, we will not be in a position to prevent an arbitrary 
nominalism. The reason why an analytic judgement applies to the 
object it is about, being merely a. formal affair, can, in other words, be a 
matter of an arbitrary definition of how a notion ought to be used. It 
might, that is, be a matter of stipulating a class of objects without 
taking into account whether this class forms a real, natural kind at all 
(to use a contemporary notion). This leads us to an awareness of the 
fact that there is a way in which it makes sense to ask why an analytic 
judgement applies to the object it is about, a sense that refers to the fact 
that analytic judgements do not reveal the reason why it is a fact that 
they apply to the objects they are about.
Let me give a few examples:
(1) A triangle has three sides.
(2) A wife is a woman.
(3) A human being is rational.
In a way these are all analytic statements (given that a triangle is, by 
definition, a space bounded by three lines, a wife a married woman, 
and a human being a rational animal). Consequently they reveal in a 
formal way the reason why they do apply to the objects they are about. 
That is, a human being is rational, for, if it wasn’t, it would, by defini­
tion, not have been a human being in the first place. Of course, such a 
response does not really answer our question why it would be the case 
that a human being is rational.12 It might be that such a response works
12 It is because of this reason that Maimon, at times, states that analytic judgements, at 
least as far as they are merely formal judgements (as Kant takes them to be), do not 
express any thought at all. See his Logik , pp. 28-29: “I maintain, however, that 
analytical thought, in which the predicate is developed out of the concept of the subject, 
and (partly) is identical with it, is not thought at all, because if the predicate is already 
thought in the concept of the subject, there is no need to think it anew”; “Ich hingegen 
halte das analytische Denken, wo das Prädikat aus dem Begriffe des Subjekts entwickelt,
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with respect to the first statement (or, perhaps even with respect to the 
second one), but, as we all know since Quine13, this might merely be a 
matter of habit, of using the notion of a triangle only in contexts where 
the stipulated meaning holds, whereas we use the notion of a human 
being (in contradistinction with Aristotle?) in a variety of contexts not 
all of which support the stipulated meaning.
The point is not, of course, that we have to accept the relativistic con­
clusion of Quine; quite the contrary. What Maimon is arguing, is that 
the formal notion of a reason why a judgement would apply to the 
object it is about, is not good enough. The kind of reason that would 
suit as a condition for real thought does not merely produce a formal 
necessity, but should rather produce an informative necessity. The rea­
son why a judgement applies to the object it is about, should not be a 
matter of stipulative definitions, but has to be a matter of explanations, 
a matter of taking into account what is the case, in order to explain why 
it is a fact that it is the way it is.14
The second kind of judgements is quite the contrary of this first 
kind, but again, we have to be very skeptical about their ability to serve 
as expressions of real thought. Again our skepsis follows from the 
threat of arbitrariness, which is much more direct in this case. After all, 
a synthesis between two concepts that do not have anything to do with 
one another, at least not as regards their contents, is a synthesis for 
which there is no reason at all. Remember that facts are, according to 
Maimon, no reasons, since a reason must have explanatory power, 
which facts do not possess. Accordingly, it makes sense to argue that 
stating a fact blocks the road to knowledge, since it rules out the pos­
sibility of understanding the reason why it is a fact that it is the way it
und mit demselben (zum Theil) identisch ist, für gar kein Denken, weil, indem das 
Prädikat im Begriffe des Subjekts schon gedacht worden ist, es nicht aufs neue gedacht zu 
werden braucht.”
13 Since his attack upon the analytic/synthetic distinction in “Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism”, in The Philosophical Review 32, 1951. Reprinted in From a Logical Point 
of View (New York, 1961)
14 We can understand the tenor of this requirement only once we have understood what 
Maimon means by his claim that all judgements that express real thoughts are governed 
by the Principle o f Determinability. See below, p. 118f.
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is. Hence Maimon’s claim that these synthetic judgements a posteriori 
do not express any thought at all.15
The disapproval of this kind of judgement, as regards the possibility 
of expressing real thought, is of the same structure as the one against 
analytic judgements. Just as the formal notion of necessity is not good 
enough to provide an answer to the Quid juris, we have to accept that 
the arbitrary notion of informativeness is not good enough to provide 
an answer to the Quid facti. This is so, because it is according to 
Maimon impossible to identify an object by means of a synthetic 
judgement a posteriori. As we shall see in the following chapter16, the 
synthesis of two concepts that have nothing to do with one another, is, 
according to Maimon, not a matter of thought, but a matter of cooper­
ation between intuition and imagination, such that it is up to the intui­
tion to identify the object in space-time. Hence, arbitrary thought cannot 
at all reveal the fact that it applies to the object it is about, since it is 
nothing but a product of the imagination which tries to account for the 
fact that intuition identified something by means of spatio-temporal 
coordinates. This last fact, however, which is for us a necessary fact, 
enforced upon us by the contingency of the world of experience, cannot 
be expressed by means of a judgement.
Should these two extreme kinds of judgements be all our finite mind 
could produce, it is clear that we would be forced to draw a rather des­
perate conclusion. Luckily however, we are at least in principle, accord­
ing to Maimon, also able to produce synthetic judgements a priori, 
which give us at least a chance of performing real thought. In order for 
them to be successful, they must give an answer to the Quid juris that 
is not merely formal, but that explains the reality of the objects they are 
about; and an answer to the Quid facti that is not merely arbitrary, but
15 Logik, pp. 24-25: “An arbitrary thought has no reason at all, and therefore it actually 
is not a thought at all. After all, that the predicate does not contradict the subject is a 
reason for knowledge only if the predicate is a possible predicate at all, i.e. if the 
predicate in question, as well as its opposite, is with respect to consciousness dependent 
upon the subject.”; “Das willkührliche Denken hat gar keinen Grund, und ist also in der 
That gar kein Denken. Denn daß das Prädikat dem Subjekte nicht widerspricht, ist nur 
alsdann Erkenntnißgrund, wenn das gedachte Prädikat ein mögliches Prädikat überhaupt 
ist, d.h. wenn das gedachte Prädikat sowohl, als sein Gegentheil, in Ansehung des 
Bewußtseyns, vom Subjekte abhängig ist.”
16 Below, pp. 141-146.
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that reveals the concept (i.e. the rule of the understanding) of the 
objects they are about. Unfortunately, synthetic judgements a priori do 
not succeed in giving these answers (therefore we will have to be skep­
tics), but, and this is a crucial ‘but’, they reveal a fundamental Principle 
of Thought17, such that we are able to understand how and why real 
thought must be expressed by judgements that reveal both the reason 
why and the fact that they do apply to the objects they are about (and 
therefore we will have to be Maimonian skeptics, defending the Anti­
nomy of Thought as a plausible account of our human condition).
The first kind of synthetic judgements a priori possess a transcen­
dental necessity, forced on us by an analysis of real thought itself: they 
have to apply to real objects, in order to make experience, i.e. real 
thought, possible at all. Following Kant, Maimon argues that this ne­
cessity is self-evident. He accepts that Kant’s Transcendental Deduc­
tion gives a convincing argument for the following conditional: either 
the categories apply to the objects of experience, or experience is mere­
ly an illusion. Hence, the necessity of these judgements reveal the rea­
son why they have to apply to the objects they are about. But they do 
not, by that, reveal the fact that they do apply, as Maimon never tires of 
pointing out. Conditionals do not state facts; they need them, in order to 
be effective. Kant’s mistake, according to Maimon, is that he assumed 
without questioning that experience is not an illusion, thus thinking that 
his Transcendental Deduction, by providing an answer to the Quid 
juris answers the Quid facti as well. But it doesn’t, as we saw in the 
previous chapter.
Notwithstanding this disappointing conclusion, we can learn some­
thing important from Maimon’s criticism of Kant. An analysis of 
synthetic judgements a priori allows us to develop a notion of an 
answer to the Quid juris that is not based upon the form of the judge­
ment, but upon the possibility of the reality of an object that possesses 
the determinations expressed in the judgement as if they were inner 
features of the object in question.1* As a consequence, it is possible to
17 This is the Maimonian Principle of Determinability that I will discuss in the following 
section.
18 The point of this notion, in terms of finding and making, is that it aims to clarify the 
meaning of “meaningful” in *finding a meaningful world’, without the need to revert to a
argue with Maimon in favour of the thesis of the Antinomy of Thought. 
That is to say, the notion of a ‘reason why’ under consideration is an 
essential precondition of real thought, in such a way that judgements 
that reveal this kind of reason, do really possess part of what is needed 
for a performance of real thought. In other words, real thought is really 
possible, even though it might be that we will never be able to attain it. 
It is to this that Maimonian skepticism amounts, but a sufficient 
defence of it will only be possible after the introduction of the Principle 
ofDeterminability.
There is, however, more to real thought than only an adequate 
answer to the Quid juris. The Quid facti must be answered too, and 
although Maimon claims that the Quid facti cannot be answered in 
physics, it can, according to him, be answered in mathematics. 
Therefore, we can learn something about the Quid facti from an analy­
sis of the last kind of judgement that we are able to produce. These are 
the synthetic judgements a priori that make up the body of mathemati­
cal knowledge. They do, indeed, possess a necessity of a factual kind, 
but do not reveal the reason why they do. That is, the predicate of such 
a judgement is not identical to a part of the subject, even though intui­
tion reveals that what the predicate refers to, is necessarily a part of the 
object the subject refers to. Maimon’s paradigm is here the judgement 
that “the sum total of the angles of a triangle equals two right angels”. 
What these judgements show, is that the fact that they apply to the 
objects they are about, depends, although for us in an incomprehensible 
way, upon a rule of the understanding that is used to construct the 
object in question. And it is this feature of synthetic judgements a priori 
that allows us to develop a notion of an answer to the Quid facti that is 
not based upon the contingency of the world of experience, but upon 
an activity of the mind that, following a rule of the understanding, 
amounts to the construction of an object.19
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notion of meaningfulness that is derived from the idea of ‘making the world meaningful’. 
See the general remark at footnote 9.
19 The point of this notion, in terms of making and finding, is that it aims to clarify the 
meaning of “the world” in ‘making the world meaningful’, without the need to revert to a 
notion of the world that is derived from the idea of * finding a meaningful world’. See the 
general remark at footnote 9.
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As a consequence, it is, once more, possible to argue with Maimon 
in favour of the Antinomy of Thought; this time in favour of the anti­
thesis of the second formulation. That is, the notion of a fact that’ un­
der consideration is an essential precondition of real thought, in such a 
way that judgements that reveal this kind of fact, do really possess part 
of what is needed for a performance of real thought. Thus we are, once 
more, in a position to maintain that real thought is really possible, even 
though it might be that we will never be able to attain it.
In order to be able to understand the precise meaning of this conse­
quence for Maimonian skepticism, it will be necessary to analyse the 
Principle of Determinability. But let me here, by way of summary, 
point out that, even though Maimonian skepticism can be correctly 
characterized as based upon the conviction that the human mind is un­
able to answer the Quidfacti, it is nevertheless more than just a nega­
tive claim, because, as the case of mathematics shows, we can under­
stand the possibility of an answer to the Quidfacti. This means that an 
accurate characterization of Maimonian skepticism will have to take 
into account that it amounts to a defense of the Antinomy of Thought. 
Real thought would, in other words, really be expressed by judgements 
that provide both the reason why and the fact that they apply to the 
objects they are about. Unfortunately, however, in the case of a finite 
mind, an answer to the Quid juris implies the impossibility to answer 
the Quidfacti, and vice versa. But what is important to realize is that 
this implication is, indeed, a consequence of the finitude of our minds: 
our possibilities are limited, but we have, nevertheless, the capacity to 
understand what it means to perform real thought. How we have to 
take this will emerge from my discussion of the Principle of 
Determinability, which is the topic of the following section.
2. The Principle of Determinability 
A BASIC PROBLEM
In his Logik, Maimon introduces the Principle of Determinability as 
follows:
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The first principle of all real thought (thought that determines objects) is, what I 
call, the Principle of Determinability.20
This poses an immediate problem for any interpretation of 
Maimon’s philosophy that tends to stress the importance of the idea of 
an Antinomy of Thought. For, isn’t the idea of a Principle of Real 
Thought actually incompatible with the idea of an Antinomy of  
Thought? Isn’t it obvious that, once we are able to formulate a principle 
that governs an activity, we introduce the apparatus to solve any appa­
rent antinomy concerning that activity? Or, the other way round, isn’t it 
evident that, once we are able to prove an antinomy with respect to 
some activity, we, thereby, prove that there cannot be a principle that 
governs the activity in question? How, then, are we to understand the 
relation between Maimon’s apparent defence of the Antinomy of 
Thought and his introducing the Principle of Determinability as if it 
were a Principle of Real Thought?
I will argue in this section that the tenor of these questions is misdi­
rected. In order to account for the real inescapability of the Antinomy of 
Thought, Maimon needs to take refuge to the Principle of Determina­
bility, because that is the only way to end up with the Antinomy, and 
not, merely, with some uninteresting kind of self-refuting skepticism.21 
To put it differently, I will argue that Maimon needs some kind of 
Principle of Thought, in order to account for an Antinomy that reflects 
more than just a contradiction in or of the account he gives. That is, if 
Maimonian skepticism is self-refuting, then this will not merely be a 
matter of a view that cannot be maintained, but rather a matter of the 
fact that it is a view that cannot be abandoned — not merely a matter of 
words, but as well a matter of what the words do stand for.22
20 “Der erste Grundsatz alles reellen, Objekt bestimmenden Denkens ist der von mir 
sogenannte Satz der Bestimmbarkeit.", Logik, p. 20.
21 Nathan Rotenstreich, in his description of Maimon’s skepticism as occupying a 
special position within the history of skeptical ideas, makes roughly the same point. He 
writes: “such scepticism is explicitly formulated by reference to a definite, crystallized, 
cognitive ideal. Such scepticism accordingly implies the nonrealization of the ideal, not 
the self-contradiction or self-destruction of knowledge.” Nathan Rotenstreich, “On the 
Position of Maimon’s Philosophy”, in Review o f Metaphysics 21, 1968, p. 543
22 Both the propositions they express, and the reality they refer to.
The Value of Skepticism 109
AN EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLE
Now, of course, this is a tough claim. Let me, therefore, argue for it 
with care, using Maimon’s words as guides, beginning with the for­
mulation of the Principle of Determinability that immediately follows 
the sentence I quoted just above:
This [Principle o f Determinability] is itself made up of two principles: 1) a 
principle which concerns the subject in general: Each subject should not only as 
a subject, but also in itself, be a possible object of consciousness; 2) a principle 
which concerns the predicate: Each predicate should not in itself, but as a 
predicate (related to the subject) be a possible object of consciousness. What 
does not conform to these principles might be just a form al or, perhaps, an 
arbitrary, but not a real thought.23
It is important to be aware of the fact that according to Maimon 
thought is nothing but the production of judgements, and, in addition, 
that he assumes that every judgement typically has a subject-predicate 
structure.24 Thus, we should not think that Maimon is perhaps trying to 
formulate a rule of grammar. This will be even more clear, once we 
realize that the Principle of Determinability is not really about that what 
might occupy a position in a judgement, but is actually expressing the 
characteristics of a relation of determinability. We can see this perhaps 
more clearly in the notions that are based upon this Principle; i.e. the 
‘determinable’ (‘das Bestimmbare’) and the determination (‘die 
Bestimmung’). I already used them once or twice, calling the subject of 
a judgement the ‘determinable’, and the predicate the determination.
23 “Dieser [der Satz der Bestimmbarkeit] zerfällt wiederum in zwei andere Sätze: 1) in 
einen Satz fürs Subjekt überhaupt: Ein jedes Subjekt muß nicht nur als Subjekt, sondern 
auch an sich, ein möglicher Gegenstand des Bewußtseyns seyn; 2) in einen Satz fürs 
Prädikat: Ein jedes Prädikat muß nicht an sich, sondern als Prädikat (in Verbindung mit 
dem Subjekt) ein möglicher Gegenstand des Bewußtseyns seyn. Was nicht diesen Sätzen 
gemäß ist, kann ein bloß form elles , oder gar willkührliches, aber kein reelles Denken 
seyn.” Logik, p. 20.
24 Cf. Logik , p. 248, “The entire affair of thought consists, as will be explained below, 
in judging. A judgement consists of two parts (subject and predicate) and their 
conjunction.”; “Das ganze Geschäft des Denkens bestehet, wie weiterhin gezeigt werden 
soll, im Urtheilen. Ein Urtheil bestehet aus zwei Gliedern (Subjekt und Prädikat) und ihrer 
Verbindung mit einander (Kopula).”
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Now the point of these notions and, thus, the point of the Principle of 
Determinability, is to account for the fact that there are representations 
that do stand in real relations, whereas there are others too that are not 
really related.
An example might help: the relation between ‘green’ and ‘color’ is 
of another kind than the relation between ‘green’ and ‘grass’. 
According to Maimon, the first relation is a relation that is governed by 
the Principle of Determinability, whereas the second is not. That is, 
‘green’ is a determination of ‘color’, because ‘green’ cannot be an 
object of consciousness on its own, but only as a predicate of ‘color’. 
We cannot think of ‘green’ without, by that, thinking of ‘color’ as well, 
even in such a way that we think of ‘green’ as the determination and of 
‘color’ as the ‘determinable’. In contrast we can think of ‘green’ with­
out, by that, thinking of ‘grass’ (imagine, for example, some kind of 
fancy Italian icecream, known as ‘pistache’), just as we can think of 
‘grass’ without, by that, thinking of ‘green’ (put up your tent in an 
alpine meadow, and imagine what the grass underneath looks like after 
a couple of weeks). Therefore, we cannot say that ‘green’ is a determi­
nation of ‘grass’, nor that ‘grass’ is a ‘determinable’ in relation to 
‘green’. Of course, this does not mean that there cannot be judgements 
in which ‘green’ occupies the position of the predicate, and ‘grass’ the 
position of the subject, but, and this is exactly what Maimon is driving 
at with his Principle of Determinability, such judgements cannot be 
taken to express a real thoughtP
25 For exegetical reasons it might be observed here that Maimon’s distinction between 
determinations and ‘determinables’ resembles, but does not coincide, with W.E. 
Johnson’s account of the relation between determinables and determinates. Johnson 
writes in his Logic, (Cambridge 1921) Part I, p. 174: “I propose to call such terms as 
colour and shape determinables in relation to such terms as red and circular which will be 
called determinates". The point of his distinction is two-fold: (a) some adjectives belong 
to one another because they have a real relation of difference to one another in such a way 
that they can take the place of one and the same more indeterminate adjective (red and 
blue, unlike red and circular, can both replace one and the same adjective, i.e.coloured); 
and, related, (b) some adjectives increase the determination of the subject-matter without 
increasing the number of adjectives (we know more of an object if it is said to be red than 
if it is said to be coloured, but there is no point in saying of a thing that it is both red and 
coloured since the latter adjective is already implied in the former). Maimon clearly is 
aware of the differences in logical function of the two kinds of adjectives (predicates) that 
Johnson observes, but what he attempts to do is to connect far-reaching metaphysical
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A full appreciation of the idea that there are real relations of deter- 
minability, revealed by the Principle of Determinability, will only be 
possible by taking into account what, according to Maimon, is implied 
by this basic idea. In the first place there is the consequence that for 
every determination, there is one and only one ‘determinable’.26 That 
means that, for example, nothing can be green, except a color.27 This 
consequence is implied by the fact that, if we are dealing with a real 
relation of determinability, it has to be the case that the determination 
implies the specific ‘determinable’ in question. Would it be possible 
for the determination to be a real determination of another ‘determin­
able’, this would imply that it was after all possible to think of the 
determination without, by that, implying the ‘determinable’ in question. 
Hence, it would not have been a real relation of determinability in the 
first place.
Though it is perhaps possible to accept this first consequence as 
implied by a rigorous conception of the purity of thought, it might be 
much harder to accept its reverse: that every ‘determinable’ can at one 
time have one and only one determination. And yet, this is implied too 
by the Principle of Determinability.2* The point is as follows: if a real 
relation of determinability is only possible if being conscious of the 
determination implies a consciousness of the ‘determinable’, then 
although the ‘determinable’ is thinkable without this specific determi­
nation, it is not at the very moment of thinking the determination (that 
is, of forming the judgement that expresses the real relation of de­
terminability between both). For, would it, then there would have to be 
two judgements the mind was conscious of at the very same moment: 
both judgements in which the same ‘determinable’ occupies the posi­
tion of the subject. Such a coincidence implies, according to Maimon,
consequences to them, suggesting that these differences display a kind of deep structure 
present in our ways of judging (which is not merely a way of speaking but always also a 
way of encountering objects). The precise meaning of this idea of deep structure will be 
analysed in the following pages.
26 Transscendentalphilosophie, pp. 86ff.
27 Or, as Maimon states it boldly: “it is just as impossible to think of a red body as it is 
to think of a sweet line.”; “man kann so wenig einen rothen Körper als eine süße Linie 
denken.” ibid. p. 93.
28 Logik, pp. 187f.
that it would be possible to think of any one of these judgements, 
without, by that, having to think of the other. And that implies that this 
conjunction does not express a real relation of determinability; hence, 
that it is not one and the same ‘determinable’ that occupies in both 
judgements the position of the subject.29
Nonetheless, this second consequence seems to be rather counter­
intuitive. After all, isn’t it evident that we do think of complex objects, 
for example of red and round tomatos. Well, according to Maimon this 
is exactly what isn't evident, and just the mentioned kind of example 
might help to prove his point. For, tomatos are not red, but colors are; 
and neither are tomatos round: shapes are.30 Thus, if we think of a red, 
round tomato, we have to presuppose the presence of representations 
that are the products of the imagination, associated with one another in 
a specific intuited spatio-temporal unity. The synthesis of these 
representations, in the idea of a tomato, is, so far, not at all a matter of 
real thought (that is, not at all a synthesis governed by the Principle of 
Determinability).
This suggests, however, a third consequence. The only possibility 
for us to think of complex objects now seems to be that we have to 
assume that representations are ordered in a hierachical, linear way. 
That is, if we cannot but think of ‘round’ by thinking of ‘shape’ as the 
‘determinable’ ‘round’ is a determination of, then it might be that we 
are implicitly (or, as Maimon would say, symbolically), by thinking of 
‘shape’, thinking of ‘space’ as well.31 This is so because ‘shape’ and 
‘space’ stand in a real relation of determinability, ‘shape’ being the de­
termination and ‘space’ its ‘determinable’. All this suggests that 
Maimon is thinking of linear chains of representations, of which every 
link is governed by the Principle of Determinability, such that the 
thought of the chain as a whole would amount to a complete concept of 
a real object. This is, indeed, a crucial aspect of Maimon’s philoso­
phy32. The idea is that we will be able to think the reality of a tomato,
29 Transscendentalphilosophie, pp. 142-144.
30 Cf. Logik, p. 188.
31 Logik, pp. 31-32.
32 It implies, according to Maimon, the idea of an infinite understanding. Cf. Transscen­
dentalphilosophie, p. 248. There are informative resemblances between Leibniz’ and 
Maimon’s thoughts about the relation between the idea of an infinite understanding, the
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once we are able to conceive a (presumably infinite) linear chain of 
subordinated representations (containing ‘red’, ‘color’, ‘round’, ‘shape’ 
and ‘space’, etc.) such that each link is governed by the Principle of 
Determinability. Our finitude exists precisely in our inability to attain 
the thought of such an infinitely long linear chain of representations.
Notwithstanding our impossibility to reach the completion of any 
concept of a real object, this idea of a linear chain of subordinated 
representations of which each link is governed by the Principle of 
Determinability, leads to a very important consequence. The point is 
that, despite the undeniable fact of our possibly overwhelming finitude, 
there is no qualitative difference between our finite kind of real thought, 
and the real thought of an infinite mind. Both will be build up from 
judgements that express real relations of determinability, the only dif­
ference being quantitative. Thus, whereas it will take an infinitely long 
time for us to attain the thought of an infinitely long chain of represen­
tations that stand in real relations of determinability, this will take just 
one timeless moment for an infinite mind.33
This is a very complex consequence. I will explain its tenor by dis­
cussing two closely related claims of Maimon, one being that judge­
ments that express real thought have an ‘analytic-synthetic’ character34, 
the other that thought is real if it is concerned with the determinate 
object (‘das bestimmte Objekt’), as the object referred to by a 
judgement that is governed by the Principle of Determinability35.
In his Kritische Untersuchungen iiber den menschlichen Geist,36 
Maimon gives a clear statement of why he thinks that judgements that 
are governed by the Principle of Determinability have an ‘analytic- 
synthetic’ character:
concept of a real object and the infinite number of steps to be taken in an analysis of a 
contingent truth. See on this F. Kuntze, Die Philosophie Salomon Maimons, pp. 276, 
307, 341; and S. Atlas, From Critical to Speculative Idealism, pp. 75f, pp. 79ff.
33 Cf. T ransscendentalphilosophie, p. 228. We should also understand Maimon’s 
tendency to speak of our finite mind as if it is the 'Schema’ of the infinite mind, in this 
context. See Transscendentalphilosophie, p. 365, and Kritische Untersuchungen, p. 263.
34 Cf.Transscendentalphilosophie, p. 107; Kritische Untersuchungen, p. 116, pp. 131- 
132.
35 See, Logik, pp. 166-167.
36 In this book Maimon presents a kind of popularization of his views, by means of a 
number of dialogues.
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the construction of a straight line, as a real object, presupposes an analytic- 
synthetic judgement, because the determination of ‘being-straight’ cannot be an 
object of consciousness without the ‘determinable’ ‘line’. Thus, in conscious­
ness, the predica te  is analytically  related to the subject, not because of its 
concept but because of its existence, by way of the judgement, which is indeed 
not expressed, but nevertheless presupposed. In this construction, expressed by 
the judgement ‘a line can be straight’, ‘line’ and ‘straight’ are only related in a 
synthetic way, because in being conscious of a line it is not necessarily implied 
to be conscious of straightness. This judgement, therefore, is analytic-synthetic, 
if we take everything into account which is thought by means of this judgement. 
Analytic from the point of view of the predicate, and synthetic from the point of 
view of the subject.31
The point of this new characterization of a judgement that is 
governed by the Principle of Determinability, is that it allows us to 
understand how a synthetic judgement might, in the final analysis, turn 
out to be analytic, as must be the case with synthetic judgements a 
priori, if, that is, they will turn out to be judgements that express real 
thought. It allows us this understanding, because it assumes the pos­
sibility to approach a specific judgement from two different directions.
The most informative way to clarify this, is to imagine the judge­
ment to be a link in a (perhaps infinite) chain, such that we can 
approach the specific judgement from, as it were, the direction of the 
most general ‘determinable’ (which is, according to Maimon, con­
sciousness in general— “das Bewußtseyn überhaupt”38), and also from 
the other direction, that is, from the direction of the most specific
37 “die Konstruktion einer geraden Linie, als reelles Objekt, setzt ein analytisch-synthe­
tisches Urtheil voraus, indem die Bestimmung des Geradeseins nicht ohne das 
Bestimmbare·. Linie, ein Gegenstand des Bewußtseins sein kann. Das Prädikat ist also mit 
dem Subjekte, nicht ihren Begriffen nach, sondern ihrem Dasein nach, im Bewußtsein, 
durch das Urtheil, das zwar nicht ausgedrückt, aber dennoch vorausgesetzt wird: das 
Geradesein ist nothwendig Linie, analytisch verbunden. In dem in dieser Konstruktion 
ausgedrückten Urtheile: eine Linie kann gerade sein, aber wird Linie mit Geradesein 
synthetisch  verbunden, weil in dem Bewußtsein von Linie das Bewußtsein des 
Geradeseins nicht nothwendig enthalten ist. Dieses Urtheil ist also, wenn wir auf alles 
Rücksicht nehmen, was darin gedacht wird, analytisch-synthetisch. Analytisch von  
Seiten des P r ä d ik a ts ,  und synthetisch  von Seiten des S u b je k ts .” K r it is c h e  
Untersuchungen, pp. 131-132.
38 Logik, pp. 244-245.
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determination.39 The former kind of approach is the approach according 
to which the specific judgement is synthetic. Thus, approaching the 
judgement as a judgement that states that a ‘color’ can be ‘green’, we 
realize that the judgement is synthetic, since it adds to ‘color’ the de­
termination ‘green’, in an informative, but so far groundless way. 
Approaching the judgement, however, from the opposite direction, as a 
judgement that states that ‘green’ has to be a ‘color’, we realize that the 
judgement is analytic, since it reveals that the ‘determinable’ of ‘green’ 
is necessarily a ‘color’.
Granted, now, that an infinite mind can think in one single moment 
an infinitely long chain of representations related by means of judge­
ments that are governed by the Principle of Determinability, it is obvi­
ous that it makes no difference for an infinite mind whether it ap­
proaches any specific judgement from whatever direction. After all, it 
thinks the whole chain at once, such that it creates, by that very activity, 
both the complete concept and the real object it is the concept of. 
Hence, for the infinite mind, the chain as a whole is neither synthetic 
nor analytic, but, all the same, it is absolutely informative (creating an 
object ex nihilo) and absolutely necessary (completely governed, as it 
is, by a rule of the understanding).
Even though we, gifted with only a finite understanding, cannot ap­
proach a judgement from these two different directions at once, this 
makes not a difference at all with respect to the status of the judge­
ments under consideration. Granted that a judgement is governed by 
the Principle of Determinability, it will express real thought, irrespec­
tive of the nature of the mind that is forming the judgement.
Roughly the same point can be stated in another way, by paying 
attention to the idea of a determinate object (‘das bestimmte Objekt’).
39 The “spatial metaphor” I introduce here, aims to make sense of the assumptions that all 
judgements have a subject-predicate structure and that all qualities have a place within a 
linear genus-species structure. These assumptions exhibit, as Samuel Atlas showed, the 
influence of Maimonides and Leibniz on Maimon’s conception of the difference between 
the finite and the infinite mind. See S. Atlas, “Solomon Maimon’s Doctrine of Infinite 
Reason and Its Historical Relations”, in Journal o f the History o f Ideas, 1952, pp. 178- 
182
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Such an object is identified by a judgement40, which is governed by the 
Principle of Determinability. Even though such a judgement takes 
almost everything about the object for granted (because it does not 
specify what the ‘determinable’ is supposed to be, but only that it is 
determined by the determination that occupies the position of the predi­
cate), it nevertheless is, according to Maimon, a judgement about a real 
possibility, about an object that can be real. Therefore, the thought ex­
pressed by the judgement is a real thought41 Even though it expresses 
nothing but a tiny fragment of the concept of a real object, i.e. nothing 
but one link in a chain that it is infinitely long, it expresses nonetheless 
a link that is a real part of both the concept of a real object, and of the 
real object itself. In other words, real thought is a matter of stating 
syntheses that are links in chains that might be infinitely long to make 
up the complete concept of a real object. Whether or not we are able to 
attain such concepts is one thing; whether we are able to think real parts 
of such objects is quite another. And what Maimon is claiming, is that 
we can perform the latter, even though we may never be able to com­
plete our thought of reality.
A DISTINCTION BASED UPON THE PRINCIPLE
We are now in a position to understand what Maimon means by 
claiming that the Principle of Determinability allows us to distinguish 
between judgements that are formal, judgements that are arbitrary and 
judgements that are real.
A formal judgement is one in which the predicate is a part of the 
subject. Such judgements are analytic in an uninteresting, tautological 
way. It is because of their formal structure that they are necessarily 
true, but they are, just because of that, unable to determine an object. 
Stated differently, they are true because of the Principle of 
Contradiction, not because of the Principle of Determinability. Since
40 As we will see in the next chapter, any object is, according to Maimon, identified by 
means of a judgement and with respect to a conscious subject. See below, p. 138-139.
41Logik , pp. 166-167.
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their formal structure is “ab = a”42, they do not manifest a real relation 
of determinability. After all, it is not clear whether the predicate can 
only be an object of consciousness if, by that, the subject has to be an 
object of consciousness too. This is so, because it is not clear at all 
whether the subject can be a ‘determinable’ with respect to the predi­
cate, since the subject is compound. Hence, it is itself the product of a 
judgement, and, if that judgement is not itself governed by the Prin­
ciple of Determinability, the subject cannot be thought at all. That is, if 
the judgement that constructs the subject of the formal judgement, is 
itself not real, then the subject does not refer to a determinate object at 
all.
An example will clarify this straightaway. Suppose I think that a ‘red 
smell’ is ‘red’. Now the judgement that expresses this thought is surely 
necessarily true. It is just true because of its formal structure. But even 
so, it is plain nonsense. ‘Red’ cannot be a determination of a ‘red 
smell’, because it is possible to think of ‘red’ without, by that, having 
to think of a ‘red smell’. Even stronger, it is not possible at all to think 
of a ‘red smell’, since ‘red’ and ‘smell’ do not stand in any real relation 
of determinability. It follows, therefore, that a ‘red smell’ cannot be a 
‘determinable’ with respect to ‘red’, for the simple fact that a ‘red 
smell’ cannot be a determinate object in the first place.
If one attempts to object, now, by pointing out that Maimon’s 
favourite example of an analytic judgement is “a triangle has three 
sides”, this will only help me make the point I try to make. Thus, not 
all analytic judgements are formal judgements, if only for the fact that 
all real judgements will, according to Maimon, turn out to be analytic. 
What would be a formal judgement in this case, and consequently not a 
real judgement, is “a space bounded by three sides has three sides”. 
This judgement is merely true because of its formal structure, because, 
that is, of the Principle of Contradiction. That it, nevertheless, refers to 
a determinate object, an object that is determined by a judgement that is 
governed by the Principle of Determinability, is not a merit of the 
judgement, but only of the judgement that is implied by the subject of
42 In concordance with Maimon’s notation, this is the formal structure of sentences like 
“A pink elephant is pink”. The *=’ symbolizes the copula, not the mathematical ‘is equal 
to’.
it. This judgement is: “a space can be bounded by three sides”. This 
means that the judgement “a triangle has three sides” is not itself a real 
judgement; it presupposes a real judgement that makes the statement 
necessarily true. Because of that we can, notwithstanding its character, 
maintain that it is a judgement that expresses knowledge; according to 
Maimon, analytic knowledge.43
This analysis of a formal judgement, in terms of its not being 
governed by the Principle of Determinability, explains why one of the 
extreme kinds of judgements discussed in the previous section, is not 
able to express real thought (the analytic judgements a priori, that pos­
sess a formal necessity, because their predicate is identical to a part of 
their subject). Now we can see why, as I argued there, the reason why 
these judgements apply to the objects they are about, is not good 
enough to account for the reason why real thought applies to the objects 
it is about. For, either they do not provide a reason at all (in the case of 
red smells being red), or they presuppose it (in the case of a triangle 
having three sides).
Just such an explanation can be given too of why the other extreme 
kind of judgement (the synthetic judgements a posteriori, that are 
merely arbitrary, because they consist of a synthesis of a subject with 
a predicate that do not have anything to do with one another) is not able 
to express real thought. As I argued above, these judgements do not 
provide a notion of the fact that they apply to the objects they are about, 
that is good enough to account for the fact that real thought applies to 
the objects it is about. An analysis in terms of its not being governed 
by the Principle of Determinability can explain why this is so.
Arbitrary judgements express syntheses between two representa­
tions that do not have any kind of relation to one another. That is to say, 
both of them can be an object of consciousness by themselves, i.e. 
without, by thinking of it, having to think of the other. One of Mai­
mon’s favourite examples is rather provocative: “sugar is sweet”. The 
point is that we can think of the predicate ‘sweet’ without, by that, 
having to think of ‘sugar’. Hence, ‘sugar’ cannot be the ‘determinable’ 
of ‘sweet’. The only kind of representation we have to think of, by
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thinking of sweet, is ‘taste’. That is, ‘taste’ and ‘sweet’ stand in a real 
relation of determinability; ‘taste’ being the ‘determinable’, ‘sweet’ its 
determination.
The temptation to object that we, nevertheless, cannot think of 
‘sugar’ without, by that, having to think of ‘sweet’, implies the sug­
gestion that perhaps ‘sugar’ is the determination, and ‘sweet’ its ‘deter­
minable’. But this surely is not what is meant by the judgement that 
“sugar is sweet”. That is, this judgement does not express a way in 
which ‘sweet’ might be determined by ‘sugar’, because ‘sugar’ is not a 
determination of anything. It is, instead, at most a name for a class of 
‘objects’ that share a number of determinations. As such it resembles, 
according to Maimon, such incomprehensible ‘objects’ as ‘red smells’. 
Or, to put it differently, ‘sugar’ is the name for a kind of object that we 
can only identify in space and time (in experience)44, not by means of 
an intelligible chain of representations. For the chain that will make up 
the idea of sugar, consists of such unrelated determinations as ‘sweet’, 
‘soluble’, ‘crystal-shaped’, etc. Hence, if it seems undeniably true that 
“sugar is sweet”, then this is presumably a consequence of the fact that 
we take for granted that ‘sugar’ is the determinate object referred to by 
a judgement like “the crystal-shaped thing that is sweet, soluble, etc.”. 
Thus, the judgement is, as a judgement, at most true because it is in 
fact a formal judgement: “the thing that is sweet, etc. is sweet”. How­
ever, as we saw above, such judgements are not able to express real 
thought.
And actually, it is unlikely that we will reason in this direction, if we 
were to defend the truth of “sugar is sweet”. It is more likely that we 
will try to point out that the judgement states a fact. But then it states 
this fact in an incomprehensible way, giving expression to a synthesis 
we might perhaps experience in space and time, but which we cannot 
understand as governed by a rule of the understanding. The notion of 
the fact that such a judgement applies to the object it is about is there­
fore not good enough, since we do not have any guarantee that the 
judgement does in fact refer to a determinate object at all. It might
44 In Maimon’s terminology ‘sugar’ is an object determined outside o f thought. See 
above, Chapter Four, pp. 65-67, and below, Chapter Six, section 2, pp. 138-146.
indeed as well be the case that there is no more than an arbitrary coinci­
dence between, on the one hand, the experience of a specific spatio- 
temporal unity (over there, at this very moment, in the sugar bowl) 
and, on the other hand, the occurrence of a judgement that expresses a 
synthesis between ‘sugar’ and ‘sweet’.45 After all, there is nothing in 
‘sugar’ nor in ‘sweet’ that gives us any reason to believe that the judge­
ment expresses a real relation of determinability.
So far, then, the Principle of Determinability does indeed explain 
why the two extreme kinds of judgements we are able to produce, 
cannot express real thought. But can the Principle also explain why the 
two remaining kinds of judgements (the synthetic judgements a priori 
that do exist in mathematics, and should exist in physics) might 
express real thought?
Maimon gives a positive answer to this question, an answer that 
needs careful treatment. For all emphasis has to be on ‘might’: the 
Principle of Determinability does not explain why synthetic judge­
ments a priori do express real thought, but merely why they might 
express it. Or, to say it in another way, the Principle of Determinability 
helps us to identify the kinds of judgements thought needs in order to 
realize the possibility of its being real thought. Let us first consider the 
case of mathematics. As we saw above, there are mathematical state­
ments that are synthetic judgements a priori, and they give expression 
to the necessity of the fact that they apply to the objects they are about, 
even though they do not provide the reason why they apply. Thus, it 
appears to be the case that we can find a meaningful world by means of 
these judgements, even though we are not in a position to understand 
this world by means of these judgements. Using the Principle of 
Determinability, this can be analysed in the following way.
Consider the judgement “the sum of the angles of a triangle equals 
two right angles”. Clearly we can think of the subject (i.e. ‘the sum of 
the angles of a triangle’) without having to think of the predicate (i.e. 
‘equals two right angles’). So, from the point of view of the subject 
there is at least a chance that it stands in a real relation of determin-
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45 As we will see in the next chapter, Maimon assumes that this coincidence is the result 
of our imagination. See below, pp. 143-144.
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ability with respect to the predicate. After all, the Principle ofDeter- 
minability states no more about the ‘determinable’ than that it must be 
possible to think of it without, by that, having to think of the deter­
mination. We can, however, think of the predicate as well, without, by 
that, having to think of the subject. Therefore it rather seems to be the 
case that we are dealing here with a judgement that is just arbitrary, a 
judgement that tries to state a fact that might as well be otherwise. Or in 
other words, from the point of view of the predicate it does not seem to 
be the case that the judgement is governed by the Principle of 
Determinability. After all, the Principle states that it has to be impos­
sible to think of the predicate without, by that, having to think of the 
subject, in order for a predicate to be a determination (i.e. to stand in a 
real relation of determinability with respect to the subject). Thus, the 
Principle does not govern this judgement.
Nevertheless, we cannot prove that the Principle of Determinability 
does not govern judgements like these. This follows, according to 
Maimon, from the evident impossibility to construct a triangle such 
that the sum of its angles does not equal two right angles. The object 
the judgement is about makes the judgement necessarily true, and we 
can convince ourselves of that, because we possess of any mathe­
matical object the rule for constructing it. Thus, every time we con­
struct a triangle (every time we delineate a space by three lines), we will 
discover that one of the determinations of it is that the sum of its angles 
equals two right angles. It is just because of this fact that Maimon 
assumes that mathematical judgements provide an answer to the Quid 
facti. That they do not answer the Quid juris follows from the fact that 
we are unable to understand why the determination is a determination 
of the ‘determinable’. That is, from the point of view of the determi­
nation it is absolutely unclear that there is a real relation of determin­
ability involved. But from the point of view of the ‘determinable’ (not 
considered as the subject of a judgement, but as the determinate object 
the judgement is about) it is absolutely self-evident that it must be a real 
relation of determinability.
The result of this analysis is that mathematical judgements would, 
indeed, be governed by the Principle of Determinability, if that would 
only mean that the subject-term refers to a real ‘determinable’ with res-
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pect to the predicate. This presupposes, however, that it is possible to 
transform the part of the Principle that concerns the predicate into a 
part that concerns the subject. The necessity provided by the impos­
sibility to think of the predicate without, by that, having to think of the 
subject, must now be provided by the ‘determinable’ considered as a 
determinate object. According to Maimon, this is possible in the case 
of mathematics, because we possess the rule for constructing mathe­
matical objects, that is, we can turn the ‘determinable’ into a determi­
nate object just on our own. Therefore we are able to discover whether 
the subject of a mathematical judgement stands in a real relation of 
determinability with the predicate.
From the point of view of the predicate, however, we are unable to 
recognize this relation. But still, to make the idea of this analysis 
explicit, it just may be that there is a missing link that would reveal that 
synthetic judgements a priori in mathematics are governed by the 
Principle of Determinability, even though we are unable to find it. All 
our knowledge of the subject points into that direction, into the direc­
tion of the hidden existence of some kind of missing link, but since we 
are unable to find it, we can do no more than pointing out that these 
judgements might be governed by the Principle of Determinability.46
Before discussing the last part of Maimon’s explanation of synthetic 
judgements a priori in terms of the Principle of Determinability, it will 
be fruitful to pause a moment and consider the effect of the nineteenth 
century invention of non-Euclidean geometry (of which Maimon was 
evidently ignorant) on Maimon’s explanation of thoughts concerning 
mathematical objects. One might say that these kinds of geometry 
show that we can, after all, prove that the Principle of Determinability 
does not govern some or all of the judgements concerning mathe­
matical objects. One should then point out that since the rule for con­
46 Thus, an account of thinking in terms of finding cannot account for the intelligibility 
of the world. It can only express our hope for such an intelligibility, but, and this is the 
core of Maimonian skepticism taken as a refutation of dogmatism, we are not allowed to 
assume this intelligibility. I will deal with the refutation of dogmatism in the next 
chapter. See also note 50, below.
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structing for example a triangle assumes unwarrantly the uniqueness47 
of Euclidean geometry, we might, once we accept another kind of geo­
metry, succeed in constructing triangles such that the sum of its angles 
does not equal two right angles. Such an insight does not show that 
Maimon’s analysis fails, however, but only shows that the missing link 
I spoke about is in these cases uncovered by the invention of non- 
Euclidean geometry, and as it turned out to be this link is not governed 
at all by the Principle of Determinability, but is merely a formal link 
producing the uninformative, arbitrary kind of necessity I discussed 
above.48
The point is nevertheless instructive, since it helps us understand the 
difference between Maimonian skepticism and a mere agnosticism. 
The latter kind of position holds that we should not make claims about 
our being able or unable to form judgements that express real thought 
at all, because our human finitude precludes our being able to distin­
guish between judgements that express real thought and judgements 
that don’t. Maimonian skepticism, however, helps us state our position 
a bit more precisely. After all, we do know how to distinguish 
judgements that express real thought from judgements that don’t, since 
we do understand the Principle of Determinability. Therefore we can 
make claims about the possibility that we do form judgements that 
express real thought -  namely, all those judgements that seem to be 
synthetic a priori. But, more importantly, Maimonian skepticism 
allows us to claim that we are able to know which judgements do not 
express real thought49 -  namely, all those judgements that are not go­
verned by the Principle of Determinability, for example (as we know 
since the invention of non-Euclidean geometry) all those judgements 
about mathematical objects that unwarrantly assume the uniqueness of 
Euclidean geometry.
47 This argument is reminiscent of Komer’s argument against the possibility of 
transcendental deductions. See his “The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions”, in 
Kant Studies Today, ed. L.W. Beck, 1969, pp. 230-244.
48 See pp. 102-103.
49 As I observed in note 5 above, this is the point of Maimon’s criticism of Aenesidemus’ 
kind of skepticism.
Let us now turn to the case of synthetic judgements a priori in 
physics (i.e. with respect to the objects of experience), in which case 
we may find the same kind of explanation as in the case of mathe­
matics, though it proceeds in the opposite direction. That is, the analy­
sis of this kind of judgement in terms of the Principle of Determin­
ability could be based upon the possibility to transform the part of the 
Principle that concerns the ‘determinable’ into a part that concerns the 
determination. We have to be well aware, in this case, of the hypo­
thetical character of this analysis, since for Maimon there are actually 
no synthetic judgements a priori with respect to the objects of expe­
rience.50 Nevertheless, the proposed analysis is of utmost importance 
for his skepticism, because we can only claim that there are no such 
judgements if we know what they have to look like.
Well, consider the judgement “‘grass’ and ‘green’ stand in a relation 
of ‘substance’ and ‘attribute’ to one another”. Because they are cate­
gories, we cannot, according to Maimon, think of ‘substance’ and ‘at­
tribute’ without, by that, having to think of objects to which they apply. 
This is so because the categories are merely “Verhaltnifibegrijfe”, they 
are not themselves objects, but only possible objects of consciousness 
as the ways in which objects of consciousness can be related.51 The 
categories are the most fundamental determinations (“Elementarpra- 
dikate aller reellen Objekte”52) and therefore, any thought of a category 
must, actually, be a thought about other objects. That is, we must think 
of them as determinations, which implies that we must think of their 
‘determinables’ as well — this follows from the Principle of 
Determinability. But, and here again we are confronted with the mys­
tery of our having finite minds, these ‘determinables’ are not given 
together with our being conscious of the categories as determinations. 
To be sure, many objects are given to us by means of the intuition. But
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50 Einstein’s relativization of Newton’s physics does not, because of this hypothetical 
character, concern Maimon’s analysis as much as the relativization of Euclidean 
geometry I discussed above. Of course, both relativizations are equally important to 
investigations of Kant's theory of synthetic judgements a priori, but since Maimon is a 
skeptic with respect to synthetic judgements a priori in physics he has as it were left the 
scene before the general theory of relativity makes its point.
51 Logik, p. 185.
52 Logik, p. 155.
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there is not one specific object of experience which qualifies as a ‘deter­
minable’ with respect to the categories.
Thus, even though we cannot think of ‘substance’ without having to 
think of an object that is a ‘substance’, it is not clear at all whether 
‘grass’ is such a substance. As an empirical object ‘grass’ is nothing 
but an arbitrary name for something identified in space and time (in an 
act of intuition by someone, somewhere, sometime); not at all in any 
clear sense a ‘determinable’. Likewise, we cannot think of ‘attribute’ 
without, by that, having to think of an object53, but it is not clear at all, 
in experiencing that grass is green, that ‘green’ is an attribute. ‘Green’, 
too, is actually nothing but an arbitrary name for something identified 
in space and time.
However, there is a difference between ‘green’ and ‘grass’, since in 
thinking of ‘green’ we have to think of ‘color’ as well. This is so be­
cause the relation between ‘green’ and ‘color’ is, as we have seen 
above, a real relation of determinability; i.e. a relation governed by the 
Principle of Determinability. It is because of this relation of deter­
minability, Maimon stresses, that we are allowed to state that ‘green’ is 
an attribute with respect to ‘color’, and ‘color’, consequently, a sub­
stance with respect to ‘green’. Maimon’s point here is that the cate­
gories can be deduced from the Principle of Determinability —not only 
the categories of relation but also those of quantity, quality and 
modality.54
In two different ways does this line of argument support Maimon’s 
claim that it is because of the Principle of Determinability that synthetic 
judgements a priori might be possible with respect to the objects of 
experience. On the one hand the Principle explains our being in pos­
session of the categories, and on the other hand it points out the kind of 
judgements that are the basic parts of real thought. And even though it 
is true that these latter kind of judgements (for example, the one that 
expresses the real relation of determinability between ‘color’ and
53 I use this notion here in a technical sense: everything one can make a judgement about 
is, according to Maimon, a logical object. Thus, even the letter ‘h’ can be an object, or 
the character *#’, since I can form the judgement *“h’ is a letter”, or even “# is Cf. 
Logik , pp. 172-173; and below, Chapter Six, pp. 138f.
54 Logik , pp. 153-170.
126 Part Two: Salomon Maimon and the Antinomy of Thought
‘green’) are not about the objects of experience, they are, nevertheless, 
about possible objects that are real parts of the objects of experience. 
And, moreover, even though we are not capable to understand how to 
build up the objects of experience out of these real parts of them, there 
does not seem to be any reason why the ultimate syntheses that consti­
tute the complete object (syntheses we don’t understand) will not be 
build up out of the syntheses that constitute their parts (syntheses we 
do understand).
Thus, while it is not possible to claim that there are synthetic 
judgements a priori in physics that express real knowledge about speci­
fic (kinds of) empirical objects (like “‘grass’ and ‘green’ stand in a 
relation of ‘substance’ and ‘attribute’ to one another”), it is nevertheless 
true that there might be. It appears to be the case that we could make the 
world meaningful by means of these judgements, if only we could 
formulate them; i.e. if we were able to understand the relation between 
the subject and the predicate as a real relation of determinability. As we 
saw in the case of mathematics, even though we were unable to under­
stand the relation between, for example, ‘the sum of the angles of a 
triangle’ and ‘two right angles’ in this way, we were, according to 
Maimon, nevertheless able to discover their relation as a real relation of 
determinability, because we were able to construct a triangle. Now, 
according to Maimon, Kant assumed something like that in the case of 
the objects of experience, although in the opposite direction. Because 
Kant was not aware of the consequences of this change in direction, he 
could, erroneously, assume that there are synthetic judgements a priori 
in physics.
The point is this. In mathematics we can, as we have seen above, 
create an intuition of the determinate object by means of a rule of the 
understanding we possess once we think of the ‘determinable’. Accor­
dingly, mere knowledge of the ‘determinable’ is sufficient, in mathe­
matics. Likewise, it is Kant’s suggestion that we can create, in the case 
of physics, an intuition of the determinate object by means of a rule of 
the understanding once we think of the determination (being a cate­
gory). The reason for this is accepted by Maimon, as I just stated, it 
being that we have to think of ‘determinables’ once we think of the 
categories. But even though we have to, it does not follow, Maimon
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argues, that the content of the categories is rich enough to allow us to 
create intuitions of objects that are the determinate objects of the judge­
ments in which the categories function as predicates. Indeed the content 
of the categories is not rich enough, according to Maimon, and there­
fore we have to rely on objects determined outside of thought to occupy 
the position of the subject in judgements of which the position of the 
predicate is occupied by a category. These objects determined outside 
of thought are given to us by intuition. Hence, their origin does not lie 
in a rule of the understanding we possess once we think of the catego­
ries. Therefore, Maimon argues, Kant did not answer the Quid facti at 
all. For it is this question that arises as soon as we make judgements in 
which distinct faculties are responsible for the representations that 
occupy the positions of subject and predicate.
With respect to the relation between the Principle ofDeterminability 
and the last kind of judgements we are able to produce, we can now 
draw the following conclusion. If it was possible to transform the part 
of the Principle ofDeterminability that concerns the ‘determinable’ into 
a part that concerns the determination, i.e. if it was possible to create an 
intuition of the determinate object by means of merely being in posses­
sion of a category (a determination per se), then there would have 
existed synthetic judgements a priori in physics. Because this isn’t the 
case, we have to rely on intuition in order to think of an object that 
might occupy the position of the subject. As a consequence, we are 
confronted with the Quid facti: does the synthesis produced by a 
judgement which combines elements that stem from different faculties 
in fact apply to the determinate object it is supposed to be about? And 
as long as we don’t know the answer to this question, we can claim no 
more than that it might be possible that there are synthetic judgements a 
priori with respect to objects of experience.55
55 Thus, an account of thinking in terms of making cannot account for the fact that it is 
the world we are thinking of. It can only express our hope for it being the world that we 
are able to think of, but as before, and this is as well the core of Maimonian skepticism 
as a refutation of dogmatism, we are not allowed to assume that it is the world that we are 
thinking of. This refutation of dogmatism is the subject-matter of the next chapter. See 
also note 45, above.
THE PRINCIPLE AND THE ANTINOMY
Now that I finished my exposition of Maimon’s Principle of Deter­
minability and the possibilities it generates to specify what is meant by 
real thought, it is important to return to the problem I set out at the 
beginning of this section: what are we to think of a philosopher who 
defends the inevitability of an Antinomy of Thought by means of an 
analysis based upon a Principle of Thought! Is it indeed true, as I sug­
gested, that such a Principle is needed in order to be able to explain 
why we are confronted with such an Antinomy? And if so, does my 
exposition help to make this point?
Let me begin by restating the reason for my suggestion. What 
Maimon is arguing for is not for some kind of contradiction, but for an 
Antinomy. The difference between these is that a contradiction functions 
at the level of language, whereas an Antinomy functions at the level of 
understanding.56 Now, one way to see the possibility of this distinc­
tion, is to argue that there is, besides the Principle of Contradiction, 
some kind of ‘Principle of Understanding’, which can solve the contra­
diction by showing that one of the contradicting sentences is false. If 
we want to be able to get rid of contradictions, we need some such 
principle, since the Principle of Contradiction is itself nothing but a 
formal principle, enabling us no more than the identification of contra­
dictions, not their resolution. And of course we all do assume some 
such principle, calling it ‘truth’ most of the time, implying some kind 
of accessibility of reality.
But now, it might be the case that this ‘Principle of Understanding’ 
generates ‘contradictions’, that is, that some of its implications are in­
compatible with one another. As a consequence we have to distinguish 
between these latter ‘contradictions’ and the former ones, since we can, 
by means of the ‘Principle’ in question, solve the former, but not, by 
definition, the latter. These latter ones are, what I call, antinomies. Of 
course, it is only natural to distrust a ‘Principle of Understanding’ that 
generates antinomies, since these are incomprehensible, implying that 
at least the name of the ‘Principle of Understanding’ seems to be inap-
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propriate. But as long as we are unable to find another ‘Principle of 
Understanding’ which turns the antinomies into ordinary contra­
dictions, we do not seem to have any alternative but to accept the pro­
posed, problematical ‘Principle’.
Maimon’s Principle of Determinability is meant to be such a pro­
blematical ‘Principle of Understanding’, or, as he would say, Principle 
of Thought. It can solve contradictions insofar as it helps identify 
judgements that are formal or arbitrary, judgements that might be 
discarded because they do not express a real relation of determinability. 
Thus, contradictions like “the tomato is red and the tomato is not red” 
are dissolved, because, since ‘red’ and ‘tomato’ do not stand in a real 
relation of determinability, none of the statements expresses a real 
thought.
Besides this success in identifying judgements that do not express a 
real relation of determinability, there is the failure of the impossibility 
to understand the identification of judgements that do express a real 
relation of determinability, without ending up with an antinomy: the 
Antinomy of Thought. That is, we know what we have to look for, in 
trying to find judgements that express real relations of determinability, 
but we cannot formulate the requirements such a judgement has to sa­
tisfy, without running into the incomprehensibilities of contradicting 
ourselves. This is, according to Maimon, a consequence of our having 
a finite mind. From the point of view of an infinite mind, the require­
ments for real thought are perfectly clear. Let me explain this.
Our having a finite mind consists for Maimon in our thought evol­
ving through time, which means that we are conscious of our repre­
sentations one after another. The series of our representations would, 
according to Maimon, be a performance of real thought if any sequence 
of representations would be governed by the Principle of Determin­
ability. But, since our mind is finite, these sequences are one-direc­
tional: of every two representations one precedes the other. And this 
leads us to the Antinomy of Thought. This is so because the Principle of 
Determinability consists of two parts, which apply to different repre­
sentations (the subject and the predicate), but which express conditions 
that must be satisfied at one and the same moment, in order for the 
judgement that establishes a synthesis between the representations in
question, to be understood as a judgement that expresses a real relation 
of determinability. We have seen that this is, according to Maimon, no 
problem at all for an infinite mind, because such a mind thinks of an 
infinitely long chain of representations at one and the same moment, 
therefore being able to satisfy at once, with respect to any link in the 
chain, the two conditions involved.
We can now understand why the second formulation of the Anti­
nomy of Thought follows from the structure of synthetic judgements a 
priori. As we have seen, synthetic judgements a priori would exist if 
the two parts of the Principle of Determinability could be reformulated 
as both applying to only one of the representations involved. In such a 
way the Principle would have been accomodated to suit the human 
condition, i.e. to suit a mind that is finite, that has to proceed from one 
given representation to the next. That is, if both conditions concern the 
progress from one representation to another, both conditions can be 
satisfied at one and the same moment, i.e. in one and the same move.
In the case of mathematics, we have according to Maimon the possi­
bility to satisfy both conditions by means of our consciousness of the 
‘determinable’, since this consciousness implies a rule for the construc­
tion of the determinate object the ‘determinable’ refers to.57 In the case 
of physics we have, according to Kant (at least as Maimon understands 
him), the possibility to satisfy both conditions by means of our con­
sciousness of the determination (being a category). But, as we have 
seen, Maimon argues that Kant is wrong in this respect.58
In both cases, however, can we notice the seeds of the Antinomy of 
Thought. For in mathematics the relation of determinability between, 
for example, ‘the sum of the angles of a triangle’ and ‘two right angles’ 
is mediated by a determinate object (a specific triangle). To hold that it 
is, nevertheless, the Principle of Determinability which governs the 
relation between ‘determinable’ and determination, means to minimize
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appearances), but, according to Maimon, Kant mistakenly assumes this. So construed, 
Maimon foreshadowed Thomas Nagel’s argument against Kant’s ‘humanism’. See above, 
Chapter Three, pp. 35-38. See also my discussion of Maimon’s argument against Kant’s 
“empirical dogmatism” in the following chapter, pp. 153-161.
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the mediating function of the determinate object. Maimon assumes that 
this is possible, by assuming that the specific size of the sides of the 
triangle (generated by the imagination) do not really matter.59 Such a 
move, however, implies that, somehow, the ‘determinable’ is identical 
with the determinate object, but if so, it becomes quite impossible to 
hold that we can think of the ‘determinable’ without, by that, having to 
think of the determination. After all, in that case to think of the ‘deter­
minable’ means to think of the determinate object, and, thus, to think of 
the determination. Therefore, it is only as finite minds (assuming that 
the determinate object is, partly, a product of the imagination) that we 
can understand the working of the Principle o f Determinability —that 
we can make sense of the part of the Principle that concerns the ‘deter­
minable’.
But, making sense of this requirement, implies, from the point of 
view of a finite mind, at the same time the impossibility to make sense 
of the part of the Principle that in its original formulation concerns the 
determination. For, now that we, as finite minds, accept the mediating 
role of the determinate object, it becomes impossible to see that we 
cannot think of the determination without, by that, having to think of 
the ‘determinable’. The relation between the determinate object and the 
determination turns out to have a formal character: “this specific tri­
angle of which, among other things, the sum of the angles equals two 
right angles, is such that the sum of the angles equals two right 
angles”. The fact that each time we construct a triangle our imagination 
fills in the variables in the rule for constructing it in such a way that this 
formal judgement follows, remains necessarily something beyond our 
understanding.60 That is exactly what is meant by Maimon’s claim that 
synthetic judgements a priori in mathematics have an answer to the 
Quid facti, but fail to answer the Quid juris. Given our finite minds, 
that is, given that we proceed from representation to representation in a
59 It is in this context that we can understand Maimon’s notoriously obscure ‘Doctrine of 
Differentials’. See for an account Bergman’s study on Maimon’s philosophy, pp. 59-68.
60 In his exposition of what the radicalization of phenomenology in France is supposed 
to be, Descombes refers to this kind of argument, by accident using the very same 
example. Cf. Vincent Descombes, Modern French Philosophy (Cambridge, 1980), p. 99.
one-directional way, it is the possibility to answer the Quid facti which 
implies the impossibility to answer the Quid juris.61
The case of synthetic judgements a priori in physics (would they 
exist) gives us this same implication the other way round. Here we 
start from our being conscious of a category, which should lead us to 
representations of the objects of experience in a one-directional way 
governed by the Principle o f Determinability. The fact that the 
categories are ‘Verhaltnifibe griffe‘ implies, as we have seen, that we 
can only think of them as being determinations of the ways in which 
other representations are related. This means two things that are 
mutually incompatible. On the one hand, being conscious of a determi­
nation implies being conscious of its ‘determinable’, but on the other 
hand, the fact that the categories are ‘Verhaltnifibe griffe’, implies that 
they do not themselves lead to any representations. These two things 
are nothing but the two requirements of the Principle o f Determin­
ability both applied to the possibility of a mental state that is a con­
sciousness of a category.
It is only because of the finitude of our minds that such a mental 
state can occur on its own. And it is only because of that occurrence 
that we can understand the dynamics of our stream of consciousness. 
Thus, the possibility of a mental state which is a consciousness of a 
category produces the idea of necessary sequences of mental states. 
That is why Maimon claims that the idea of a synthetic judgement a 
priori in physics entails an answer to the Quid juris.
But all the same, it is not our being conscious of a category that leads 
to the following phase in the sequence. Since the categories are merely 
‘Verhaltnifibegriffe’, we need the mediating function of the imagi­
nation, to come from the consciousness of a category to the conscious­
ness of an object that might stand to the category as a ‘determinable’ 
stands to its determination. But it is exactly because of this mediation 
by the imagination that the relation between the ‘determinable’ and the 
determination (being a category), turns out to be nothing more than an 
arbitrary conjunction between two representations that have nothing to
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61 It is in this way that Maimon’s analysis helps us to understand why the meaning of 
“meaningful” in an account of thinking conceived as 'finding a meaningful world’ will 
remain a problem.
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do with one another. Which means that, after all, the posibility to un­
derstand the idea of a necessary sequence of representations (generating 
an answer to the Quid juris) implies the impossibility to answer the 
Quidfacti.62
Therefore, we may conclude that the Principle o f Determinability 
leads to the Antinomy o f Thought as soon as it has to be used by a finite 
mind; i.e. a mind that proceeds in a one-directional way from represen­
tation to representation. Because the Principle consists of two condi­
tions, one with respect to the subject and one with respect to the pre­
dicate, which both must be satisfied in order for a judgement to express 
a real relation of determinability, it leads to the Antinomy of Thought. It 
does so because the conditions demand opposing directions of pro­
ceeding from representation to representation, which is impossible for 
a finite mind to do at one and the same moment.
To conclude, however, that we arrive at a comprehensive account of 
thinking once we accept that the relation between thoughts and objects 
will remain a problem, means presumably to elicit the following kind 
of questions. Wouldn’t I have to agree that any account of whatsoever 
is unacceptable as long as it implies an inescapable problem? Can we 
claim to have understood anything as long as it continues to challenge 
us with incomprehensibilities? If skepticism has the last word, will we 
not necessarily be lost in absolute ignorance? And doesn’t this imply 
that skepticism just cannot be defensible? These questions introduce the 
voice of dogmatism. I will dispute it in the next chapter, arguing that 
these questions are misdirected, thereby reinforcing my claim that an 
adequate account of thinking will have to take the form of a problem.
62 It is in this way that Maimon’s analysis helps us to understand why the meaning of 
“the world” in an account of thinking conceived as *making the world meaningful’ will 
remain a problem.
CHAPTER SIX
THE FAILURE OF DOGMATISM
1. Introducing the dogmatic option
Dogmatism isn’t in the air nowadays—or, so it seems. Unlike its 
counterpart, skepticism, it didn’t survive the eigthteenth century. 
Probably not because of Maimon’s, or for that matter, Kant’s criticism 
of it. No, as Beiser aptly observes1, dogmatism was a relic of a passing 
age. It was more than just a philosophical issue, losing esteem by the 
gu illo tin e , rather than by the arguments of Kant or any other 
philosopher. The choice for or against dogmatism was, at the close of 
the eightteenth century, a choice for or against the ancien régime.
Still, this chapter will not be about eightteenth century politics nor 
about eightteenth century philosophy. To be sure, it will be about 
Maimon’s criticism of dogmatism, but in the composition of my ar­
gument, this criticism is meant to strenthen my claim that the structure 
of our articulations of thinking has an aporetic character. Hence, this 
chapter has a systematic tenor. It is about a problem that emerged out 
of the eightteenth century, not one that perished with it. And so it is 
about dogmatism, although this strain of thought nowadays appears 
under different names.2
1 Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason , pp.197-198.
2 be it scientific, constitutive, internal realism or conceptual idealism.
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At the close of the eigtheenth century ‘dogmatism’ was mainly a 
polemical notion, used by the Kantians as a nickname for the 
Wolffians, who took it as a title.3 It must, therefore, have been confus­
ing to both parties that Maimon accused the Kantians of being “empiri­
cal dogmatists”4, and for both it will have been one more reason to 
regard his individuality as intractability.5 Nevertheless, Maimon’s use 
of the notion of ‘dogmatism’ was much more specific and coherent 
than common usage. According to him ‘dogmatism’ is not a theory 
concerning our knowledge of God, the Soul and the World; it is not a 
theory that secures the possibility of metaphysics, nor just a theory that 
asserts that verités de faits are governed by a principle of sufficient 
reason, nor even a theory that holds that the principles of thought are, in 
effect, principles of being. To be sure, some Wolffians might have held 
some of these theories6, and some people might have labeled one or 
any combination of these ‘dogmatism’, but such facts never were of 
any interest to Maimon. He was too much of a “Selbstdenker”; in his 
hands ‘dogmatism’ turned out to be a theoretical option with respect to 
what he judged to be the real philosophical challenge: how to account 
for the Antinomy o f Thought. And, with respect to this Antinomy, both 
Kant and the Wolffians somehow argued for the same option, namely, 
that the Antinomy o f Thought could not be the last word about the rela­
tion between thoughts and objects. If there were an Antinomy at all, it 
could be resolved.
In order to clarify this dogmatic option, I will concentrate on the first 
formulation of the Antinomy o f Thought:
3 According to Kant a philosophy is dogmatic if it starts with metaphysics, without first 
developing a “Kritik der Verstandesvermögen”. See “Ueber eine Entdeckung” in 
Akademie Ausgabe Vol. 8 p. 229. The Wolffians replied in a number of ways, arguing 
either that Kant’s criticism needed a dogmatic metaphysics, or that Leibniz himself had 
already developed a critique of reason. See Beiser, The Fate of Reason, pp. 193-225.
4 Maimon, Transscendentalphilosophie, p. 434.
5 See, Ernst Cassirer, D as Erkenntnisproblem, Vol. 3, p. 81: “So erschien (...)  seine
[Maimon’s] gedankliche Eigenart bald als Eigensinn.”
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(1) Thesis: Real thought will only be real thought if it deter­
mines its object according to rules of the under­
standing.
Antithesis: Real thought will only be real thought if its object 
is given to thought as determined outside of 
thought.
According to this formulation, as I explained in Chapter Four, the 
structure of our accounts of thinking has an aporetic character because 
the objects of thought must be taken to be both objects determined by 
thought and objects determined outside of thought—which is for us, 
finite minds, incomprehensible because we cannot understand the pos­
sibility of an identity between these two notions. The dogmatic option, 
at least as Maimon conceives it, now is to challenge this last claim. 
That is, according to Maimon, dogmatism amounts to nothing but the 
claim that we are justified in assuming that an identity between objects 
determined by thought and objects determined outside o f thought 
obtains.
In order to be able to understand the precise impact of this option, 
and to understand in what way both Kant and the Wolffians might, 
according to Maimon, be regarded as advocates of dogmatism, it is 
necessary to analyse at length the notion of an object determined out­
side o f thought. This will be done in the next section. In this introduc­
tory section it will suffice to remember that for Maimon both objects 
determined outside o f thought and objects determined by thought are 
intentional objects. This means that the dogmatic identity-thesis is not 
going to be, in any traditional, pre-Kantian sense, an ontological thesis 
about reality as such. Nor will it for that matter be, in any Kantian 
sense, a strictly epistemological thesis about the forms of knowledge. 
Being a thesis about intentional objects, dogmatism will be a thesis 
about the commensurability of thought and reality, whatever the episte­
mological or ontological status of either one. That is, although objects 
determined outside o f thought are identified by another kind of mental 
state than objects determined by thought, both kinds of objects will, in 
the final analysis, turn out to have the very same structure, such that it 
will ultimately be possible to identify any specific object determined
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outside o f thought with a specific object determined by thought. That is 
the identity-thesis Maimon attributes to dogmatism, be it in its “empiri­
cal” (as it is with Kant), or its “transcendental” (as it is with the Wolff- 
ians) variant
The impact of this thesis on my claim that the relation between 
thoughts and objects will remain a problem, is considerable. If indeed 
any object determined outside o f thought might be identified with a 
specific object determined by thought, then the aporetic character of the 
structure of our articulations of thinking is, after all, just a matter of 
inadequate accounts. Stated differently, if dogmatism is possible, then 
the Antinomy o f Thought is resolvable—i.e. not an inevitable conse­
quence of the radical finitude of our minds, but, as it happens, only a 
consequence of an accidental lack of understanding which unwarrant­
ably deceived us in believing in the plausibility of Maimonian skep­
ticism. If the very same object might be thought of as determined by 
the rules of the understanding as well as it might be thought of as deter­
mined outside of thought, then it will be possible, after all, to arrive at a 
comprehensive account of thinking. For if so, it would make sense to 
maintain that ‘finding a meaningful world’ comes to the very same 
thing as ‘making the world meaningful’. Or, in one more formulation, 
if the dogmatic option is tenable, then it will be possible after all that 
judgements provide both the reason why and the fact that they apply to 
the objects they are about.
In the third section of this chapter, after having clarified what exactly 
Maimon means by the notion of an object determined outside o f  
thought, I shall pay close attention to this line of argument. There I will 
present Maimon’s reasons for calling Kant as well as the Wolffians 
dogmatic. By arguing in addition that it makes sense to call Rosenberg 
a twentieth century advocate of dogmatism, I aim to stress the syste­
matic power of Maimon’s analysis of the aporetic character of the 
structure of our accounts of the relation between thoughts and objects.
In the final section of this chapter I will reconstruct an argument of 
Maimon against what he called Kant’s “empirical dogmatism”. This 
argument is meant to show that the dogmatic option does not enable us 
to escape from the Antinomy of Thought, since the only way to make 
sense of dogmatism implies itself a profound problem of intelligibility.
To anticipate the core of the matter I might observe that the argument 
concerns our inability to understand the meaning of an identity-relation 
holding between the notion of an object determined outside of thought 
and that of an object determined by thought.
2. The notion of an object determined outside of thought
In Chapter Four I stated that the notion of an object determined out­
side o f thought was introduced by Maimon to save the function of the 
notion of a thing in itself in a critical account of real thought, without 
having to introduce the idea of a transcendent object — an object the 
mind, by definition, cannot cope with. An object determined outside of 
thought must, therefore, be a consciousness-inherent object; an inten­
tional object as I proposed to call it. It is an object our minds can cope 
with, although, as was already suggested, only in a confused, muddled, 
incomplete way. Objects determined outside o f thought are objects of 
intuition, and intuitions are states of mind we happen to be in, without 
having the faintest idea of what caused us to be so. According to 
Maimon, this means that even though intuitions imply determinate 
objects, they do not imply a rule of the understanding by means of 
which it would be possible to explain, or reconstruct, the synthesis that 
led to the specific determination of the object in question. In order to be 
able to understand how such an object might be possible at all, I shall 
first have to clarify Maimon’s use of the notion of an object.
For Maimon the notion of an object has on the one hand a very spe­
cific connotation, but on the other hand a very large extension. Thus, on 
the one hand the notion of an object only makes sense if related to the 
notion of a judgement. Something can be an object only as far as there 
can be a judgement whose subject-term does refer to it. On the other 
hand, almost everything can be an object, in this sense, since it is so 
very easy to construct a judgement about almost anything. After all, the 
only condition for a judgement, to make it a judgement that refers to an 
object (at least, to a logical object), is that it is not self-contradictory, i.e. 
that the predicate is a possible predicate of the subject:
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a logical object is everything of which something can be predicated, even if it 
is no more than that it is identical to itself, or that it cannot be and not be at the 
same time.7
This means that anything which might be said to have an identity, is 
an object; i.e. it is the Principle of Identity that governs the possibility 
of objects. A logical object has, according to Maimon, a very simple 
identity: it must, in an act of consciousness, be distinguished from the 
subject:
If one abstracts from the inner features of a real object (an object treated as 
such, and distinguished from other objects, by a subject because of its inner 
features), and has left over just the fact that it is distinguished from a subject by 
means of consciousness, and is related to it as an object at all, then what 
remains is the concept of a logical object at all.8
Real objects, however (and as we saw in Chapter Four, objects 
determined outside o f thought are real objects) cannot in such a simple 
se::se be dependent upon a conscious being. Somehow they must have 
an identity ‘of their own’—they must be unique. But of course, for 
Maimon this cannot mean that they are things in themselves, as was 
clear too from the discussion in Chapter Four. No, their ‘inner features’ 
will have to be consciousness-inherent, if they are going to be anything 
at all. This is a complex thesis, which should not at once be classified 
as idealism, not because it isn’t9, but rather because such a classification 
is likely to misplace the tenor of me thesis. It is not meant to be an 
ontological thesis, even though it will have ontological consequences.
7 “Ein logisches Objekt ist alles das, wovon etwas prädizirt werden kann, sollte es auch 
bloß seyn, das es mit sich selbst einerlei ist, oder daß es nicht zugleich seyn und nicht 
seyn kann.”, Maimon, Logik, p. 172.
8 “Wenn man von einem reellen (durch innere Merkmale sowohl vom Subjekt, als Objekt 
betrachtet, als von ändern Objekten unterschiedenes) Objekt die innem Merkmale abstra- 
hirt, und nur das zurückbehält, daß es überhaupt vom Subjekt durchs Bewußtseyn unter­
schieden, und darauf, als Objekt überhaupt, bezogen wird, so bleibt der Begriff eines 
logischen Objekts überhaupt übrig.”, Maimon, Logik, p. 173.
9 It is, however, quite difficult to determine what kind of idealism it is. Atlas tends to 
identify it with Kant’s transcendental idealism (see his From Critical to Speculative 
Idealism, p. 57), whereas Bergman is more careful (see his The Philosophy o f Solomon 
Maimon, p. 89). Kuntze speaks of “Maimonscher Idealismus” as a kind of compromise 
between Transcendental Idealism and Transcendental Realism (see his Die Philosophie 
Salomon Maimons, p. 73).
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Maimon’s point here simply is that ‘identity’ implies ‘determinate­
ness’, which in turn takes place only in consciousness. Consciousness 
itself is impersonal, nothing but the mere possibility of determinate­
ness10. It is, as it were, the event of consciousness, the occurrence of 
determinateness, which enables objects as well as subjects (they, too, 
have a consciousness-inherent status) to manifest themselves to one 
another. And it is the dynamic of this event which Maimon tries to 
understand.
Two important points must be made here. Firstly, we have to notice 
that ‘independence’ is not part of the connotation of the notion of a real 
object. A real object is not a substance, not something which exists on 
its own, independent of everything else. No. To be sure, every real 
object will be (will have to be) unique, but for Maimon uniqueness is a 
matter of complete determinateness.11 In other words, a real object is, 
according to Maimon, an object that is completely determined, an ob­
ject whose inner features specify in every detail its reality; i.e. its place 
vis-à-vis everything else.12 What status these inner features have, will 
follow from the second point.
As I take it, this second point is that Maimon’s stress on the 
consciousness-inherent status of everything is not meant to be 
ontological but methodological. The dependence of both object and 
subject on the happening of consciousness implies that, in order to 
understand objects or subjects, we have to understand the event of con­
sciousness itself. In other words, although it is possible, at least appa­
rently, to approach an object from an ontological angle, as it seems
10 Maimon’s influence on Fichte is particularly clear, here. See, for example, Maimon’s 
Wörterbuch, p. 62: “As a consequence, the philosophical, i.e. the conceived, and. not the 
fe lt  I is the most general concept of the subject of consciousness at all. It is to be sure 
always thought as the precondition of every specific consciousness, but it cannot be 
known in itself by means of inner features.”; “Folglich ist das philosophische, d.h. das 
gedachte, nicht aber gefühlte Ich, der allgemeinste Begriff vom Subjekt des Bewußtseyns 
überhaupt, das zwar als Bedingung eines jeden besondem Bewußtseyns gedacht, durch 
keine innere Merkmale aber an sich erkannt werden kann.” See on Maimon’s influence on 
Fichte Samuel Hugo Bergman, The Philosophy o f Solomon Maimon, pp. 245-247.
11 See, for instance, Logik, pp. 132-135, where Maimon argues, along Leibnizian lines, 
that two identical drops of water show that our concept of a drop of water is not 
completely determinate, since it does not allow us to distinguish between those two 
drops, although they must have different determinations.
12 Cf. Chapter Four, above, p. 66, and pp. 84-88
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possible to approach a subject from a psychological angle, this will not 
suffice, unless one wrongfully hypostatize objects or subjects as things 
in themselves. Without such hypostatization one will need to approach 
the event of consciousness itself from an angle I, in want of a better 
label, will dub semantic. By that I mean that in order to understand the 
event of consciousness, we have to study its intentionality —that is, if 
objects are intentional objects, and if subjects are intentional states of 
mind, then we have to understand their meaning and not their being (as 
if that is something beyond or behind their meaning). That is why 
Maimon relates objects and subjects in such a strong sense to judge­
ments.
With respect to the inner features of real objects this methodological 
change in perspective has important consequences. These inner features 
will be presented by judgements, and so it becomes very important to 
understand the nature of judgements that refer to objects determined 
outside of thought. We have to ask at least two questions about them:
(1) What is a judgement if not the product of thought?
(2) How can a judgement determine its object completely?
The first question reflects the fact that a judgement, if it is supposed 
to refer to an object determined outside o f thought, cannot consist in a 
synthesis of the understanding, a synthesis thought can produce 
because it possesses the rule that connects the ‘determinable’ and its 
determination (this rule being the concept of the object in question). 
After all, there are no concepts of objects determined outside o f  
thought; they are the objects of intuitions. Thus, the question is whether 
an intuition can be, or (what is a more careful formulation) can be 
presented in a judgement, and if so, what kind of judgement. There are 
two problems here. On the one hand it seems to be the case that the 
elements of judgements are conceptual, since they are linguistic; and on 
the other hand it seems to be the case that the understanding is the only 
faculty able to generate judgements.
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It will prove fruitful to take notice here of Richard Aquila’s study of 
Kant’s theory of knowledge13. Of course, this is a study of Kant and 
not of Maimon, but Aquila deals in a very thorough way with the rela­
tions between intuitions and judgements, such that his conclusions 
clarify much about the point Maimon tries to make here.14 Taking first 
a semantical approach Aquila develops an account of intuition as 
singular reference,15 The function of an intuition in a judgement seems 
to be the actual reference to the specific thing the judgement is about. 
As such they might be said to be the means by which things are 
‘given’ to thought. Intuitions, as it were, occupy the place of the sub­
ject-term: they pick out the ‘determinable’, “that of which we can pre­
dicate something”16. However, and this is the case in Kant’s work as 
well as in Maimon’s, Aquila observes that the place of the subject-term 
is often occupied by a concept, which leads him to make a very impor­
tant distinction between concepts that are ‘informing’ and concepts that 
function in judgements merely as external predications.
In a judgment most adequately expressed as the judgment that “This is both a 
man and giving a lecture,” both the concepts man and giving a lecture would 
appear to attach externally to the intuition in question. In a judgment most 
adequately represented as the judgment that “This man is giving a lecture” 
rather than “This is both a man and giving a lecture,” on the other hand, the 
concept giving a lecture would attach externally while the concept man would 
actually inform the intuition in question.17
Refining his account, acknowledging the fact that for Kant18 there is 
no real distinction between a linguistic and a mental account of thought, 
Aquila develops, besides, or on top of, his semantical approach a 
phenomenological approach, in which the function of an intuition as 
singular reference is specified as a mode of awareness.19
13 Richard Aquila, Representational Mind.·, particularly pp. 33-82.
14 I will not go into all the subtleties of Aquila’s study, but just want to make use of his 
conclusions in order to clarify.
15 ibid. pp. 36ff.
16 “das, wovon etwas pradizirt werden kann”. Quoted from Maimon, just above, see 
footnote 7.
17 ibid. pp. 47-48.
18 as well as for Maimon, as I already observed in Chapter Four.
19 ibid. pp. 49ff.
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This has two consequences. On the one hand such an account allows 
for an understanding of singular reference irrespective of the onto­
logical status of the thing referred to. This corresponds to my stress on 
that feature of Maimon’s ‘ontology’ according to which all objects are 
intentional objects. On the other hand it allows for the very important 
function of space (and time) in intuition20, Aquila’s point being that the 
intentionality of consciousness implies that it makes sense to speak 
about a region of space as a particular intentional object.21
From this we can infer that not all elements of a judgement are con­
ceptual, at least not all elements of a judgement that presents an 
intuition, since such a judgement will contain spatial indexicals22. No 
judgement that contains a singular reference can do without such 
indexicals as ‘this’ or ‘that’; linguistic elements that cannot be concepts 
since they don’t have any connotation — they merely stand for the 
referring function of the intuition present in the judgement.
A second inference is that it is not true that the understanding is the 
only faculty capable of generating judgements, at least not according to 
Maimon. We have to accept that there must be another faculty capable 
of generating judgements, since judgements that contain spatial index­
icals typically do not combine a subject and a predicate by means of a 
rule of the understanding, but by means of their junction in a certain re­
gion of space. According to Maimon this faculty is the imagination.23 
There does not necessarily hinge much on this claim, since it will be 
possible, using Aquila’s distinction between the semantical and the 
phenomenological approach, to keep the imagination responsible only 
for the judgement in which the intuition is presented, not for the 
junction of ‘determinable’ and determination in the same region of 
space—that is, not for the intuition itself. After all, as stated in Chapter 
Four, it is characteristic of intuitions, according to Maimon, that we 
happen to have them, without knowing anything about their causes, 
which implies that we cannot assume that the imagination causes the
20 A function Kant did not understand correctly, according to Maimon. I will say more 
about that in a moment.
21 Aquila, ibid. pp. 78-82.
22 Such judgements will also imply temporal indexicals, and a ‘subject’-indexical (the 
elusive T ).
23 See, for example, Maimon, Wörterbuch, pp. 38-39.
awareness of a certain qualified region of space.24 Thus we can safe­
guard the distinction between arbitrary judgements that might be the 
fanciful offspring of an exuberant imagination, and judgements that, 
although being arbitrary as far as the understanding is concerned, do 
nevertheless imply some objective reality; the reality of an object deter­
mined outside o f thought —i.e. a certain qualified region of space.25
We are now in a position to give a first specification of the inner 
features of an object determined outside o f thought. These inner fea­
tures are features of judgements that are (1) presumably generated by 
the imagination, and (2) characterized by spatial (and temporal) in- 
dexicals. Stated thus, it seems to be the case that objects determined 
outside o f thought have two completely different kinds of inner 
features. On the one hand, such an object is determinate in virtue of the 
qualities associated with the concepts used in the judgement which 
gives expression to the having of an intuition of it. Having, for exam­
ple, an intuition of a man giving a lecture, which comes, according to 
Maimon, to the same thing as forming, for example, the judgement 
“This man is giving a lecture”, ‘man’ and ‘giving a lecture’ seem to be 
the inner features of the object determined outside o f thought in ques­
tion. On the other hand, Maimon asserts as well that this object is 
determinate in virtue of its spatio-temporal unity of which one is aware 
— a unity expressed by means of the indexical “This”. This latter 
feature, however, cannot in any sense be understood to be an inner fea­
ture of the object determined outside of thought. After all, this feature 
only makes sense within the actual event of consciousness itself. This 
does not imply that the determinateness of the object in virtue of its 
spatio-temporal unity is not objective, but only that it is not possible for 
us to understand what this is supposed to mean. And as I argued in 
Chapter Four, that is exactly the point of Maimon’s notion of an object 
determined outside of thought.
Let me clarify this point by providing the answer to the second 
question formulated above: How can a judgement determine its object 
completely? As we saw, objects determined outside o f thought must be
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24 Thus the imagination is responsible for the meaning we attach to the intuition, not for 
the having of the intuition itself. See Maimon, Wörterbuch, pp. 38-39.
25 Cf. Maimon, Logik, pp. 118-120.
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completely determined, since they are real objects, having an objective 
reality, a unique identity. Now for sure, this means that the qualities 
associated with the concepts used in the judgement, cannot be the only 
features of objects determined outside o f thought. After all, no series of 
concepts, however extended, will succeed to determine whatever object 
completely. That is, no finite series; hence, no judgement generated by 
our finite mind can determine an object completely if it will merely 
consist of concepts.26 Therefore, we have to realize that it is precisely 
the indexical (i.e. the expression of our awareness of a certain region of 
space) that makes a judgement into a judgement that determines its 
object completely, although in a way we do not understand.27 This 
means that we do not understand the object determined outside o f  
thought, because the feature that is crucial for its unique identity
26 We have seen this in the previous chapter, where I discussed Maimon’s ideas about the 
distinction between the finite and the infinite mind among others in terms of our 
inability to understand more than a tiny fragment of the concept of a real object. See 
above, pp. 129ff.
27 This is a constant theme in Maimon’s writings. In the important passage on space and 
time in the Logik  we can read an interesting formulation of it, in a Leibnizian vein: 
“Even though, for instance, two drops of water are identical according to their concepts 
(at least as far as we can understand), it is still certain that they can exist as different 
objects, indeed on the condition that they are in different times or different places. 
Nevertheless, it remains inexplicable why they should be in these distinct external rela­
tionships, because they are (with respect to their inner features) determined by the same 
concept. Therefore we have to assume that this common concept is incomplete, i.e. that 
it does not contain everything by which these objects are determined, because it does 
contain the common part of both, but not the particular part of each, by means of which 
its external relationship is determined. That is why we are led to look for the particular of 
these objects, and to make our concept of them constantly more complete. Space and 
time are as it were indications to try to make our empirical knowledge more complete.”, 
“Daß z.B. zwei Tropfen Wasser ihrem Begriffe nach (wie weit wir denselben erhalten 
können) einerlei und dennoch als verschiedene Objekte existiren können, ist zwar unter 
der Bedingung, daß sie zu verschiedenen Zeiten oder in verschiedenen Orten sind, gewiß, 
es bleibt aber dennoch unerklärbar, warum sie, da sie (in Ansehung ihrer innern  
Merkmale) durch einerlei Begriff bestimmt werden, dennoch in verschiedenen äußeren 
Verhältnissen seyn sollten? Wir müssen also annehmen, daß dieser gemeinschaftliche 
Begriff unvolständig ist, d.h. daß er nicht alles enthält, wodurch die Objekte bestimmt 
werden, indem er bloß das beiden Gemeinschaftliche, nicht aber das einem jeden Eigene, 
wodurch sein besonderes äußeres Verhältnß bestimmt wird, enthält. Dadurch werden wir 
geleitet, dieses Eigene in den Objekten aufzusuchen, und unsere Begriffe von denselben 
immer volständiger zu machen. Raum und Zeit können also als Anweisungen zur 
Vollständigmachung unserer empyrischen Erkenntniß betrachtet werden.” Logik, p. 135.
remains a mystery that happens to us; it is, as it were, an event we 
cannot reconstruct.
I am now in a position to give a defmition of Maimon’s notion of an 
object determined outside of thought. This is an object of an intuition, 
which is itself an awareness of a certain qualified region of space. For 
Maimon this intuition, being a conscious event, is manifest as or in a 
judgement. The latter is, according to Maimon, a product of the imagi­
nation such that it presents a synthesis of the qualities involved by 
means of an indexical that refers to the region of space as a spatio- 
temporal unity. These qualities function as the inner features of the 
object involved, while the indexical, though in an incomprehensible 
way, gives the object its uniqueness; i.e. the latter is a feature of the 
object which is unknown, but nonetheless self-evident. Thus, we can 
discern three aspects that do matter with respect to an object determined 
outside o f thought: (1) the intuition as a mental state, as the event of 
consciousness — the actual occurrence of a judgement; (2) the synthe­
sis of the qualities involved as the inner features of an object; and (3) 
the reference to a region of space as an objective reality. Maimon 
distinguished these aspects as follows:
Intuitions contain something material (related to sensation) which is only a 
representation of the state of the subject that is caused by it, and something 
formal which is only a representation of the object to which these intuitions are 
related. The forms of intuition are, as already shown, time and space, which 
constitute the objective in intuition.28
Now that I have clarified the notion of an object determined outside 
of thought, it will be possible to formulate the thesis of dogmatism. 
This will be done in a number of ways in the next section.
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28 “Anschauungen enthalten etwas M aterielles, (sich auf Empfindung beziehendes), 
wodurch bloß der durch sie verursachte Zustand des Subjekts, und etwas Formelles, 
wodurch das respektive Objekt, worauf sie sich beziehen, vorgestellt wird. Die Formen 
der Anschauungen aber sind, wie schon gezeigt worden, Zeit und Raum, welche das 
Objektive in den Anschauungen ausmachen.” Logik, p. 185. In order to see in what way 
Maimon takes his ‘idealism’ methodologically serious, it might suffice here to notice 
that the first two aspects are only represented (“vorgestellt”) in intuitions. Neither 
mental states nor objects are hypostatized.
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3. The thesis of dogmatism
In the first section of this chapter I introduced the thesis of 
dogmatism as a thesis about the commensurability of thought and 
reality. As such it was supposed to be an identity-thesis, stating that the 
determinations that make up an object determined outside o f thought 
will in the final analysis turn out to be the very same determinations as 
those thought uses to determine objects determined by thought. This 
can be seen easily in the case of the Wolffians who argued for a theory 
of logic, according to which “there is no problem in our thought 
corresponding to reality. Since both thought and reality have to con­
form to the laws of logic, we can rest assured that thought conforms to 
reality (and conversily); for both concept and object share a common 
logical structure.”29 Or, as Maimon characterized it:
Dogmatism believes to possess knowledge of things in themselves, i.e. it be­
lieves to be able to determine by means of a priori relations things that are just 
thought of in an undetermined way as being determined in itself outside of the 
faculties of cognition. (...) Thus, dogmatism determines things in themselves 
(things we can, as such, only think but not know) only by means of possible  
relations, as things that really do stand in these relations.30
Apparently, Kant’s position is absolutely the reverse, but just here 
we can see the strength of the Maimonian notion of an object deter­
mined outside o f thought. The point is that the thesis of the Wolffians is 
not dogmatic because it claims the possibility of knowledge of trans­
cendent objects (i.e. things in themselves), but because it claims the 
intelligibility of objects determined outside o f thought. As it happens to 
be, the Wolffians think that such objects are things in themselves, but,
29 Beiser, op.cit. p. 201
30 “Der Dogmatismus glaubt im Besitze von Erkenntnissen der Dinge an sich zu seyn, 
d.h. bloß auf eine unbestimmte Art als an sich außer dem Erkenntnißvermögen bestimmt 
gedachte (logische) Dinge dennoch durch a priori gedachte Verhältnisse bestimmen zu 
können. (...) Der Dogmatismus bestimmt also an sich bloß gedachte aber von uns uner­
kannte Dinge an sich, durch die ihnen blos möglichen Verhältnisse, als Dinge, die wirk­
lich in diesem Verhältnisse stehen.” Maimon, Logik, pp. 374-375
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as I clarified in the previous section, this is not the case, objects deter­
mined outside o f thought are consciousness-inherent. They are objects 
of intuition, related to judgements that contain spatio-temporal indexi­
cals. Therefore it is possible for Maimon to argue that the Kantian ap­
pearances, considered to be empirical objects, are objects determined 
outside o f thought, and consequently, that it is possible to argue, as 
Maimon does, that Kant defends the dogmatic thesis too. After all, 
Kant holds that, even though appearances are given a posteriori, they 
conform to thought. Their form necessarily corresponds to the forms 
of thought. Or, as Maimon characterizes the position of the “empirical 
dogmatists”:
They assert that the objects of knowledge are given to us a posteriori, but that 
their forms are in us a priori. (...) In addition they assert that we have the 
capacity to conceive these forms not only in themselves as objects, but also to 
know them in objects. This knowledge, however, is not realised by means of an 
immediate perception, but by means of a perception of a scheme or feature of 
these objects, in such a way that we, by judging that these forms belong to 
these objects, become as well conscious of these forms themselves. (...) If one 
were to ask the Kantians whether we really are able to judge that certain forms 
belong to sensible objects, they would answer: certainly. Were one to ask, next, 
how we know that, they would answer: because of a feature a priori, which is 
necessarily related to a posteriori objects.31
In order to be able to grasp the dogmatic point in this Kantian 
position, it will be necessary to understand that it is possible, from a 
Maimonian perspective, to argue that Kant treats appearances some­
times as if they are objects determined outside o f thought, and some­
times as if they are objects determined by thought. On the one hand
31 Diese behaupten: daß die Objekte unsrer Erkenntniß uns a posteriori gegeben, aber die 
Formen derselben in uns a priori sind. (...) Ferner behaupten sie daß wir das Vermögen 
haben, nicht bloß diese Formen an sich, als Objekte zu denken, sondern auch als Formen 
in den Objekten zu erkennen. Dieses Erkennen geschiehet aber nicht durch eine unmittel­
bare Wahrnehmung, sondern vermittelst der Wahrnehmung eines Schema’s oder 
Merkmals an den Objekten, so das wir durch das Urtheil: daß diese Formen den Objekten 
zukommen, zugleich zum Bewußtseyn dieser Formen selbst gelangen. (...)  Fragt man die 
Kantianer: ob wir in der That urtheilen, daß gewisse Formen gewissen sinnlichen 
Objekten zukommen? so antworten sie: Allerdings. Fragt man sie ferner: woran erkennen 
wir dieses? so antworten sie: An einem Merkmal a priori, daß sich nothwendig auf 
Objekte a posteriori beziehet.”, Maimon, Transscendentalphilosophie, pp. 434-437.
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Kant claims that appearances are ‘given’; they are empirical objects 
exhibiting an objective reality in outer space. As such they are, accor­
ding to Maimon, objects determined outside o f thought—spatio-tem­
poral unities we happen to be aware of. On the other hand, however, 
Karit maintains that appearances could only be what they are insofar as 
they conform to our faculty of cognition, i.e. insofar as they are 
determined by means of the categories.32 As such they are, according to 
Maimon, considered to be objects determined by thought.
This is a significant ambiguity, but the obvious Kantian reply is to 
point out the difference between an empirical and a transcendental 
perspective. It is only justified from an empirical point of view (i.e. 
from the point of view of a conscious being trying to understand the 
world she lives in) to regard appearances as if they are objects deter­
mined outside o f thought. Likewise it is only justified from a trans­
cendental point of view (i.e. from the point of view of a philosopher 
trying to understand the conditions of knowledge) to regard appear­
ances as if they are objects determined by thought. It is only from an 
empirical point of view possible to have the impression that appear­
ances are objects that stand over against us, as if they have an identity 
of their own in virtue of their inner features. From the transcendental 
point of view, however, we can understand that our faculty of cognition 
has imposed on those objects an intelligible form, which is what their 
inner features display.
Even granted that it is possible to account for the ambiguity of the 
notion of an appearance by means of such a distinction between an 
empirical and a transcendental point of view, this does not rebut the 
charge of dogmatism. Quite the contrary. If it would be possible for 
Kant to argue convincingly that appearances might rightly be treated, 
under different perspectives, as both objects determined outside of 
thought and objects determined by thought, then this would be, accor­
32 Both Kant and Maimon understand a phrase like “being determined according to rules 
of the understanding” as referring to the categories. Nevertheless, Maimon’s account of 
an object determined by thought is stronger than Kant’s, since Maimon claims that the 
categories are not basic. They are derived from the Principle o f Determinability, which 
means that, as we have seen in the previous chapter, an object determined by thought is 
an object referred to by means of a judgement that is governed by the Principle o f 
Determinability. See Maimon, Logik, pp. 156ff.
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ding to Maimon, an important argument in favour o f  dogmatism. After 
all, the point of dogmatism is just to assert that thought and reality are 
commensurable, which means for Maimon nothing but to assert that 
the determinations that make up the identity of an object considered to 
be an object determined outside o f thought are the very same determi­
nations used by thought to determine the identity of this very same 
object as an object determined by thought. But, as I will argue below, 
there is no such argument in favour of dogmatism.33
In terms of the Antinomy o f Thought, this Kantian kind of “empirical 
dogmatism” amounts directly to a dissolution of the first formulation 
(and, by consequence, of the other formulations too). That is, according 
to Maimon Kant assumes he is able to make sense of both the 
requirement that real thought has to determine its objects on its own 
and the requirement that it should receive them as being determined 
outside of thought. Once we understand the distinction between the 
empirical and the transcendental point of view, Kant assumes, accor­
ding to Maimon, that we will understand that Transcendental Idealism 
makes sense of the Thesis (Real thought will only be real thought if it 
determines its object according to rules of the understanding) and 
empirical realism of the Antithesis (Real thought will only be real 
thought if its object is given to thought as determined outside of 
thought). In the same vein this “empirical dogmatism” is supposed to 
lead to the elimination of the aporetic character of the structure of our 
accounts of thinking. That is, from the transcendental point of view we 
are justified to hold that the relation between thoughts and objects 
might be characterized by means of the slogan ‘making the world 
meaningful’, whereas from the empirical point of view, we will be 
justified to hold that this very same relation might be characterized by 
means of the slogan *finding a meaningful world’.
In order to stress the systematic point of Maimon’s claim that Kant 
argues for the dogmatic option, and to show by that Maimon’s rele­
33 It is indeed one of the connotations of ‘dogmatism’ that there never is an argument in 
favour of it. The only reason for dogmatism always seems to be that, confronted with a 
dilemma like ‘either dogmatism or accepting the Antinomy o f Thought' one does not 
want to take the risk of accepting the Antinomy.
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vance to contemporary philosophy, I would like to point out a parallel 
between the dogmatic thesis formulated above, and R osenberg’s 
interpretation of Kant’s Copemican revolution as discussed in Chapter 
One. There it was stated that Rosenberg accepts identity-relations 
holding between (1) justified representations, (2) correct represen­
tations, and (3) representations that are adequate to the world. Being re­
presentations we might regard them as identifying intentional objects34, 
and it seems quite acceptable that the first kind of representation 
identifies an object determined by thought35, whereas the last kind of 
representation might be said to identify an object determined outside of 
thought. After all, the first kind of representation is the result of the 
activity of “an apperceptive, temporally-discursive intelligence engaged 
in what is necessarily the fundamental project of any such being, the 
building up through time of a comprehensive, coherent, unitary and 
determinate world-picture”36. The last kind of representation, even 
though Rosenberg argues forcefully that these representations are 
essentially nothing but correct (i.e. justified) representations, has the 
strong connotation of being about an object determined outside o f  
thought (to be sure, in the Maimonian sense of an immanent object of 
consciousness), as might be grasped from Rosenberg’s assertion that it 
“is surely a necessary truth that an object is represented correctly if and 
only if it is (in itself) as it is represented as being”37, and from his re­
mark that we sometimes “find ourselves with experiences which 
cannot be afforded a determinate explanatory accomodation in the 
evolving world-picture”.38
The identity-relation that according to Rosenberg exists between 
these kinds of representations, certainly looks a lot like the identity-rela­
tion the dogmatic thesis is about. This should not really surprise us, as
34 In the quite unproblematic sense in which John Searle states this as well. See his 
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy o f mind, pp. 4-19.
35 Though in a loose sense, i.e. satisfying the condition that the object be determined 
according to ‘rules of the understanding’, but without a strict interpretation of what such a 
rule (or concept) amounts to (thus allowing Rosenberg to opt for a Wittgensteinian 
account of concepts).
36 Rosenberg, One World and Our Knowledge o f It, p. 127. See above, p. 15.
37 ibid. p. 110. See above, p. 10
38 ibid. p. 177. See above, p. 14
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it is clear that Rosenberg tries to defend a kind of Kantian philosophy, 
and, notably, that kind of Kantianism (“constitutive realism”) that 
Maimon identified as “empirical dogmatism”.39 What I want to sug­
gest, then, is that Rosenberg is in this respect a contemporary adherent 
of dogmatism.
This interpretation is strongly supported by what Rosenberg says in 
his daring “Retrospect” to One World and Our Knowledge o f It 40. 
Arguing that we should abandon what he calls “the Myth of Mind 
Apart” (whose “central element is the supposition that the world is a 
thing which is ontologically alien to us as we are, to us as representers 
and as knowers—a thing which stands somehow outside us, and 
which challenges us to bring the inner life of our thinking into harmony 
with it”41), he writes:
the ideal order is the real, not in the false sense that “the world is Idea”, but in 
the sense that our representings of  the world are at the same time doings in the 
world. The world is not a thing apart from us as we are, but we are both in the 
world and of it — and our thinkings are episodes of its own determinate diachro­
nic unfolding. As representers and as knowers, we are within the world as 
evolved organisms. And whatever principles govern the inner life of our 
thinkings are necessarily the principles according to which the world as a whole 
evolves simply because our inner life is an integral part and aspect of that 
determinate evolution. What follows from this, of course, is that there can be no 
question of a harmony between the conceptual and the real as something to be 
achieved42
It is very significant that Rosenberg assumes here, in a very straight 
way, the central idea of Wolffian dogmatism; i.e. the idea of the laws 
of logic governing both thought and reality. Of course there is another
39 Both Rosenberg and Maimon discern two parts in Kant’s critical philosophy. (See 
Rosenberg, One World and Our Knowledge of It, pp. 109ff. and Maimon, Transscenden- 
ta lph ilosoph ie , pp. 434-437). It is defensible that the part that Rosenberg labels 
Empirical Realism is the same as what Maimon labeled “empirical dogmatism”, even 
though it is not straightforwardly defensible that Transcendental Idealism, which is in 
Rosenberg’s interpretation the other part, is the same as what Maimon labeled “rational 
skepticism”. I discussed the difference between the connotations of ‘idealism’ versus 
‘skepticism’ in the chapter on Nagel. See above, pp. 35ff.
40 One World and Our Knowledge of It, pp. 188-191.
41 ibid. p. 189.
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flavour: behind the slight agnosticism lurks the spirit of a “darwinian 
evolutionary epistemology”. But the dogmatism is just the same: our 
representings of the world (i.e. objects determined by thought) are at 
the same time episodes of the world’s unfolding (i.e. objects deter­
mined outside o f thought).
With this rather bold dogmatism comes a quite straightforward 
solution for the Antinomy o f Thought. The Antinomy, just as most of 
the “great and classical puzzles” that make up the history of 
philosophy43, is an unhappy result of our tendency to believe in the 
Myth of Mind Apart. Once we understand the truth of the dogmatic 
thesis, once we understand that the ideal order is the real, we will 
understand that it is indeed possible to identify any object determined 
outside o f thought with a specific object determined by thought—i.e. 
that indeed the Antinomy o f Thought arises only once we assume that 
the objects determined outside o f thought are things in themselves. 
Thus the arguments Rosenberg advances in favour of his dogmatism 
resemble those of Kant and not those of the Wolffians.
4. Maimon against “empirical dogmatism”
The point of Maimon’s arguments against “empirical dogmatism”, 
to which I shall turn now, is precisely that it is not possible for us to 
understand the truth of the dogmatic thesis. It is important to pay atten­
tion to the status of this claim. Firstly, it is not, in a pre-Kantian sense, 
an ontological claim. Maimon does not argue that there are objects 
determined outside o f thought and objects determined by thought, and 
that, as a matter of fact, these objects are not identical to one another. 
This is exactly the level at which Maimon refuses to reason. He does
43 It is hardly possible not to suspect Rosenberg of adopting a hilariously ironical atti­
tude, as he argues that we can rid ourselves, by means of abandoning the Myth of Mind 
Apart, of The Challenge of Skepticism or The Problem of Our Knowledge of the External 
World, and of The Problem of Induction or The Problem of the Reality of Theoretical 
Entities, and of The Problem of the Impossible Choice between Realism and Idealism or 
The Problem of the Impossible Choicebetween Rationalism and Empiricism, and of The 
Problem of Other Minds and even of The Question of the Relation of Fact and Value, ibid. 
p. 191.
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not accept the Wolffian kind of suggestion that the shade of plausibility 
of the dogmatic thesis stems from the fact that both notions are sup­
posed to refer to the same objects. For Maimon, as we have seen 
before, all talk of objects is talk about intentional objects.
Secondly, Maimon does not challenge dogmatism as if it was, in a 
Kantian sense, a strictly epistemological claim. That is, Maimon does 
not argue that there is knowledge of objects determined outside of 
thought and knowledge of objects determined by thought, and that, as a 
matter of fact, these different kinds of knowledge cannot be reduced to 
one another (either via the world — appearances and things in them­
selves are different aspects of the same reality —, or via the mind — 
what is real from an empirical point of view is ideal from a transcen­
dental point of view). No, Maimon does not accept the Kantian kind of 
suggestion that the plausibility of the dogmatic thesis stems from the 
fact that we can, with respect to one and the same kind of objects, 
distinguish between two points of view. For Maimon, all talk of the 
relation between thoughts and objects is transcendental. And it is from 
within this transcendental point of view that we have to accept a dis­
tinction of meaning between the notion of an object determined outside 
of thought and that of an object determined by thought, between intui­
tions and concepts, between answering the Quidfacti and answering 
the Quid juris — between, I might add, *finding a meaningful world’ 
and ‘making the world meaningful’.
As I said before, according to Maimon, dogmatism is a thesis about 
the commensurability of thought and reality. Consequently, Maimon’s 
reasoning against “empirical dogmatism” concerns the intelligibility of 
the notions we have to use in our accounts of thinking. His arguments 
against the dogmatic option, therefore, dwell upon our inability to un­
derstand the meaning of a relation of identity between objects deter­
mined outside o f thought and objects determined by thought: if these 
two notions are going to mean anything at all, we have to accept that 
they cannot have the same meaning. In other words, the level at which 
Maimon challenges the dogmatic option, is the level of our accounts of 
the relation between thoughts and objects. The point is that if dogma­
tism is going to fail this does not mean that we proved something 
about reality, nor about the relation between thought and reality, but
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only about our inabilities to arrive at a comprehensive account of 
thinking.
To organize Maimon’s reasoning against “empirical dogmatism”, 
and to show that it concerns the intelligibility of the identity-thesis in 
question, I propose to take a close look at the dilemma which is, accor­
ding to Maimon, the result of a consistent critical philosophy unable to 
make sense of the Faktum upon which Kant’s Transcendental Deduc­
tion is based. This Faktum, that we do apply the categories to the ob­
jects of experience, gives expression to Kant’s “empirical dogmatism”. 
It amounts to nothing, as will become evident, but the claim that we 
might assume that there is an identity-relation between objects deter­
mined by thought and objects determined outside o f thought. The 
dilemma appears at different places in Maimon’s works, for example 
in one of the final sections of the Logik :
Therefore, my skepticism is founded upon this two-homed dilemma. Either the 
fact that (Faktum) is in itself false, and the adduced examples rest on an 
illusion of the imagination, as I showed already several times. In that case the 
categories do not have any use at all. Or the fact that is in itself true, but in that 
case its reason why is not know able, and the categories (after their laborious 
decuction and schematism) remain but forms that cannot determine objects44
The horns of this dilemma concern the two ways in which we 
might, according to Maimon, understand the possibility of an identity- 
relation between an object determined outside o f thought and an object 
determined by thought. I will first discuss both alternatives separately, 
and subsequently, I will say something about the dilemma as such.
On the one hand, Maimon states that it might be the case that there 
only seems to be an identity-relation, but that actually there is none. 
Thus, it might be the case that the empirical objects we happen to be 
aware of, seem to display an intelligible (categorial) order. For Maimon
44 “Mein Skeptizismus gründet sich also auf diese zweihömichte Dilemma. Entweder ist 
das Faktum an sich (...) falsch, und die angeführten Beispiele beruhen auf Täuschung der 
Einbildungskraft, wie ich schon mehreremal gezeigt habe, die Kathegorien haben alsdann 
gar keinen Gebrauch·, oder es ist an sich wahr, und dann hat es keinen erkennbaren Grund, 
und die Kathegorien bleiben nach ihrer mühsamen Deduktion und Schematismus, wie vor, 
bloße Formen die keine Objekte bestimmen können.”, Maimon, Logik, p. 192. See also 
Logik, pp. 437-438, Wörterbuch, pp. 46-49.
this means that there might be judgements about objects of intuition 
that seem to be synthetic a priori.45 The story behind this horn of the 
dilemma is Humean in essence. It seems to be the case, as goes one of 
Maimon’s examples, that fire causes the stone to become warm, but it 
might well be that the causal order in question is merely apparent, that 
it is an illusion produced by our imagination, which unjustifiedly 
assumes that a contingent conjunction between perceived events reveals 
the actual operation of a principle.46
The point here is not to prove that the intelligible order of, for 
example, causality is merely an illusory effect of our imagination. For 
the sake of argument Maimon just assumes this, in order to argue that, 
even if we suppose that experience is actually not intelligible, it is still 
possible to explain why we perceive an apparent order. In terms of his 
critique of the dogmatic identity-thesis the point can be put as follows. 
Suppose, in order to introduce the first horn of the dilemma, there is no 
identity between objects determined outside o f thought and objects 
determined by thought. The former notion refers to objects of intuition, 
in the way I explained in the previous section. The latter notion refers to 
the objects identified by means of judgements that are governed by the 
Principle o f Determinability, in the way I explained in the previous 
chapter. Consequently, both notions cannot have the same meaning. 
This would be so because it is the case that, with respect to the identity 
of objects determined outside o f thought, spatio-temporal indexicals are 
necessary to express the awareness of a certain qualified region of 
space in which the synthesis of the qualities involved is present. With 
respect to the identity of objects determined by thought, however, it is 
out of the question that anything but real relations of determinability, let 
alone indexicals, could have a function. Nevertheless, it could still seem 
to be the case that objects determined outside o f thought are identical to 
objects determined by thought. This could be so because our imagina­
tion fools us in two ways by inciting generalizations. In the first place, 
by generalizing, we are likely to leave the indexicals out of the picture. 
Fire warms stones, not this and this and this and (...) this stone. Se­
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45 As, for example, the one I discussed in the previous chapter: ‘Grass’ and ‘green’ stand 
in relation of ‘substance’ and ‘attribute’ to one another. See above, p. 110-111.
46 Cf. Maimon, Logik, p. 191.
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condly, by generalizing, our imagination generates habits: we get the 
impression that the conjunction in question has a kind of immediate 
naturalness. As if the qualities involved (the determination and the 
‘determinable’ of the judgement in question) belong to one another 
prior to any other combination. And this means nothing but the 
genesis of the impression that the judgement in question has an a priori 
character.47
The upshot of this attempted explanation of the apparent order we 
experience by means of the operations of the imagination, is that 
Kant’s attempt to use this order in his Transcendental Deduction to 
prove the ‘transcendental fact’ that objects determined by thought are 
identical to objects determined outside o f thought fails. It fails, and this 
is crucial, in the sense that the supposed identity is not the only way to 
understand the apparent fact that we do apply the categories to the 
objects of experience. Thus, even though Maimon’s critique of Kant’s 
Transcendental Deduction aims to show that the deduction is a petitio 
principii**, it is as well a critique in which it is assumed that the deduc­
tion is a regressive argum ent49 That is, even though Maimon is 
unwilling to accept the Faktum, and argues that once we assume it, the 
deduction is a piece of cake, he is nevertheless aware of the fact that the 
point of the Transcendental Deduction is to provide the meaning of the 
Faktum, and not to answer the skeptical challenge. What Maimon is 
unwilling to accept, in other words, is that the Faktum makes sense as 
a ‘transcendental fact’. We don’t know yet what it means to assert that 
the objects of experience display an intelligible order. And Kant’s 
Transcendental Deduction, which aims to provide the meaning of it in 
terms of an identity between objects determined outside o f thought 
(appearances conceived from the empirical point of view) and objects 
determined by thought (appearances conceived from the transcendental 
point of view) fails as a transcendental argument. It fails because the 
argument does not provide the necessary conditions for there being
47 Cf. my discussion of the connotation of a priori in section 2 of Chapter Four above, 
pp. 69f.
Cf. Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason, p. 288.
49 Cf. Karl Ameriks, “Kant’s Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument”, in 
Kantstudien, 1978.
such a ‘transcendental fact’, even though it might provide sufficient 
conditions.50 For even though it might be the case that the identity- 
thesis makes sense of the Faktum, so does the Humean explanation in 
terms of the operations of our imagination, without implying the dog­
matic identity-thesis.
The second horn of the dilemma starts from the assumption that the 
dogmatic identity-thesis obtains, and seeks to determine whether we 
could have a reason to defend the dogmatic option. Again the point of 
Maimon’s criticism is on the level of the intelligibility of our accounts 
of the relation between thoughts and objects. He is not interested in 
whether or not it is the case that objects determined outside o f thought 
are indeed identical to objects determined by thought, but merely in 
whether or not we will be able to understand what such an identity- 
thesis means. Therefore, we had better formulate the dogmatic claim as 
follows: the determinations that we use in judgements that identify 
objects determined outside of thought will turn out to be the very same 
determinations that we use in judgements that identify objects deter­
mined by thought. Formulated in this way, the point of the second horn 
of the dilemma emerges in a quite straightforward way. It is true that 
judgements that identify objects determined outside o f thought contain 
notions that introduce a ‘determinable’ and a determination. But these 
notions do not function as identifying the objects they are supposed to 
refer to. As I explained in the previous section, the identification of 
objects determined outside of thought is a matter of intuition, or, on the 
level of judgements, a matter of spatio-temporal indexicals. Therefore, 
we have no reason to believe that these notions apply to the objects they 
are supposed to refer to. And what is more, and this is the crucial point, 
the notions that introduce the ‘determinable’ and the determination will 
on principle never imply a real relation of determinability, whereas the 
determinations that identify objects determined by thought will on 
principle always imply a real relation of determinability.51 As a conse­
50 The argument resembles those put forward by Karl Ameriks, op.cit. p. 274 and Stephan 
Komer, “The Impossibility of Transcendental Deductions” in Kant Studies Today, ed. 
L.W. Beck, 1969. See also Nagel’s argument against Kant that I discussed in Chapter 
Three, above pp. 35-38.
51 We have seen this point in Chapter Four where I discussed the distinction between real 
objects of intuition and possible objects of concepts. See above, pp. 85-90.
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quence, we might conclude that we do not know what we mean if we 
ascertain that objects determined by thought are identical to objects 
determined outside o f thought. This does not mean that the dogmatic 
thesis is false, nor that it is true; it is meaningless, which does not, 
however, imply that we have won, by means of this argument, a 
positive account of the relation between thoughts and objects, other 
than an account which implies the Antinomy o f Thought.
Maimon does not always present his arguments against Kant’s 
“empirical dogmatism” in the way of a dilemma. At times he presents 
both sides of the dilemma in a sequential way, as if the second 
objection comes on top of the first This is, for example, the case on the 
last page of the Briefe des Philaletes an Aenesidemus:
Thus, I have two reasons to doubt the use of the categories with respect to 
experience. Firstly, there is the Humean, subjective explanation of this pre­
sumed use, that I already introduced. And in addition there is the absence of the 
required reason for such a use, namely the insight in the relation of determin- 
ability (...) with respect to empirical objects.52
Nevertheless, if we take the objections as the horns of a dilemma, 
there is the advantage that we are in a position to see (1) that the 
arguments are directed against the dogmatic thesis, and (2) that they 
concern the meaning of the identity-thesis. This can be shown by 
taking notice of the striking similarity between Maimon’s arguments 
against Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and the conclusion of his 
“Herausforderung an die Dogmatiker oder AntiKantianer”:
Conclusio: Well, what right do you have, to treat the objects of metaphysics as 
real objects, to assign necessarily certain forms (substance, singularity, and so
52 “Ich bezweifle also den Erfahrungsgebrauch der Kathegorien aus einem doppelten 
Grund, erstlich aus der schon angeführten humischen subjektiven Erklärungsart dieses 
vermeintlichen Gebrauchs; und dann wieder aus dem Mangel des zu diesem Gebrauche 
erforderlichen Grundes, nämlich der Einsicht in das Verhältniß der Bestimmbarkeit (...)  
an den empyrischen Objekten.”, Maimon, L ogik , pp. 437-438. Beiser presents 
Maimon’s objections against Kant’s Transcendental Deduction along this line, separa­
ting it from the argument in terms of the radical dualism between sensibility and under­
standing that supports the Antinomy o f Thought. See Beiser, The Fate of Reason, pp. 
288-292.
on) to them, and to determine them in such a way? You should either generate 
these objects out of these forms themselves, which is impossible, because forms 
cannot become objects, or you should assign these forms to completely 
unknown objects, which is, however, illegal.53
It is no accident that this conclusion is put in the form of a dilemma, 
or, so I argue. After all, as we have seen, it is according to Maimon up 
to a dogmatic philosopher to defend an identity-thesis between objects 
determined by thought and objects determined outside o f thought. For a 
Wolffian dogmatic this means that he has to argue that transcendent 
objects (i.e. the Wolffian kind of what are according to Maimon objects 
determined outside o f thought) are identical to objects determined by 
thought. Taking into account that Maimon is arguing against the intel­
ligibility of the dogmatic thesis, the either/or form makes sense. This is 
so because, with respect to the intelligibility of the thesis, it is irrelevant 
whether the thesis is actually true or whether it is false. If it is false, we 
have to make sense of the apparent plausibility of the dogmatic argu­
ments, and if it is true, we have to make sense of whether or not we are 
able to know it is true.
In the first case, the Wolffian version of the identity-thesis is obvi­
ously supposed to be false. Maimon’s referring to the genesis of the 
transcendent objects out of the forms of thought has both, I argue, to 
do with the fact that an object determined by thought is supposed to be 
an object produced by thought according to a rule of the understanding, 
and with the fact that Maimon tries to make sense of the apparent 
plausibility of the dogmatic arguments. The fact is that Maimon is re­
ferring here to the Kantian kind of explanation of this seeming plausi­
bility (as developed in the Transcendental Dialectic) in terms of the ten­
dency to take regulative ideas as truly referring. This kind of expla­
nation, which rebuts the position of a Wolffian kind of metaphysical 
dogmatism, is according to Maimon actually the same as the Humean
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53 “Conclusio: Was für ein Recht haben sie also, die Gegenstände der Metaphysik als 
reelle Objekte zu behandeln, ihnen gewisse Formen (Substanzialität, Einfachheit, u.dgl.) 
auf eine nothwendige Art beizulegen, und sie dadurch zu bestimmen? Sie müssen also 
entweder diese Objekte aus den Formen selbst entstehen lassen, welches aber unmöglich 
ist, weil Formen nie Objekte werden können; oder Sie müssen diese Formen ganz imbe­
kannten Objekte beilegen, welches wiederum unrechtmäßig ist.”, Maimon, Wörterbuch, 
p. 46.
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kind of explanation in terms of the operations of our imagination, 
which rebuts the position, as we saw above, of a Kantian kind of 
“empirical dogmatism”. This is so because the regulative ideas of pure 
reason are, Maimon argues, nothing but illusory products of the ima­
gination, just as the apparendy principled order of experience.54 Thus, it 
is possible to hold that Maimon uses Kant’s interpretation of the 
apparent plausibility of Wolfian dogmatism to point out that Kant’s 
“empirical dogmatism” is also only apparently plausible. Granted that 
the identity-thesis is false, the conclusion is that the dogmatic ar­
guments are not good enough to convince us of it being true.
But in addition, supposing that the dogmatic identity-thesis is true, 
both kinds of dogmatic philosophers are actually not in a position to 
give us a compelling reason for knowing it is true. It might as well be 
false, which just means to come to the conclusion I formulated above. 
Whether or not the dogmatic identity-thesis is true, we are not in a 
position to understand what it could mean to hold that it is true.
This is all, in a sense, nothing but to repeat the claims of Maimonian 
skepticism, considered as an account of the relation between thoughts 
and objects by which we are able to explain why any such account will 
lead to an Antinomy o f Thought; i.e. why the structure of our articu­
lations of thinking will have an aporetic character. The failure of 
dogmatism, for which I argued in this chapter, strengthens my claim 
that Maimonian skepticism is not a simple self-refuting skepticism, 
even though it does imply that we cannot have a comprehensive ac­
count of the relation between thoughts and objects. To put it in a provo­
cative way, the point of Maimonian skepticism is that a theory is the 
wrong thing to look for as regards the relation between thoughts and 
objects — an adequate account of this relation will have to take the 
form of a problem . Or, in a perhaps more sensible way, the aporetic 
character of the structure of our articulations of thinking is not
54 The claim that the “Vemunftideen” are actually products of the imagination is, 
according to Maimon, one of the main themes of his criticism of Kant. See the “Sechster 
Brief des Philaletes an Aenesidemus”, in which Maimon presents a concise and numbered 
critique of Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft. See Logik, particularly, pp. 422-424. See 
for a more detailed version of this criticism, Logik, pp. 201-207.
something to be eliminated but, rather, something to be understood, 
which means to appreciate it for what it is: a problem.
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CONCLUSION
Twohundred years ago Salomon Maimon prepared the manuscript 
of his first book for publication. Now I prepare mine. Much has been 
published in the meantime — books that changed the characteristics of 
philosophy in almost every aspect. Nonetheless, I think we can still 
learn a lot from Maimon’s penetrating analysis of the structure of our 
articulations of thinking, as I have tried to show in the preceding chap­
ters. Of course this does not mean that I advocate a reversion to eigh­
teenth century philosophy. Far from that. But it does mean that some­
how we missed an important voice in the Kantian composition of our 
recent philosophical past: the voice of skepticism — Maimonian skep­
ticism. Its point has been to resist the temptation to eliminate the 
aporetic character of the structure of our accounts of the relation be­
tween thoughts and objects, in favour of a rigorous attempt to under­
stand it as a problem.
Let me repeat the central claims of the preceding chapters concisely, 
paying attention to the way in which they support the criticism of a 
number of contemporary American accounts of thinking that I deve­
loped in Part One of this study.
In Chapter Four, “Salomon Maimon’s Reading of Kant”, I in­
troduced the idea of an Antinomy o f Thought, arguing that it follows 
from Maimon’s critical interpretation of a number of Kantian distinc­
tions. These distinctions concerned (1) the objects of thought (objects 
determined by thought versus objects determined outside of thought),
(2) the linguistic medium of thought (judgements that answer the Quid 
facti versus judgements that answer the Quid juris), and (3) the mental
medium of thought (intuitions versus concepts). They give rise to the 
idea of an Antinomy o f Thought because a comprehensive account of 
thinking implies what is impossible for us to understand: (1) that the 
objects of thought are as well objects determined outside o f thought as 
objects determined by thought, (2) that the judgements that express a 
real thought should answer both the Quid juris and the Q uidfacti, and
(3) that the mental states by means of which it is possible to identify 
real objects are as well intuitions as concepts. As I have suggested, 
these distinctions, and their related formulations of the Antinomy of 
Thought, throw light upon the views behind the slogans with which I 
began this study. The need and the impossibility to do justice to the 
intuitions1 that underly both the idea that thinking is like ‘making the 
world meaningful’ and the idea that it is like ‘finding a meaningful 
world’, give rise as well to the idea of the Antinomy o f Thought, even 
though these slogans lead only to a rather suggestive and quite vague 
formulation of it.
Looking back at the first part of this thesis, it will now be evident 
that the Antinomy o f Thought was the leading idea behind my criticism 
of Rosenberg and Rorty, as well as behind my approvement of Nagel’s 
awareness of the aporetic character of our accounts of thinking. Let me 
put it this way: the plausibility of arguments against views that do not 
acknowledge the aporetic character of the structure of our accounts of 
the relation between thoughts and objects, can be explained in terms of 
the inescapability of the Antinomy o f Thought.
The point of Chapter Five, “The Value of Skepticism”, was to argue 
that Maimonian skepticism is not an uninteresting kind of self-refuting 
skepticism, but a defense of the Antinomy o f Thought, as reflecting 
more than just a contradiction in or o f  the account of thinking it gives 
rise to. This did not mean that the aporetic involved is a matter of the 
relation between thoughts and objects itself, but only that it is not 
possible for us to distinguish between the account and that what the 
account is supposed to be about. In other words, although the Mai-
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1 Not in the technical sense of “Anschauung”, but in the more general sense of 
particularly certain knowledge for which, however, it is very difficult or perhaps even 
impossible to give convincing reasons.
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monian account of thinking leads to an Antinomy o f Thought, it is an 
account that cannot be abandoned.
With respect to the Americans I criticised, it will be clear that this 
point played an important role in my critique of Nagel. His attempt to 
distinguish between thinking itself and our account of thinking led to 
problems, precisely because he neglected the modesty he himself urged 
for with respect to the Kantian attempt to deduce a transcendental fact 
out of the impossibility to distinguish between the form of our ac­
counts and their content. Maimonian skepticism, or so I argued, is the 
attempt to preserve this modesty. Our accounts of the relation between 
thoughts and objects imply an Antinomy. Hence, the character of their 
structure is aporetic. We should, nevertheless, resist the temptation to 
solve the problem involved. All we should do, is to try to understand 
why our attempts to account for the relation between thoughts and 
objects lead to the Antinomy o f Thought. We can do so, according to 
Maimon, with the help of the Principle o f Determinability. This does 
not solve everything. It does not make everything intelligible, but it 
does make intelligible why an account of thinking implies something 
that is unintelligible. It doesn’t help us understand something of think­
ing itself, but it does help us understand something of our accounts of 
thinking, namely, why they take the form of a problem.
The point of the last chapter, “The Failure of Dogmatism”, was just 
to strengthen this conclusion, by means of a refutation of what seemed 
to be a possible way out of the Antinomy o f Thought. Arguing that the 
dogmatic option (which is to assume that objects determined outside of 
thought will turn out to be identical to objects determined by thought) is 
not intelligible, I was able to improve the arguments in favour of a mo­
dest claim. There is no good reason for having positive views about the 
relation between thoughts and objects -  all we can have is views about 
our accounts of the relation between thoughts and objects. These 
accounts have a structure that has an aporetic character. Any attempt to 
understand the relation between thoughts and objects will imply 
problems of intelligibility, since it will imply the Antinomy of Thought. 
Trying to understand why our attempts to understand thinking are 
intrinsically problematic is all there is left to do. If this tells us some­
thing about our finitude, it tells us no more than that theories about the
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relation between thoughts and objects cannot be maintained, because 
accounts of thinking in terms of the Antinomy o f Thought cannot be 
abandoned.
POSTSCRIPT
IRONY: A CHANGE OF 
ATTITUDE
“Getting to grips with irony seems 
to have something in common with 
gathering the mist; there is plenty to 
take hold of if only one could.”
D.C. Muecke, 
The Compass of Irony, 
(1969)
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In this study I argued that an account of thinking should not be an 
attempt to solve the tension between finding and making, between 
answering the Quidfacti and answering the Quid juris, between objects 
determined outside o f thought and objects determined by thought, be­
tween intuitions and concepts. Rather, such an account should be an 
attempt to understand this tension, to understand the aporetic character 
of the structure of our articulations of thinking, to understand why an 
account of the relation between thoughts and objects will take the form 
of a problem, why, in one more formulation, there is an Antinomy of 
Thought.
This conclusion sounds like a paradox. It is as if I argue against the 
temptation to solve problems of intelligibility, as if I claim that under­
standing has nothing to do with the dissolution of the unintelligible.
It is in order to make sense of this claim, that I will end up this study 
with a few remarks on the relevance of irony. Though I will make use 
of some ideas developed by Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829), the dis­
cussion is too far removed from his works to be rightly called to be 
about him.1
To begin with, there is an obvious irony in the question evoked by 
my conclusion: Is thought intelligible? The irony arises out of the 
tension between the sincerity of the question and the self-evident cor­
rectness of a positive answer. Of course, one is apt to react, of course
1 It is not easy to become acquianted with Schlegel’s philosophy. For, on the one hand 
there is hardly any literature on it, and on the other hand, until very recently (1964) the 
main texts were inaccessible. These main texts are, to my judgement, the Philosophische 
Vorlesungen (1800-1807), and, particularly, Die Entwicklung der Philosophie in zwölf 
Büchern. See, Kritische Friedrich Schlegel Ausgabe. Bd. XII-XIII (München, 1964).
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thought is intelligible! If not thought, what else could be! But then, in 
the midst of the eagerness of one’s reaction, the uneasy peace and quiet 
of a sincere question announces itself. Whence this eagerness, if the 
positive answer is so self-evident? Naturally however, there is the 
reversal. In the midst of the all too serious confusion induced by the 
question, the uncomplicated confidence in a positive answer pops up. 
Don’t bother too much, for it is only if a positive answer is implied to 
be correct that the question makes sense at all!
Out of this example we can discern the basic elements we need for 
an account of irony as the essential feature of a way in which we can 
learn to live with the aporetic character of the structure of our accounts 
of thinking. These elements are:
1. A tension between two opposite self-evident convictions.
2. A consciousness in motion, such that a deliberate support for 
either one of the convictions uncovers an unintended support 
for the other one.
I am not suggesting that every account of irony needs these ele­
ments. Irony is a notion with many friends and foes, and consequently 
there are many interpretations of it. I am not interested in these interpre­
tations, because I am not interested in irony as the subject-matter of a 
systematic investigation. My subject-matter is the aporetic character of 
our accounts of the relation between thoughts and objects, and as I 
claim that this aporetic character is an intrinsic feature of the structure 
of any account of thinking, I see myself as bound to suggest a way in 
which we can learn to live with the paradox that follows from my con­
clusion. I think irony is such a way, granted we give it an interpretation 
in terms of the elements I just formulated. Such an interpretation is 
possible, and is reminiscent of the romantic irony as developed by 
Friedrich Schlegel.
Although I do not intend to argue for it as if it was a historical claim, 
I think it makes sense to suggest that Schlegel’s notion of romantic 
irony could have been a response to the problem Maimon discovered 
in reading Kant. And, as I argued that Maimon’s analysis of the pro­
blem is of importance for contemporary philosophy, so I will suggest
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here that Schlegel’s notion of romantic irony is likewise important too. 
Its main importance lies in the fact that it takes irony as a way of living 
with problems of intelligibility, rather than as a way of eliminating 
them—i.e. irony is, in terms of this notion, a way of relativizing the 
temptation to answer all questions.2 And this could be relevant in 
situations in which we deal with philosophical accounts that possess an 
aporetic character.
In the following pages I will do two things. First I will introduce an 
initial interpretation of irony as a way of living with problems of intel­
ligibility, making some references to Schlegel’s notion of romantic 
irony. Subsequently I will use this account of irony in order to show 
how it might help us change our attitude towards analyses that yield 
paradoxical conclusions. This implies, I will suggest, the need to re­
think our notion of method.
Since these are complicated matters, let me stress from the outset 
that my remarks in this postscript are not meant to be analyses—they 
are mere suggestions, indicating a way to rethink the philosophical 
enterprise as yielding problems, not theories.
The central element of the account of irony I am proposing here, is 
the idea of a consciousness in motion. This idea can be given a quite 
uncomplicated meaning in terms of a series of mental states that follow 
one another in time. Of course, such an interpretation assumes that it is 
possible to count mental states, which is far from obvious. Moreover, 
it makes use of a notion of succession which is perhaps not compatible 
with the idea of motion, since it cannot account for that which endures 
in motion.3 But as far as the case of irony is concerned, these compli­
2 As such, my attempt to propagate the relevance of irony is of a kind with Strawson’s 
recent attempt to propagate the relevance of some varieties of naturalism as proper 
reactions to the skeptical challenge. See his Skepticism & Naturalism. Some Varieties 
(London, 1985). This theme is dominant as well in two other recent publications on the 
relevance of skepticism: David R. Hiley, Philosophy in Question. Essays on a 
Pyrrhonian Theme (Chicago, 1988), and Stanley Cavell, In Quest o f the Ordinary. Lines 
o f Skepticism and Romanticism (Chicago, 1988).
3 This was one of the main problems of Henri Bergson, See a.o. Essai sur les donneés 
immédiates de la conscience (Paris, 1889).
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cations need not confuse us. For a crucial aspect of irony is precisely 
that the succeeding mental state follows the preceding one in time, 
without it being possible to understand whether it followed from  this 
previous mental state. This explains, I think, why irony has in ordinary 
discourse so often a humorous effect. What I am suggesting here is 
that the consciousness in motion which plays a crucial role in my 
account of irony, is a consciousness that passes from one mental state 
to another in a way that is not algorithmic, to use a contemporary 
phrase. In irony the mind does not move from one mental state to 
another by deliberately following an explicit and finite step-by-step pro­
cedure. Irony comes as a surprise, which is just to say that the suc­
ceeding mental state happens to be the unexpected and unintended 
result of an attempt to pursue the opposite. Thus, trying to support the 
self-evident conviction that thought is of course an intelligible affair, the 
troubling effect of a sincere question that begins to announce itself, as 
in the example above, is an occurrence of irony.
At this point it will be a good idea to say something about the 
character of the tension between the two opposite convictions which 
plays a role in the motion of the consciousness involved in an occur­
rence of irony. As I take it, this tension is of a kind with the tension we 
found in the analysis of Maimon which led to the Antinomy o f  
Thought. As I am focusing now on consciousness, let me try to state 
my point in terms of the tension between intuitions and concepts.4 
According to Maimon, an intuition is a mental state which is an aware­
ness of a certain qualified region of space. This intuition is present as or 
in a judgement which is, according to Maimon, a product of the ima­
gination. In contrast, a concept is a mental state which consists of a 
specific rule of the understanding. This concept is present as or in a 
judgement which is, according to Maimon, governed by the Principle 
of Determinability. What is important now, is that a judgement which 
is supposed to be an expression of a real thought should be a presen­
4 But, as became clear from the analysis I gave in the previous part, the same point can be 
stated in terms of the tension between finding and making, between answering the Quid 
facti and answering the Quid juris, between objects determined outside of thought and 
objects determined by thought. After all, the ineliminability of the Antinomy of Thought 
can be shown in terms of each of these paired notions.
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tation of both an intuition and a concept. But, as argued in the final part 
of this thesis, we cannot understand judgements to be such double pre­
sentations. Therefore, in our attempt to understand a judgement, we 
will have to take them in a one-sided way. Thus, to take the example 
from the introduction, in judging that the chair I sit on is a typical 
twentieth century wheeled office chair with all kinds of moving parts, I 
will either be tempted to take it as a presentation of a concept (a location 
in a conceptual framework identified by means of rules of the under­
standing) or as a presentation of an intuition (an awareness of a certain 
qualified region of space, described with the help of the creative ima­
gination). Either way I must go wrong, since I’ll have to neglect the 
Antinomy of Thought and to assume the plausibility of an indefensible 
dogmatism.
Irony, I now suggest, is a way of eliminating such a dogmatism. 
Not theoretically, as was the case with Maimon’s argument against 
empirical dogmatism, but practically — as a way of living. For, as I 
will argue, an attempt to understand my judgement about my chair as a 
presentation of a concept will lead to a support of the opposite inter­
pretation of the judgement as a presentation of an intuition. And vice 
versa.
The point can perhaps be stated more convincingly in terms of 
Schlegel’s notion of romantic irony. According to Schlegel, the tension 
present in an occurrence of irony is a manifestation of the tension 
between the finite and the infinite.5 Thus, in understanding what would
5 The theme of the tension between the finite and the infinite is of utmost importance in 
Schlegel’s writings. A clear and well-considered statement of it can be found in the part of 
Die Entwicklung der Philosophie in zwölf Büchern called “Die Psychologie als TTieorie 
des Bewußtseins”, in Kritische Friedrich Schlegel Ausgabe. Bd. XIII (München, 1964), 
pp. 324-408. ‘T o unify in life this infinity that we find in us, with the feeling of 
limitation, one needs the help of the concept o f becoming. Just thus it becomes 
possible: if there is no being, but only becoming, then the finite, although extensively 
limited, will intensively be infinite by means of infinite variation and alteration (...)  a 
becoming infinitude, although infinite, is not yet ready, and therefore finite.”; “Um nun 
diese Unendlichkeit, die wir in uns finden, mit dem Gefühle der Beschränktheit im Leben 
zu vereinigen, muß man den Begriff des Werden zu hilfe nehmen. Bloß hiedurch wird es 
möglich: gibt es kein Sein, sondern nur Werden, so ist das Endliche, wenn auch extensiv 
begrenzt, doch intensiv durch die unendliche Mannigfaltigkeit und Veränderlichkeit 
immer unendlich. (...) Ein werdendes Unendliches aber ist gleichsam ein Unendliches, das 
noch nicht fertig, und insofern endlich ist.” pp. 334-335.
Irony: a Change of Attitude 173
make a judgement a presentation of a real thought (it being a presen­
tation of both a concept and an intuition) we are aware of the infinite, 
but in every attempt to understand a particular judgement (as either a 
presentation of a concept or of an intuition) we realize our finite mode 
of thinking. Now, this does not mean that we had better sit down in 
despair, realizing that we are not well equiped for the task of thinking. 
Not at all. After all, as long as there are judgements, we cannot resist 
the temptation to try to understand them. So we had better try enthu­
siastically. That is part of irony too.6
It might seem as if this is at variance with what I said above. For 
there I stated that irony is a way of relativizing the temptation to answer 
all questions. But now it seems as if Schlegel accepts that we cannot 
resist such a temptation, and he even seems to suggest that part of 
irony consists in the (no doubt futile) attempt to try for answers. 
Should it not be better to forget Schlegel, and, for that matter, to forget 
irony as well, and make a plea for some kind of Zen-inspired training 
to learn to resist the temptation to think at all? I don’t know. But as far 
as irony is concerned, it is not the case that the enthusiasm to try for 
answers is incompatible with the relativization of the temptation to 
answer all questions. Enthusiasm is not, in any way, related to dogma­
tism. To put it this way, while dogmatism is motivated by the answer, 
enthusiasm is motivated by the question. It is the presence of a judge­
ment that asks for understanding which evokes our enthusiasm. And it 
is our enthusiasm, our taking of the judgement in a one-sided way (as 
either the presentation of a concept or of an intuition) that is needed to 
realize an occurrence of irony, a consciousness in motion. Such a con­
sciousness in motion is an awareness of the ‘idea’7 that both “die Welt 
noch unvollendet ist”% and “wir nur ein Stück von uns selbst sind”.9
6 ibid. pp. 393ff. Schlegel makes use of both “Begeisterung” and “Enthusiasmus” to 
indicate our eagerness to find answers, i.e. to make sense, as part of irony as a mode of 
living with the tension between the finite and the infinite. See also Vorlesung über die 
Transzendentalphilosophie (in Band XII), p. 42.
7 "Idee" is a technical term in Schlegel’s philosophy; it is an inexpressible 
consciousness of an encompassing totality which consists, as a totality, of opposites. 
“An idea is a comprehension o f the whole ( ...)  Therefore we say idea rather than concept·, 
because that to which it is supposed to refer, cannot be grasped in a concept according to 
its ordinary meaning, because it is incomprehensible with respect to its expression, for
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A good way to begin to explain this rather lunatic statement is to take 
a look at one of the early Athendums-Fragmente:
An idea is a concept completed up to irony, an absolute synthesis of absolute 
antitheses, a permanent alternation between two conflicting thoughts induced 
by itself10
The fragment aims to explain that an ‘idea’ is somehow a synthesis of 
antitheses. It consists in a tension between two opposite thoughts in 
such a way that this tension realizes an alternation between the two 
thoughts in one consciousness. This alternation, now, is realized by 
means of “ein bis zur Ironie vollendeter Begriff’. That is, by enthu­
siastically defending a one-sided interpretation of a judgement (as if it 
presented for example a transparant and discursive rule of the under­
standing — i.e. a concept), we arrive, finally, at a point at which this in­
terpretation unmasks itself as one-sided, and, consequently, as false (as 
well as true). This unmasking happens by means of an unintended 
awareness of the plausibility of a radically opposed interpretation. The 
implication of this is that it is, strictly speaking, not simply correct to 
maintain that the interpretation unmasks itself. It is the awareness of the 
infinite which protests against the finite way in which it is being 
thought. Irony occurs just at the point where a consciousness begins to 
believe it grasps the whole meaning of a judgement in terms of a 
single, unequivocal interpretation. Thus, irony wouldn’t have occured if 
there was no enthusiasm, if the consciousness was not eager to grasp 
the whole meaning of a judgement in terms of a one-sided interpre­
tation. In other words, irony, i.e. the consciousness in motion which is
example, Not-I equals ƒ.”; “Ein Idee ist ein Wissen des Ganzen. (...) So sagen wir Idee 
statt Begriff; weil das, was damit bezeichnet werden soll, in einem Begriff, nach der 
gewöhnlichen Bedeutung, nicht gefaßt werden kann, und gleichsam unbegreiflich ist, 
nämlich in Absicht des Ausdrucks. Z.B. Nichtich ist gleich Ich.” (Vorlesung über die 
Transzendentalphilosophie, pp. 4-5)
8 ibid. p. 42
9 Die Entwicklung der Philosophie in zwölf Büchern, p. 337.
10 “Eine Idee ist ein bis zur Ironie vollendeter Begriff, eine absolute Synthesis absoluter 
Antithesen, der stete sich selbst erzeugende Wechsel zwei streitender Gedanken.”, 
Athenäums-Fragment nr. 121
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an awareness of an ‘idea’, can only be realized by means of an enthu­
siastic attempt to grasp the infinite in terms of the finite.
That the tension between the finite and the infinite manifests itself as 
a tension between two opposite (finite) convictions, is just to be expec­
ted, granted our inability to understand a judgement as a presentation of 
both a concept and an intuition (to hold on to Maimon’s notions), i.e. 
granted our finite understanding. That we become in the irony aware of 
an ‘idea’ that both “die Welt noch unvollendet ist” and “wir nur ein 
Stück von uns selbst sind”, is something, however, that needs more 
explication. Of course these phrases are images: attempts to present an 
‘idea’, a synthesis of antitheses. Hence, they have to fail beforehand. 
That is their irony. But it is exactly their success that unfolds itself in 
their ironical failure.
As regards the world, irony shows that our notion of the world is 
necessarily partial. We can think of the world as either a set of objects 
determined outside o f thought or a set of objects determined by 
thought, but either interpretation is unmasked as incomplete. There 
must be more to the world than we can think of. Not in the trivial sense 
that our world is a proper subset of the world. No, the point is that a 
world has to be a set of objects, but the only kinds of objects that are 
possible (as objects) are either objects that cannot yet be thought of as 
objects (objects determined outside o f thought) or objects that cannot 
yet exist as objects (objects determined by thought). Thus, it is the 
Antinomy o f Thought which comes to consciousness in irony in the 
image of a world that is not yet complete.11 This image makes it pos­
sible to live with the Antinomy: irony turns Maimonian skepticism into 
a constructive motive to try for completeness. I will return to this, but 
let me first point out the irony of the awareness of the ‘idea’ that we are 
but a part of ourselves. Basically, the point is just the reverse of the one 
with respect to the world. Any object implies over against it a con­
scious subject. This subject now is unmasked in irony as necessarily 
partial. We cannot be the beings that think of the world as either a set of 
objects determined outside o f thought or a set of objects determined by
11 This idea occurs, at times, in the writings of Maimon as well. See, for example, 
Transscendentalphilosophie, pp. 33-35.
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thought. We have to be both, even though we cannot be, since if we 
were both, we would no longer stand over against the world. There­
fore, all we can ever be is a part of ourselves, which is of course a flag­
rant contradiction but, again, in the irony of its failure the awkward 
nature of our lives uncovers itself in a meaningful way. For, there is a 
constructive element in this occurrence of irony. We live our lives 
essentially in being a consciousness in motion, i.e. our life exists in the 
moment of irony in which we realize that our complete self shows 
itself precisely in the ‘idea’ of our being just a part of ourselves.12
That irony turns Maimonian skepticism into a constructive motive to 
try for completeness in order to be able to live with the Antinomy of 
Thought, is the suggestion I want to put forward in this postscript. The 
basic elements of my account of irony:
1. A tension between two opposite self-evident convictions; and
2. A consciousness in motion, such that a deliberate support for 
either one of the convictions uncovers an unintended support 
for the other one,
reflect the influence of the Antinomy o f Thought on our ability and 
inability to understand judgements. Any judgement expressing a real 
thought can be accounted for in two opposite ways. We have seen this 
before: a judgement can be taken as (1) either the product of thinking as 
making or thinking as finding; (2) either about objects determined by 
thought or objects determined outside o f thought', (3) either answering 
the Quid facti or the Quid juris; (4) either consisting in a concept or an 
intuition. Either way we take it is necessarily partial — but the re­
maining part will turn out to be the incompatible opposite. Hence the 
Antinomy.
Just this conclusion however (this “Hence the Antinomy”), is intel­
ligible only at the moment we grasp the partiality of one account of a 
judgement by realizing the value of the opposing account. The Anti­
nomy o f Thought manifests itself through the second element, i.e. in a 
consciousness in motion. Thus, Maimonian skepticism, which is, as I
12 This idea is also a Maimonian theme. See Transscendentalphilosophie, pp. 155-166.
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have argued, nothing but a defense of the inescapability of the Anti­
nomy o f Thought, needs the occurring of irony in order to make itself 
appear intelligible. Therefore, it will be good for this Maimonian skep­
ticism to strive for irony, which means, as I explained above, that it 
will be good to try for completeness with enthusiasm. (It is, perhaps, 
superfluous to notice the irony in this advice.)
It is important to point out the commitments involved. It should be 
stressed that to strive for irony has, for Maimonian skepticism, a logi­
cal primacy. This means that to try for completeness gets a ‘chrono­
logical primacy’, as this is the appropriate means to strive for irony. 
This is, however, fundamentally to be distinguished from the Fichtean 
or Hegelian notions of an infinite striving to expand the boundaries of 
inquiry.131 am defending Maimonian skepticism. I take the Antinomy 
of Thought seriously. My plea for enthusiasm with respect to whatever 
attempt to grasp the infinite in terms of the finite, is a plea for irony, a 
plea for a consciousness in motion, a plea for the awareness of the 
infinite by means of an ‘idea’ (in Schlegel’s technical meaning of the 
word) which uncovers our finitude as well. The point of the infinite 
striving for irony by means of a move in the opposite direction is not in 
any way to be associated with a notion of growth. We do not approach 
completeness. Wisdom is not like that. It is much more like food — 
thinking resembles eating in a significant way. We are hungry and 
desire food, and as we find it (or make it) we eat, an activity which 
eradicates our hunger. So we loose our desire for food, not because we 
have had all of food, but because we have had enough of it. We loose 
our appetite which does not last for long, however. And so we go 
again, never getting enough but often having enough. Clearly, there is a 
point in associating the process of nutrition and digestion with the 
notion of growth. But so there is in associating it with ageing. Neither 
way it has to do with completeness as the realization of the absolute. It 
has to do with the paradox of life, and so has my plea for irony as a 
way of living with the Antinomy o f Thought.
13 Even though it might, historically speaking, be true that Maimon cleared the way for 
German Idealism (See, for example, Samuel Atlas From Critical to Speculative Idealism, 
and Ernst Cassirer Das Erkenntnisproblem), Maimon himself was a skeptic, and not, at 
least not in an interesting sense of the word, an idealist, as I argued above, p. 140.
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Perhaps the best way to vindicate this plea for irony is to show how 
it might help us change our attitude towards analyses that yield para­
doxical conclusions. Therefore, let me show how irony might help us 
approve of the aporetic character of our accounts of the relation be­
tween thoughts and objects.
Suppose I judge that the chair I sit on is a typical twentieth century 
wheeled office chair with all kinds of moving parts, and that its colour 
is anthracite. It is possible to take this judgement to be informative 
about a certain object because it identifies a location in a conceptual 
framework that is occupied by the object in question. It is also possible 
to take the judgement to be informative about this object because it 
specifies some of the real properties of a particular object upon which I 
happen to sit at this very moment. Claiming that we have to take the 
judgement both ways is correct, but it leads, as argued, to the Antinomy 
o f Thought. We cannot defend this claim coherently. That was the point 
of my criticism of Rosenberg, Rorty and Nagel: the structure of our 
articulations of thinking has an intrinsically aporetic character. It is be­
cause of that, that I suggest a change of attitude, a change towards iro­
ny. Well, what does it amount to?
In order to keep things as simple as possible, suppose I just focus 
upon the colour of my chair, and suppose I think the judgement that 
my chair is anthracite is informative because it points out a location in 
my conceptual framework. The location is labeled “anthracite”, and a 
specification of this location will at least have to point out that it is a 
location of colour, like, for example, “red”, “yellow” and “blue”. 
Colours, to say just a bit more, have to do with the surfaces of objects 
and with the way in which these surfaces reflect light. Now, what is the 
meaning of my judgement, according to this interpretation? Something 
like the following sounds reasonable enough. If “anthracite” is a co­
lour, and if colours have to do with the surfaces of objects and with the 
ways in which these surfaces reflect light, then the judgement that my 
chair is anthracite will mean that my chair is an object whose surface 
reflect light in such a way that the resulting colour occupies the location 
“anthracite” in my conceptual framework.
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But what is it exactly that is realized, or done, or said by means of 
my judgement? The judgement certainly did not just point out a loca­
tion in a conceptual framework labeled “anthracite”. Such things are 
done by judgements as “Anthracite is a colour”, or “Anthracite is 
between grey and black”. No, the judgement must somehow have suc­
ceeded in expressing that it is my chair (or its colour) that occupies the 
location labeled “anthracite”. But, how can it do that? My chair does 
certainly not occupy this location in a literal way. Well, then, what, 
exacdy, occupies this location? Not, I presume, a ‘mental image’ of my 
chair. For, what would that be? Another location in my conceptual 
framework? It will not do to suggest that the judgement just makes a 
connection between a number of locations in a conceptual framework. 
For, there is no definite description that would capture the indexical 
“this” or “my”, or, to put it even stronger, there is no definite descrip­
tion that would capture the essential part “There is an x such that x ...”.
If we resist the temptation to take refuge in the hopeless notion of an 
“ubiquitous, scheme-neutral input”14, it seems we are bound to loose 
the object the judgement is supposed to be about (my chair). Realizing 
this result, as for example in Quine’s statement that “to be is to be a 
value of a variable”, is an occurrence of irony. For, after all, it is so 
overwhelmingly clear that I do not sit on a bunch of values of a 
number of variables. I just sit on an object, my chair: a typical twentieth 
century wheeled office chair with all kinds of moving parts, and with 
an anthracite colour.
What I suggest, then, is that the attempt to support the account of 
judgements as identifying a particular location in a conceptual frame­
work implies under certain conditions a kind of reductio ad absurdum. 
This suggestion is vague in two ways: the nature of the conditions is 
not specified and neither is the kind of reductio. As regards the first I 
think we need a specification of the conditions as depending upon the 
attitude of the consciousness involved, which should be an attitude 
sensitive to the possibility of an occurrence of irony. As regards the 
second I think we need a specification of the reductio as not being an
14 See Nicholas Rescher, “Conceptual Schemes” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy V , ed. 
P.A. French (Minneapolis, 1980), p. 336.
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ordinary reductio ad absurdwn; i.e. not one that ends with a formal, 
logical contradiction, but one that ends with a contradiction because the 
consciousness involved begins to move in such a way that the initial 
support for an account of the judgement as identifying a particular loca­
tion in a conceptual framework, turns out to entail a support for the 
opposing account that the judgements actually are about real charac­
teristics of actual objects. That is, the reductio I am speaking of does 
not have a dead end. It does not just terminate in a contradiction that 
opens up the possibility of saying anything whatsoever. No, the move­
ment of the consciousness involved is productive in the sense that it 
uncovers, via an absurdity (i.e. through irony), the plausibility of the 
opposing account.
Of course, things do not end here. We should not loose our sensi­
tivity for irony. The opposing account is not better, even though it 
appears at the moment of the irony I just discussed to be the only 
viable account. But, there is an ironical end to this account as well. For, 
imagine that we believe that the judgement about my chair is infor­
mative because it specifies some of the real properties of the object 
upon which I happen to sit at this very moment.
Let us again keep things as simple as possible, and focus just on the 
anthracite colour of my chair. Well, what does it mean that my chair 
has an anthracite colour? On this account, we are aware of a real object 
(to be identified by means of spatio-temporal coordinates), and we take 
it that one of the essential features of this object is its anthracite colour. 
The problem, definitely, is with the phrase “essential feature”; appa­
rently most seriously with “essential”, but, actually, the real problem 
arises with respect to “anthracite” being a feature of my chair. For, 
how can that be, or, rather, what does that mean? As far as under­
standing goes, we can understand that a colour can be anthracite, and 
that a surface can have a colour, but we cannot get closer to my chair 
than by means of spatio-temporal coordinates. And it is very hard to 
understand what it means to say that a part of space-time has a surface, 
and that the reflected light on this surface has a colour, and that this 
colour is anthracite. Thus, supporting the interpretation that anthracite is 
a feature of an actually existing object, leads to the conclusion that the 
link between the object and the colour is incomprehensible as long as
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we do not have a conceptual access to the object, i.e. as long as we do 
not take the judgement as identifying a location in a conceptual frame­
work. In other words, again there is the irony that even though we have 
the object right beforehand, this does not mean at all that we are able to 
understand what it means that the object has an anthracite colour. In 
order to be able to understand that, we will need some rules of the 
understanding that relate my chair to its colour.
The point of this example is not to prove or defend the untenability 
of one-sided accounts of judgements. For arguments in favour of that 
claim were developed in the previous parts of this thesis. No, the point 
here is to indicate how a sensitivity to the irony of the intelligibility of 
the relation between thoughts and objects, might help us see the opti­
mistic, constructive force of Maimonian skepticism. Understanding the 
Antinomy o f Thought does not rob us of our appetite for understanding 
the meaning of judgements. Quite the contrary. Every failure to grasp 
the relation between thoughts and objects by means of an attempt to 
understand the meaning of a judgement gives us new hope, because 
every such failure presents itself in a moment of irony: the failure 
uncovers the plausibility of the opposite account. What is more, being 
sensitive to irony prevents us from getting tired or sick of never being 
able to reach the final truth. For in irony there is not only the awareness 
of the failure of a specific account, but, besides that, there is the evo­
cation of our enthusiasm for the opposite account, and, moreover, there 
is the satisfaction of a consciousness of the ‘idea’ that both “die Welt 
noch unvollendet ist” and “wir nur ein Stück von uns selbst sind?\ i.e. 
there is a sense of the presence of the infinite in the finite. In other 
words, being sensitive to irony makes it possible for us to live with the 
Antinomy of Thought, because irony makes us (1) try for complete­
ness, and (2) aware of the fact that the satisfaction of understanding is a 
matter of understanding the problematic, aporetic nature of our arti­
culations of the relation between thoughts and objects.
I think this plea for irony arouses the need to rethink our notion of 
method. Irony is not something that can be realized following a 
procedure. It is not a goal that can be approached. Irony is an event. We 
can, perhaps, provoke it, but we will need a quite subtle attitude for
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such a provocation to be successful. For on the one hand we will have 
to try for completeness, but on the other hand we have to remain 
sensitive to the possibility of an occurrence of irony. Thus, in our 
enthusiastic attempt to grasp the whole meaning of a judgement by 
means of one account of it, we should resist the temptation to loose 
ourselves in some kind of dogmatism. This means that we should be 
able to play a honest dogmatic, succeeding as we fail, failing as long as 
we succeed. That is perhaps the only way to live with the Antinomy of 
Thought .
APPENDIX
Many notions used throughout this study have a technical meaning, 
partly because they belong to the jargon of Anglo-Saxon Kant- 
scholars, and partly because they refer to German notions used by 
Maimon in a special way. The following list might serve as a guide.
Antinomy of Thought
appearance
category
concept
consciousness
Principle of Determinability
determinable
determination
experience
empirical realism
the given
imagination
intuition
judgement
object determined by thought
object determined outside of thought
receptivity
representation
sensibility
shape
space
spontaneity
thing in itself
time
transcendental idealism 
understanding
Antinomie des Denkens 
Erscheinung
Kategorie, reines Verhältnisbegriff
Begriff
Bewußtsein
Satz der Bestimmbarkeit 
Bestimmbares 
Bestimmung 
Erfahrung
empirischer Realismus 
das Gegebene 
Einbildungskraft 
Anschauung 
Urteil
durch das Denken bestimmtes Objekt
außer das Denken bestimmtes Objekt
Rezeptivität
Vorstellung
Sinnlichkeit
Figur
Raum
Spontanität
Ding an sich
Zeit
transzendentaler Idealismus 
Verstand
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The Antinomy of Thought
Maimonian Skepticism and the Relation between Thoughts and Objects
In this book a case is made for an important voice we missed in the Kantian 
composition o f our recent philosophical past: the voice of skepticism. It is 
introduced by means of an analysis o f the work of an almost completely neg­
lected early critic of Kant, Salomon Maimon (1752-1800).
It is argued that the work of Maimon provides powerful arguments for the claim 
that the structure of our articulations of the relation between thoughts and objects 
has an intrinsically aporetic character, that, in other words, we are confronted 
with an Antinomy o f Thought. The point o f such skeptical arguments is that a 
theory is the wrong thing to look for as regards the relation between thoughts and 
objects -  an adequate account o f this relation will have to take the form of a 
problem.
In order to show the actual importance o f Maimonian skepticism it is argued that 
the failure of some contemporary American accounts o f thought (those of 
Rosenberg, Rorty and Nagel) can be explained in terms o f their ignorance o f The 
Antinomy o f Thought.
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